Humphrey v. Tunica Cnty. Health & Rehab LLC

• Decision Date: 05 October 2021
• Docket Number: No. 2020-CA-00355-COA,2020-CA-00355-COA
• Citation: 329 So.3d 563
• Parties: ESTATE OF Leroy HUMPHREY BY AND THROUGH Bobby HUMPHREY, Administrator, Appellant v. TUNICA COUNTY HEALTH & REHAB LLC, Appellee
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

329 So.3d 563

ESTATE OF Leroy HUMPHREY BY AND THROUGH Bobby HUMPHREY, Administrator, Appellant

v.TUNICA COUNTY HEALTH & REHAB LLC, Appellee

No. 2020-CA-00355-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

October 5, 2021

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: WALTER ALAN DAVIS, Oxford, REID KENDALL POSEY, STEVEN W. PITTMAN, Southaven

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: JOSEPH SPENCER YOUNG JR., Ridgeland

EN BANC.

CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. This case concerns a party's capacity to act as a health-care surrogate under the Mississippi Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act (the Health-Care Decisions Act), Mississippi Code Annotated sections 41-41-201 through -229 (Rev. 2018). Alta Humphrey, on behalf of his father Leroy Humphrey, signed a nursing home "Admission Agreement" that contained an arbitration provision. After Leroy died, Bobby Humphrey, as the administrator of Leroy's estate (the Estate), sued the nursing home, Tunica County Health & Rehab LLC (Tunica County Rehab), alleging negligence, gross negligence, and negligence/premises liability for injuries Leroy suffered when he was assaulted by another nursing-home resident. Tunica County Rehab moved to compel arbitration. The trial court granted Tunica County Rehab's motion.

¶2. The Estate appeals, asserting that the trial court committed reversible error when it determined that Dr. Richard Waller was Leroy's "primary physician" when he determined that Leroy lacked capacity, such that Alta was qualified to act as Leroy's health-care surrogate under section 41-41-211(1) of the Health-Care Decisions Act and to bind Leroy to the arbitration provision in Tunica County Rehab's admission agreement. For the reasons addressed below, we find that Tunica County Rehab has shown that Dr. Waller was Leroy's "primary physician" under the Health-Care Decisions Act when he determined Leroy's mental incapacitation and that Leroy's son Alta was therefore statutorily qualified to act as Leroy's surrogate and to bind him to arbitration. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order compelling arbitration in this matter.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3. Tunica County Rehab is a nursing-home facility located in Tunica County, Mississippi. Dr. Waller is both an owner of the facility and its medical director. On May 23, 2012, Alta Humphrey signed an admission agreement with Tunica County Rehab to admit his father Leroy Humphrey as a resident in that facility. Among other terms and conditions, the agreement contains an arbitration provision.

¶4. The first page of the agreement lists "Leroy Humphrey" as the "Resident" and assigns Leroy a resident number; Alta is identified as Leroy's "Son" and is identified as the "Responsible Party." There is no evidence in the record that Alta held power of attorney over his father or that any court had appointed Alta as guardian or conservator of his father. Below Alta's signature on the admission agreement is the statement: "Signature of the Responsible Party in His/Her Individual Capacity and on Behalf of the Resident in the Following Capacity ... Authorized Agent and/or Health Care Surrogate."

¶5. Section E of the admission agreement sets forth the arbitration provision. It provides, in part, as follows:

It is understood and agreed by the Facility and Resident and/or Responsible Party that any legal dispute, controversy, demand or claim (hereinafter collectively referred to as "claim" or "claims") that arises out of or relates to the Admission Agreement or any service or healthcare provided by the Facility to the Resident, shall be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act.

....

This agreement to arbitrate includes, but is not limited to, any claim for ... violations of any rights granted to the Resident by law or by the Admission Agreement, breach of contract, fraud or misrepresentation, negligence, gross negligence, malpractice or any other claim based on any departure from accepted standards of medical or healthcare or safety whether sounding in tort or in contract.

....

It is the intention of the parties to this arbitration agreement that it shall inure to the benefit of and bind the parties, their successors and assigns, including ... all persons whose claim is derived through or on behalf of the Resident, including that of any parent, spouse, child, guardian, conservator, executor, administrator, legal representative, wrongful death heir, or heir of the Resident.

The admission agreement also provides, in all capital letters, that

THE UNDERSIGNED ACKNOWLEDGE THAT EACH OF THEM HAS READ AND UNDERSTANDS THIS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE ARBITRATION PROVISION, AND HAS RECEIVED A COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT, AND THAT EACH OF THEM VOLUNTARILY CONSENTS TO AND ACCEPTS ALL OF ITS TERMS.

¶6. On the same day that Alta signed the admission agreement, May 23, 2012, Dr. Waller completed and signed a statement that reads in relevant part, "Leroy Humphrey is unable to sign Nursing Home admission papers due to dementia and confusion ... [d]oesn't understand what he is signing." "Physician" is printed under Dr. Waller's signature. The record also contains other records and admission forms dated May 23, 2012, describing Dr. Waller as Leroy's "physician" or "attending physician." A patient information "Face Sheet" with a March 10, 2016 print date identifies Dr. Waller as Leroy's "primary physician." Dr. Waller had not provided any care or treatment to Leroy before his May 23, 2012 admission date.

¶7. In February 2016, while Leroy was a Tunica County Rehab resident, Leroy was assaulted by his roommate, who beat him with the metal foot plate of a wheelchair. About two years later on April 25, 2018, Bobby Humphrey, as the administrator of Leroy's estate, sued Tunica County Rehab for negligence, gross negligence, and negligence/premises liability.

¶8. Tunica County Rehab moved to compel arbitration on May 29, 2018, in accordance with the arbitration provision in the admission agreement. The Estate opposed arbitration, asserting that Alta did not qualify as a health-care surrogate under the Health-Care Decisions Act and thus was not authorized to sign the admission agreement on Leroy's behalf and bind him to arbitration. Specifically, the Estate asserted that section 41-41-211(1) of the Health-Care Decisions Act requires a patient's "primary physician" to determine a potential resident's lack of mental competency for the statute to apply, and Dr. Waller was not Leroy's "primary physician" as that term is defined under section 41-41-203(o).

¶9. The trial court conducted a hearing on the matter and thereafter issued its order compelling arbitration, finding as follows:

Mississippi law does not require a party to prove the designation of primary through medical records. The designation alone is enough. Here, there is no need for the Court to undertake such extensive review of Dr. Waller's treatment of Leroy Humphrey. [Dr.] Waller is designated as primary in the record.

Accordingly, the requirements of [ section] 41-41-211 are satisfied; therefore, this Court finds Alta Humphrey to be a health-care surrogate of his father Leroy Humphrey. As such, Alta Humphrey possesses the requisite authority to execute ... the Admission Agreement which contains a binding arbitration provision.

The Court, having considered the pleadings and arguments of counsel, finds that [Tunica County Rehab's] Motion to Compel Arbitration is well taken and should be granted.

¶10. The Estate appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11. "In reviewing an appeal of an order compelling arbitration, we review the trial judge's factual findings under an abuse-of-discretion standard, and we conduct a de novo review of all legal conclusions." Virgil v. Sw. Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n , 296 So. 3d 53, 59 (¶11) (Miss. 2020) (quoting Smith v. Express Check Advance of Miss. LLC , 153 So. 3d 601, 605-06 (¶8) (Miss. 2014) ). The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 through 16, applies "to nursing-home admissions agreements that contain an arbitration clause." Adams Cmty. Care Ctr. LLC v. Reed , 37 So. 3d 1155, 1158 (¶6) (Miss. 2010).

DISCUSSION

Whether Alta was authorized to bind Leroy to arbitration as his health-care surrogate pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-41-211(1).

¶12. The Estate asserts that the trial court's order compelling arbitration should be reversed because Alta did not qualify as Leroy's health-care surrogate under section 41-41-211(1) of the Health-Care Decisions Act when he signed the Tunica County Rehab admission agreement. Specifically, the Estate contends that when Dr. Waller determined that Leroy lacked capacity to sign the admission agreement, Dr. Waller was not Leroy's "primary physician," as required under section 41-41-211(1) in order for Alta to act as Leroy's healthcare surrogate. See also § 41-41-203(o) (defining "primary physician"). Because he was not a statutorily qualified health-care surrogate, the Estate asserts, Alta was without authority to bind Leroy to arbitration under the admission agreement. We disagree for the reasons discussed below.

¶13. When determining whether a party is bound to arbitration, courts generally "conduct a two-pronged inquiry. The first prong has two considerations: (1) whether there is a valid arbitration agreement and (2) whether the parties' dispute is within the scope of the arbitration agreement." E. Ford Inc. v. Taylor , 826 So. 2d 709, 713 (¶9) (Miss. 2002).¹ At issue in this case is the first consideration (the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate), which requires that we determine whether Alta had authority to execute the admission agreement as Leroy's health-care surrogate.²

¶14. The law of contracts applies in determining whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. Tarvin v. CLC of Jackson LLC , 193 So. 3d 633, 637 (¶11) (Miss. 2016). The six elements of a valid contract are: "(1) two or more contracting parties, (2) consideration, (3) an agreement that is sufficiently definite, (4) parties with legal capacity to make a contract , (5) mutual...