Hundley v. Farris
Decision Date | 02 February 1891 |
Citation | 15 S.W. 312,103 Mo. 78 |
Parties | Hundley, Appellant, v. Farris, Administrator |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Buchanan Circuit Court. -- Hon. J. P. Grubb, Judge.
Affirmed.
James W. Boyd and A. D. Kirk for appellant.
(1) The appellant is entitled to an unconditional judgment against the estate of Madison S. Farris. R. S. 1879, secs. 184, 185 and 212; McLean v. McAllister, 30 Mo.App. 107. (2) Because appellant is not only a partnership creditor of the firm of M. S. Farris & Co. but is also an individual and separate creditor of Madison S. Farris, and is entitled to share pari passu with the other individual creditors of the estate. R. S. 1879, secs. 658, 3467; McLean v McAllister, 30 Mo.App. 107; Shackelford's Adm'r v. Clark, 78 Mo. 491. (3) Under the statutes of this state (secs. 658, 3467) each member of a firm is liable individually and separately to a creditor of the firm. Therefore, every creditor of a firm is an individual and separate creditor of each member of the firm. 30 Mo.App. 107; Gates v. Watson, 54 Mo. 585; Bank v Cottey, 70 Mo. 150; Bryant v. Hawkins, 47 Mo 410; R. S., secs. 658-9. And if he is an individual creditor of the estate he is entitled, even at common law, to come in equally with the other individual creditors, although he may also be a firm creditor.
B. R. Vineyard for respondent.
The estate of a partnership must be settled, in case of dissolution by death, entirely on equitable principles, and they would require that the claims of the several creditors and those of the joint creditors should be kept entirely distinct, each having its separate fund, and passing over to the other only in case of a surplus. Upon such dissolution, the assets are placed in the custody of the law for distribution. Parsons on Partnership [2 Ed.] side p. 447-8; 2 Bates on Partnership [Ed. 1888] secs. 825, 828; 2 Lindley on Partnership [Ewell's Ed.] pp. 1054-5; Story on Partnership [4 Ed.] sec. 363; Collyer on Partnership [Perkins' Ed.] sec. 920; 3 Kent's Commentaries [12 Ed.] side p. 65; Level v. Farris, 24 Mo.App. 445; Bank v. Bank, 94 Ill. 278; Rainey v. Nance, 54 Ill. 35; Black's Appeal, 44 Pa. St. (8 Wright) 503; Wilder v. Keeler, 3 Paige Ch. 171-4; Murrill v. Neill, 8 How. 426; Bond v. Nave, 62 Ind. 505; Weyer v. Thornburgh, 15 Ind. 124; Gray v. Chiswell, 9 Vesey, 118; Jarvis v. Brooks, 23 N.H. 136; Crockett v. Crain, 33 N.H. 542; Holton v. Holton, 40 N.H. 77; Moody v. Downs, 63 N.H. 50; Bagwell v. Bagwell, 72 Ga. 92; Irby v. Graham, 46 Miss. 425; McCulloh v. Dashiell, 1 Harr. and Gill (Md.) 96; 3 Redfield on Wills [2 Ed.] p. 257, sec. 9; Phelps v. McNeeley, 66 Mo. 558; Cowan v. Gill, 11 Lea (Tenn.) 674; Davis v. Howell, 33 N.J.Eq. 72; Toombs v. Hill, 28 Ga. 371; Smith v. Mallory, 24 Ala. 628; Rogers v. Meranda, 7 Ohio St. 179. (2) Independent of statute, equity has always construed all partnership contracts to be joint and several. 3 Kent's Commentaries [12 Ed.] side p. 64; Wilder v. Keeler, 3 Paige, 167; Irby v. Graham, 46 Miss. 428; McCulloh v. Dashiell, 1 H. & G. (Md.) 96; Story on Partnership, sec. 362; Level v. Farris, 24 Mo.App. 459-60-1. Yet in the distribution of the estate of a deceased partner equity has always held that the individual creditors of that estate had a prior claim upon its assets, and must be paid in full before the partnership creditors could share therein. See authorities cited in division 1 of this brief. (3) The statute of this state (sec. 658) requiring all joint contracts to be construed as joint and several, and making provision (sec. 3467) for a suit against anyone liable, or his administrator, without the necessity of uniting with him as defendants the other joint contractors, was intended only to affect the mode of procedure, "and does not affect the law of contracts as it existed prior to its enactment." Clark v. Cable, 21 Mo. 225; Ryan v. Riddle, 78 Mo. 522; Level v. Farris, 24 Mo.App. 460. (4) "Statutes making partnership debts joint and several were not intended to affect the distribution of funds, and do not give the joint creditors a right to participate pari passu with the separate creditors after exhausting the joint estate." 2 Bates on Partnership, 1888, sec. 828; Level v. Farris, 24 Mo.App. 445; Irby v. Graham, 46 Miss. 425; Smith v. Mallory, 24 Ala. 628. (5) The statutes of this state, providing for the classification of demands against the estate of deceased persons (sec. 184) and for the payment thereof (sec. 212) were not intended to disturb the prior rights of creditors already existing. "The equality required by them is subordinate to the settled equities and priorities of different grades and classes of creditors." Rogers v. Meranda, 7 Ohio St. 192, at top; Irby v. Graham, 46 Miss. 431-2; Level v. Farris, 24 Mo.App. 461-2; Smith v. Mallory, 24 Ala. 628; Black's Appeal, 44 Pa. St. 508, approving the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Gibson in Bell v. Newman, 5 S. & R. 91, and disapproving the conclusions of the rest of the court in that case.
This cause originated in the probate court of Buchanan county, from whose judgment plaintiff appealed to the circuit court where the cause was tried on the following agreed statement of facts:
This was all the evidence introduced or offered in the case on either side. The note mentioned in the agreed statements of facts was not read in evidence, nor is a copy of it preserved in the bill of exceptions. There were no instructions or declarations of law asked or given. The court, on the agreed statement of facts, allowed plaintiff's claim against the individual estate of Madison S. Farris, deceased, but, finding it to be a partnership debt of M. S. Farris & Co., allowed it subject to the payment in full first of the individual debts theretofore allowed and proved in the probate court against the individual estate of said deceased, and rendered its judgment accordingly. The case was tried at the January term, 1886, of the circuit court, and at that term motions for a new trial and in arrest were filed by the plaintiff, overruled by the court, and the case appealed to this court.
Touching the principle involved in this litigation, Chancellor Kent remarks:
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