Hunt v. AAA Nev. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 25 February 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:18-cv-00062-LRH-WGC
• Citation: 369 F.Supp.3d 1113
• Parties: John David HUNT, Plaintiff, v. AAA NEVADA INSURANCE COMPANY, d/b/a CSAA General Insurance Company, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada

369 F.Supp.3d 1113

John David HUNT, Plaintiff,

v.AAA NEVADA INSURANCE COMPANY, d/b/a CSAA General Insurance Company, Defendant.

Case No. 3:18-cv-00062-LRH-WGC

United States District Court, D. Nevada.

Signed February 25, 2019

Charles R. Kozak, Kozak & Associates, LLC, Reno, NV, for Plaintiff.

Riley A. Clayton, Troy Allan Clark, Hall Jaffe & Clayton, LLP, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant.

ORDER

LARRY R. HICKS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff John David Hunt has filed a motion for summary judgment on his claims against defendant AAA Nevada Insurance Company ("CSAA"). (ECF No. 15). CSAA responded with its own motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 16). For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Hunt's motion for summary judgment and grants CSAA's motion for summary judgment.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

Prior to filing their cross motions for summary judgment, the parties stipulated to the material facts in this UIM insurance coverage case. (ECF No. 14). On March 3, 2013, Hunt was driving his vehicle on Veterans Parkway in Reno, Nevada, when he encountered non-party Thomas Harper driving well-below the speed limit in the left lane on a two-lane road. (ECF No. 14 at 2). Hunt began to pass Harper's vehicle in the right lane, but before he could complete his pass, Harper "aggressively swerved to the right," which was an "apparent attempt to run Hunt off the road." (Id. ) Hunt managed to avoid Harper's vehicle and continued on until he reached an intersection with a stop sign. (Id. ) Harper had followed Hunt to the intersection, and upon arriving, both men pulled over, exited their vehicles, and approached one another on the side of the road. (Id. ) Harper, "angered and upset," caught Hunt by surprise with a punch to the face. (Id. at 3). Hunt grabbed Harper as he fell to the ground, but as he did so, he fractured his ankle. (Id. ) Harper initially fled the scene after striking Hunt, but he returned after realizing that he had forgotten his wireless key fob. (Id. ) At the time of the fight, Harper and Hunt were standing near Hunt's vehicle. (Id. at 2). Hunt was transported to the hospital and treated there for his injuries, which included an "open reduction internal fixation of his ankle fracture." (Id. at 3). Hunt ultimately contracted an infection in his ankle (MRSA), which required several more surgeries and procedures to successfully treat. (Id. ) At the time of his fight with Harper, Hunt had an auto insurance policy through CSAA. (Id. at 1–2).

Initially, Hunt filed a lawsuit against Harper in this Court (3:17-cv-00165-RCJ-WGC), seeking to recover damages for the injuries he sustained in the fistfight. Harper's insurance carrier, Allstate, also filed an action in this Court (3:16-cv-00579-MMD-WGC) seeking declaratory relief from having to defend or indemnify Harper. Both of those cases were resolved via a stipulated dismissal in March 2018. To date, Hunt has incurred at least $ 676,000 in medical expenses arising out of his injuries and subsequent infection. (ECF No. 14 at 3). He filed a claim with CSAA, requesting the $ 250,000 "each person" UIM limit under his insurance policy, but following an investigation, CSAA denied his claim because the injuries he sustained did not fall under the purview of his auto insurance policy. (Id. at 3–4). Specifically, Hunt's policy stated that he would be entitled to receive compensation from CSAA if he suffered a bodily injury: (1) "caused by an accident" and (2) "arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use" of an underinsured motor vehicle. (ECF No. 14 at 4). CSAA denied coverage because it claimed that Hunt's injuries did not arise out of the use of an automobile. (ECF Nos. 14-5, 14-6, 14-7). Following the denial of coverage, Hunt filed this lawsuit against CSAA in February 2018, alleging four causes of action in his amended complaint: (1) breach of contract; (2) bad faith; (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) tortious interference of a contract. (ECF No. 5). Before the close of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on August 7, 2018. (ECF Nos. 15, 16).

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the evidence, together with all inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom, must be read in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Cnty of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp. , 236 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001). The moving party bears the burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion, along with evidence showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). On those issues for which it bears the burden of proof, the moving party must make a showing that is "sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party." Calderone v. United States , 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986).

To successfully rebut a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must point to facts supported by the record which demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J , 208 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2000). A "material fact" is a fact "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, summary judgment is not appropriate. See v. Durang , 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983). A dispute regarding a material fact is considered genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient to establish a genuine dispute; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. See id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Where, as here, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the same claims, the court must consider each party's motion separately and on its own merits, "giving the non-moving party in each instance the benefit of all reasonable inferences." A.C.L.U. of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas , 466 F.3d 784, 790-91 (9th Cir. 2006). Further, in evaluating the motions, "the court must consider each party's evidence, regardless under which motion the evidence is offered." Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme , 632 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2011). See also Fair Hous. Council of Riverside County, Inc. v. Riverside Two , 249 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he court must consider the appropriate evidentiary material identified and submitted in support of both motions, and opposition to both motions, before ruling on each of them.").

III. Discussion

Because the parties have stipulated to a set of facts, there is no question of material fact in this case, making it apt for summary judgment. The success of both parties' motions turns on the definition of two phrases contained within Hunt's insurance policy – "caused by accident" and "arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use" of a motor vehicle. If Hunt's incident with Harper was an "accident" and arose out of the "use" of his motor vehicle, then CSAA is obligated to compensate Hunt based on the terms of his insurance policy and because it did not, it will have breached the insurance contract. If Hunt's incident does not fall under the purview of both provisions, then CSAA has abided by the terms of the contract and is not obligated to compensate Hunt. Furthermore, the parties have stipulated that if CSAA prevails on its motion for summary judgment, it dispenses with all of Hunt's claims, not just the breach of contract claim that he seeks summary judgment on. (ECF No. 14 at 4). On the other hand, if Hunt prevails on his motion for partial summary judgment for his breach of contract claim, then he will be allowed to further pursue his second, third, and fourth claims against CSAA. (Id. ) This narrows the Court's analysis to that of insurance contract interpretation, which presents only a question of law. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Cramer , 857 P.2d 751, 753 (Nev. 1993).

The starting point for the interpretation of any contract, including insurance policies, is with its plain language. McDaniel v. Sierra Health and Life Ins. Co., Inc. , 118 Nev. 596, 53 P.3d 904, 906 (2002). Under Nevada law, insurance policies "should be interpreted broadly, affording the greatest possible coverage to the insured." Farmers Ins. Group v. Stonik By and Through Stonik , 110 Nev. 64, 867 P.2d 389, 391 (1994) (citing Harvey's Wagon Wheel v. MacSween , 606 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Nev. 1980) ). Any ambiguity in an insurance contract must be interpreted "against the drafting party and in favor of the insured." Id. (citing Neumann v. Standard Fire Ins. , 101 Nev. 206, 699 P.2d 101, 104 (1985) ). Despite the presumption of ambiguity in favor of the insured, when a contract contains clear and unambiguous provisions, those provisions will be construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Dickenson v. Nevada , 110 Nev. 934, 877 P.2d 1059, 1061 (1994) ; Siggelkow v. The Phoenix Ins. , Co., 109 Nev. 42, 846 P.2d 303, 304 (1993). With these principles in mind, the Court turns to whether the injuries Hunt suffered were the result of an "accident" as that term is defined in his insurance policy.

A. "Accident"

Hunt's CSAA insurance policy defines an "accident" as a ...