Humphries v. State

Decision Date26 August 2002
Docket NumberNo. 25519.,25519.
Citation570 S.E.2d 160,351 S.C. 362
PartiesShawn Paul HUMPHRIES, Petitioner, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Deputy Chief Attorney Joseph L. Savitz, III, of South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for petitioner.

Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, all of Columbia, for respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL:

Shawn Paul Humphries ("Petitioner") appeals from the denial of his application for post-conviction relief ("PCR").

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was tried for the murder of Dickie Smith ("Smith"), the owner of a Max-Saver convenience store. Petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted armed robbery, and criminal conspiracy. He was sentenced to death for murder and to concurrent sentences of twenty years for attempted armed robbery and five years for criminal conspiracy. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Humphries, 325 S.C. 28, 479 S.E.2d 52 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1268, 117 S.Ct. 2441, 138 L.Ed.2d 201 (1997).

The evidence at trial, including the video from the store's surveillance camera, established that Petitioner and an accomplice entered the convenience store with the intention of robbing the store. Smith, who was working in the store, asked Petitioner whether he wanted anything. Petitioner flashed the gun he had stolen the night before and replied he wanted money. There was some evidence to suggest Smith then reached under the counter to get a gun. When Smith reached under the counter, Petitioner fired a shot in Smith's direction and fled from the store.1 The bullet fired by Petitioner struck Smith in the head, killing him. Petitioner was apprehended and immediately confessed his crime.2 The jury convicted Petitioner of murder, and after hearing all the evidence in the sentencing phase, recommended a death sentence. The statutory aggravating factor relied on by the State, and found by the jury, was that the murder was carried out while in the commission of an armed robbery.3

During the sentencing phase, the State introduced testimony from the victim's family (his brother and his wife) about Smith's childhood, work ethic, generosity, and close relationship with his young daughter. Smith's brother testified he and his brother grew up in a poor family and that they did not have hot water. When Smith was nine years old, his father died. After his father's death, Smith and other family members began working to support the family. Smith's brother testified when Smith was in the ninth grade, he took a job as a meat cutter at Bi-Lo after school, working until 10:00 or 11:00 at night. In the tenth grade, Smith acquired a full-time job working second shift in a textile mill while continuing to attend school. Smith's brother testified further that everyone in the community liked Smith and that he was a good person.

Smith's wife also testified during the sentencing phase. She described Smith as ambitious, hardworking, and generous. For instance, after receiving one technical degree and becoming a supervisor, Smith went back to school to get his residential home builder's license and began building houses in 1986. According to Smith's wife, she and Smith had a daughter, Ashley, in 1988. Smith's wife described Smith and Ashley's relationship as very close, and testified Ashley was having a hard time since her father was killed and was receiving counseling.

Petitioner presented evidence in mitigation during the sentencing phase through the testimony of thirteen witnesses. Apparently, Petitioner's strategy was to mitigate the circumstances of his offense by making the jury aware of the brutal circumstances in which he was raised.

Petitioner's paternal grandfather testified Petitioner and Petitioner's brother lived with him and Petitioner's grandmother from the time Petitioner was three years old until Petitioner was twelve years old. Petitioner's grandfather testified that he and his wife were heavy drinkers, and that his wife grew marijuana in their back yard. Petitioner's grandfather described his son, Petitioner's father, as unpredictably violent, noting he had been to prison several times. Petitioner's grandfather testified that his son, Petitioner's father, had cut him on the arm with a knife and had kicked Petitioner's grandmother in the face, knocking her false teeth out.

Next, Petitioner's aunt testified Petitioner's father had said on numerous occasions that he never loved his children and that the children should have been aborted.

Petitioner's mother testified that, after she left Petitioner's father, she became pregnant with Petitioner as a result of his father raping her at knife point. She stated she eventually left the children with their paternal grandparents and married several more men. She reunited with the children only after she married someone who would allow the children to live with her.

Petitioner's mother also discussed Petitioner's criminal record. According to his own mother's testimony, Petitioner was arrested in 1984 for two counts of breaking and entering, and was placed on probation. Thereafter, he was given more probation after he was suspended from school for fighting several times. After Petitioner's second probation revocation when he was fifteen years old, he was sent to Reception & Evaluation in Columbia for thirty days and was placed on probation again. Petitioner was arrested in January 1989 for breaking into a church, apparently looking for food because he had been living on the street for a week. Petitioner pled guilty to that charge and was placed on probation. In 1990, Petitioner was charged with stealing an automobile after he was released from substance abuse treatment in Texas.4 As a result of that charge, Petitioner was sentenced to two years imprisonment with four years of probation.

Petitioner's step-mother testified that Petitioner's father used a combination of alcohol, drugs, and paint fumes every day, and had shared those substances with Petitioner from 1983 to 1992. Petitioner's brother testified regarding the circumstances in which he and Petitioner grew up, including: their father's violence toward his own parents, the lack of hot water and sometimes running water, the lack of food, and the trips taken to the dumpsters to find school clothes.

Mary Shults, an expert witness with a degree in sociology and a master's degree in social work, testified regarding Petitioner's social history. She related that Petitioner had been reminded throughout his life that he was a product of rape. Shults stated that Petitioner's father was incredibly violent, would kick people in the face, cut people, and would refer to himself as Satan. In addition, Shults testified that Petitioner's father introduced Petitioner to drugs and alcohol sometime between the ages of six and ten.

At the close of the sentencing phase evidence, Petitioner's counsel moved to prohibit the solicitor from making any reference to victim impact in his closing argument. The trial judge denied that motion.5

In his sentencing phase closing remarks, the solicitor argued, in part:6

It's easy in this stage of the game—in this stage of the trial to start looking at [Petitioner] as a victim in this case. And the Defense wants to paint a picture sort of a window for you to look through. Let's remember the good [Petitioner], and lets forget what he did and let's forget all the back record and all that stuff. Let's just look at what he did.
And they presented a bajillion [sic] pictures of [Petitioner] as a little boy to you. Folks, the State of South Carolina is not attempting to send to death row that little boy in that picture. Every defendant in this country who has gone to death row has had pictures like that. Everyone that comes after this will have pictures like that.
We're not talking about a three year old boy or a six year old boy or a twelve year old boy. We're talking about a 22 year old man who went to a store and executed [Smith]. That's what we're talking about. But it's easy at this stage when you go through day after day of testimony about [Petitioner] to start looking at him as some sort of victim.
I would submit to you that the last thing you need to look at in this case is [Smith] and his uniqueness as an individual. When I talk about [Smith], I'm not trying to get tears of sympathy for him. A jury's duty is to look objectively at the case. So look at the cold hard facts.
. . .
[Smith] was born in 1950, fourth son, fifth child of a fellow named Alton Smith and a sweet lady named Lottie Mae Darnell Smith. They grew up poor. They didn't have hot water. They had a spigot coming in and a tub next to the stove, and they had a few acres of cotton.
[Smith] is as much about this case as [Petitioner]. When [Smith's father] died when [Smith] was nine, he pulled himself up by his boot straps and he started contributing to the family. He got all kinds of odd jobs picking cotton at a penny a pound, hunting rabbits, skinning them, dressing them out, selling them for 50 cents.
When he's 14 years old, he gets a job in Greenville at the Bi-Lo in the Meat Department working after school. He's gone to school all day. From after school till about 10:00 or 10:30 at night working at Bi-Lo, saving his money, buying a car for the family.
When he's in tenth grade, he goes down to Boenett's and he gets a full-time job, second shift. He's going to school all day, and he's working until midnight, contributing. Lottie Mae Darnell Smith with eight kids, got them all out of high school, all at least a tech degree, some of them through college.
When [Smith] finished high school, he went to work for Union Carbide, then Kemet, but he didn't stop there. He kept improving himself. He went to Tech, h
...

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