Hundhausen v. U. S. Marine Fire Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 30 April 1871 |
| Citation | 52 Tenn. 702 |
| Parties | Emily Hundhausen v. U. S. Marine Fire Insurance Co. and G. W. Cook. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
MOTION TO DISMISS.
WILSON & BEARD for Complainant.
T. W. BROWN and JNO. G. FINNIE for Defendants.
This is a motion to discharge a supersedeas issued in pursuance of fiat of one of the Judges of this Court, superseding the execution of an order of commitment against G. W. Cook, one of the defendants in the case, for alleged contempt of process and orders of Chancery Court at Memphis.
The only question properly before us on this preliminary motion is the jurisdiction of this Court to grant writ of error and supersedeas in such cases. The merits of the cause of commitment need not be discussed at present.
By sec. 3155 of Code, it is provided that “either party to a decree of Chancery Court may have a re-examination of the whole matter of law and fact appearing in the record, by appeal to the Supreme Court.
By sec. 3172, an appeal in the nature of a writ of error lies, at instance of either party, from decrees of Court of Chancery, subject to the same regulations as an appeal from similar decrees. By sec. 3176, a writ of error lies from Chancery Court, where the decree is final, to the Supreme Court in all cases where an appeal in the nature of a writ of error would have lain.
By sec. 3178, the writ of error does not operate as supersedeas, unless one of the Judges of this Court, upon inspection of the record, shall be of the opinion that there is error, and shall order a supersedeas to issue.
By Constitution of State, art. 6, s. 2, it is provided that the “jurisdiction of this Court shall be appellate only, under such restrictions and regulations as may, from time to time, be prescribed by law;” and, by sec. 1 of said article this Court is provided for as the Supreme Court, and other Courts that the Legislature may, from time to time, ordain and establish, are denominated inferior Courts.
We think the fair and legitimate meaning of these last provisions is, that this Court is the supreme tribunal of the State, and other Courts inferior in the sense of being subject in their action to the jurisdictional control of this Court, as the appellate tribunal, over all such judgments and decrees as they may render affecting the life, liberty, property, or rights of the citizens of the State.
The particular mode in which this jurisdiction may be exercised, whether by appeal in the nature of a writ of error, or by writ of error and supersedeas, is a matter of regulation by the Legislature; and such restrictions and regulations may be enacted by the Legislature as may be deemed proper, so as not to defeat the ultimate control of this Court, as the Supreme Court of the State, over the inferior Courts ordained by the Legislature.
Perhaps there may be exceptions to the generality of the rule above stated, as in case of writ of habeas corpus, and it may be in some other cases--but if so, they are but exceptions growing out of the particular nature of the case, and do not in any way affect the soundness of the rule itself.
With this view of the jurisdiction of this Court, we hold that the action of the Chancellor in a case of contempt, such as is before us in this record, is subject to be reviewed, and that the writs of error and supersedeas were applicable and appropriate as the remedy of the party, and the motion to discharge the supersedeas will not be allowed.
As to the merits of the case arising out of the facts, we express no opinion at present, but leave that question to be investigated when the case is regularly reached, and shall be properly before us on hearing of the case.
We deem it proper to say, however, that we have looked through this entire record, and we see no evidence whatever, that his Honor the Chancellor, who made the order of commitment, has acted from any motive, except that of a conscientious discharge of his duty. We think the record abundantly vindicates him from the suspicion of any motive except that of performance of what he deemed an act necessary to proper enforcement of the orders of his Court.
The question has been argued before us in this case, as to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Parker v. Turner
...Leonard, 207 Tenn. 609, 341 S.W.2d 740 (1960); State ex rel. Wright v. Upchurch, 194 Tenn. 657, 254 S.W.2d 748 (1953); Hundlhausen v. U. S. Marine, 52 Tenn. 702 (1891).In addition to a right of direct appeal, Tennessee offers a litigant relief via what it terms a writ of certiorari. The wri......
-
Laramie National Bank v. Steinhoff
...Myers v. State, 46 O. St., 473; cases supra; Blodgett v. State (Neb.), 69 N.W. 751; State v. Stevenson (Ia.), 73 N.W. 360; Hundhausen v. Ins. Co., 5 Heisk., 702; Tyler v. Hammersley, 44 Conn. 393; Baldwin v. Miles, 58 Conn. 496; State v. Horner, 16 Mo. App., 191; Romeyn v. Caplis, 17 Mich. ......
-
S.A.M.D. v. J.P.D.
...Thompson v. State, 241 S.W.2d 404 (Tenn. 1951); Metcalf v. Eastman, 228 S. W.2d 490 (Tenn. 1950); see also Hundhausen v. U.S. Marine Fire Ins. Co., 52 Tenn. 702 (Tenn. 1871) (wherein the court held that "if the punishment seems to be excessive this Court on appeal has jurisdiction to revise......
-
Corlew v. State
... ... exercised is a matter of regulation by the Legislature ... Hundhausen v. United States Marine Fire Insurance Co., ... 52 Tenn. 702, 704; ... ...