Humphries v. Milwaukee Cnty.

• Decision Date: 26 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–3758.,11–3758.
• Citation: 702 F.3d 1003
• Parties: Shontay HUMPHRIES, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. MILWAUKEE COUNTY, Milwaukee County Department of Health and Human Services, Juan Muniz, Pang Xiong, and Felice Riley, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

702 F.3d 1003

Shontay HUMPHRIES, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.MILWAUKEE COUNTY, Milwaukee County Department of Health and Human Services, Juan Muniz, Pang Xiong, and Felice Riley, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 11–3758.

United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 20, 2012.

Decided Dec. 26, 2012.

Jeffery Ross Myer (argued), Attorney, Legal Action of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Krista K. Buchholz, Douglas Knott (argued), Attorneys, Leib & Katt, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before MANION, ROVNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.

Shontay Humphries submitted an application to Milwaukee County, Wisconsin to renew her child care provider certificate. Juan Muniz reviewed her application, sent a standard inquiry to a state agency as part of the background check, and learned that Humphries had a substantiated finding of child abuse from 1988. As a result, after conferring with his supervisor, Muniz denied Humphries's application. Although Humphries maintains that the denial of her application violated her right to due process, we agree with Muniz and his supervisor that qualified immunity protects them from any liability for this decision. They had no involvement whatsoever in the investigation or determination of the 1988 finding of substantiated abuse, and no case law clearly establishes that they violated Humphries's constitutional rights when they relied on that finding to deny her child care provider renewal application. Therefore, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Muniz and his supervisor on the basis of qualified immunity.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 12, 1988, an assistant principal contacted Wisconsin's Child Protective Services after a six-year-old student came to school with a welt on her face. A CPS social worker met with the girl and observed a five- or six-inch mark. The girl told the social worker that her aunt hit her with a shoe or slipper because she was writing on the furniture. The social worker visited the aunt, Shontay Humphries, who was also the child's guardian, and interviewed her as well. The social worker concluded and reported to the state that the incident was one of “substantiated” abuse by Humphries, and the substantiated abuse finding was entered into the state's child offender database. Humphries maintains she was not aware at the time that the finding had been entered.

In Wisconsin, one must have a license in order to be paid to care for four or more children under the age of seven who are not related to the child care provider. Wis. Stat. § 48.65(1). A license holder must submit an application for review every two years. Wis. Stat. § 48.65(1), 48.66(5). On June 27, 2008, Humphries submitted her application for renewal of her child care certification to the Milwaukee County Department of Health and Human Services, as she had been certified in the past. Juan Muniz, a child care specialist in the background check unit, processed Humphries's application. Pursuant to state law, Muniz initiated a background check on Humphries, which includes a check of whether there are any substantiated findings of abuse or neglect against an applicant. SeeWis. Stat. § 48.685. Milwaukee County, where Muniz worked, did not have access to the state's abuse and neglect findings, so Muniz faxed a request to the Bureau of Milwaukee Child Welfare (“BMCW”), which, despite its name, is a state agency and not an agency of Milwaukee County. A few weeks later, Muniz received a response from the BMCW with a case number for Humphries, so Muniz went to the BMCW office to review and copy the file. The file included a copy of the December 1988 Child Abuse & Neglect Investigation Report that detailed the investigation after the assistant principal's call and concluded that the reported incident was one of “substantiated” abuse.

Pursuant to Wisconsin statute, a county department may not license or renew the license of a child care provider if a determination has been made under § 48.981(3)(c)4 ¹ that the person has abused or neglected a child. Wis. Stat. § 48.685(4m)(a)4. Knowing that, Muniz concluded that Humphries's application had to be denied. He was concerned because the Department had previously certified Humphries in 2004 and 2006, so he consulted with Pang Xiong, his supervisor. Xiong approved the denial of Humphries's application. Apparently, the BMCW had failed to produce the 1988 substantiated abuse finding during the 2004 and 2006 background checks.

With Xiong's approval, Muniz sent Humphries a letter on October 23, 2008 informing her that her child care certification application had been denied. The letter cited the 1988 substantiated finding of abuse and the Wisconsin statute prohibiting a county department from certifying a provider knowing that a determination had been made that the person had abused or neglected a child. The letter also informed Humphries of her right to appeal the denial, which she did. The hearing was postponed several times at Humphries's request, and it was eventually held on February 5, 2009.

In a decision on February 23, 2009, the hearing examiner reversed the certification denial on the basis that the uncertified report of the substantiated finding of abuse that Muniz presented at the hearing lacked foundation and was inadmissible hearsay. The hearing examiner ordered that Humphries be reinstated to the application process. On April 1, 2009, Xiong sent a letter to the BMCW asking it to allow Humphries to appeal the substantiated finding of abuse determination. Humphries received a copy of this letter as well.

Humphries filed this suit on December 31, 2009, invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleging that her procedural due process rights were violated when the defendants denied her application for a child care certificate based on the 1988 substantiated finding of child abuse without first affording her an opportunity to contest that finding of abuse. The State of Wisconsin took control of the child care program from Milwaukee County the day after Humphries filed her lawsuit, including the responsibility for processing child care certification renewal applications. About six months later, the BMCW state agency overturned the 1988 substantiated abuse finding. Muniz then forwarded Humphries's application onto the next steps in the child care certification process, and Humphries received her child care certification from the state.

In the lawsuit, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted their motion after concluding that they were entitled to qualified immunity. Humphries appeals that decision with respect to Muniz and Xiong. She does not appeal the dismissal of her claims against other defendants or for injunctive and declaratory relief.

II. ANALYSIS

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity de novo. Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 622 (7th Cir.2012). The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages when their conduct “ ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). The Supreme Court held in Pearson that a court may grant qualified immunity on the ground that a purported right was not “clearly established” by prior case law without first resolving whether the purported right exists. Id. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808;see also Reichle v. Howards, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2093, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) (noting that this approach comports with the Court's reluctance to decide constitutional questions unnecessarily).

As the plaintiff, Humphries has the burden of defeating the qualified immunity defense that the defendants raised, so she must show that the due process right she asserts was clearly established by prior case law. See Purvis v. Oest, 614 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir.2010). To be clearly established, at the time of the challenged conduct, the right's contours must be “ ‘sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’ ” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, –––U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2083, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). While a case directly on point is not required, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. This standard “protects the balance between vindication of constitutional rights and government officials' effective performance of their duties by ensuring that officials can ‘reasonably ... anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.’ ” Reichle, 132 S.Ct. at 2093 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034).

The “clearly established” requirement is not satisfied here. As Humphries emphasizes, there is case law establishing circumstances when a person is entitled to hearing rights before a finding of substantiated child abuse may be entered, and there is no suggestion that a hearing took place before the substantiated finding of child abuse against Humphries was entered in the Wisconsin database. See Doyle v. Camelot Day Care Ctrs., Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 617 (7th Cir.2002); Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d 493, 503 (7th Cir.2005); Boyd v. Owen, 481 F.3d 520, 525 (7th Cir.2007). Humphries argues in her brief that Doyle, Dupuy, and Boyd clearly established that it violates due process for an initial investigation of abuse or neglect allegations not to take into account exculpatory evidence, for an agency to attach what she calls an “abuser label” without some pre-deprivation notice and review process, and for an agency to fail to give notice and an opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing very soon after...