Hunt v. Armour & Co.

• Citation: 136 S.W.2d 312,345 Mo. 677
• Decision Date: 23 January 1940
• Docket Number: 36000
• Parties: Harry H. Hunt v. Armour & Company, a Corporation, Appellant
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

136 S.W.2d 312

345 Mo. 677

Harry H. Hunt v. Armour & Company, a Corporation, Appellant

No. 36000

Supreme Court of Missouri

January 23, 1940

Appeal from Buchanan Circuit Court; Hon. Sam Wilcox, Judge.

Reversed.

Brown Douglas & Brown for appellant.

(1) The demurrer filed by plaintiff at the close of all the evidence in the case should have been sustained upon the three grounds that: (a) The statute upon which the action was based was unconstitutional; (b) The statute was not applicable to the operations carried on by this defendant; and (c) There was no evidence that a breach of the provisions of that statute caused any injury or damage to plaintiff. The provisions of the statute are so vague and indefinite as to make it impossible for any person affected by the statute to know just what obligation is imposed upon him thereby, or even to know when the statute does apply to him. For such vagueness the statute is void, not only under Section 30 of Article II of the Constitution of the State, providing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, but being a penal statute, it is also repugnant to Article II, Section 22, of the Constitution which provides that one accused of a crime shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. Secs. 22, 30, Art II, Mo. Const.; United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 264 F. 223; Tozer v. United States, 52 F. 917; Ex parte Taft, 225 S.W. 457; Wabash Railroad Co. v. O'Brien, 285 F. 583; Chicago & N.W. Railroad Co. v. Railroad & Warehouse Comm. of Minnesota, 280 F. 387. For the identical reasons above noted, the statute is repugnant to the corresponding provisions of the Constitution of the United States, i. e., the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Amends. 6, 14, U.S. Const. Since the statute leaves it to a court or jury to determine the standards which it seeks to impose, it constitutes an unlawful delegation of power from a lawmaking to a judicial body, and is repugnant to Section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution of the State, providing that in the separation of powers the law making or legislative power shall be vested in the General Assembly. Sec. 1, Art. IV, Mo. Const.; Merchants' Exch. of St. Louis v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616, 111 S.W. 565; Schechter v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 79 L.Ed. 1570; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 79 L.Ed. 446; Parks v. Libby, Owens, Ford Glass Co., 195 N.E. 616; Boshuizen v. Thompson & Taylor Co., 195 N.E. 625; McCreary v. Libby, Owens, Ford Glass Co., 2 N.E. 290; Vallat v. Radium Dial Co., 196 N.E. 485. The statute also runs afoul of Article IV, Section 28 of the Constitution of the State, providing that the subject of any bill shall be clearly expressed in its title, for the title to this act contains the limitation that it shall apply only to employees engaged in the repair of cars to be used within this State whereas the act itself contains no such limitation, and applies to the repair of cars, regardless of where such cars are to be used. Sec. 28, Art. IV, Mo. Const.; Columbia v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 329 Mo. 38, 43 S.W.2d 816; 36 Cyc., p. 1029; State ex rel. v. Edwards, 241 S.W. 950; State ex rel. v. Hackman, 292 Mo. 27, 237 S.W. 743; Fidelity Adjustment Co. v. Cook, 339 Mo. 45, 95 S.W.2d 1162; State ex rel. v. Walker, 326 Mo. 1233, 34 S.W.2d 131; Berry v. Majestic Milling Co., 223 S.W. 738; State ex rel. v. Revelle, 257 Mo. 529, 165 S.W. 1084.

Randolph & Randolph and Nile L. Vermillion for respondent.

(1) Civil and remedial statutes are to be construed liberally so as to effectuate their purposes. If a statute is both remedial and penal and is separable, the remedial portion will not fail because the penal section may be invalid. Every statute is presumed to be constitutional until conclusively and necessarily shown to be otherwise. Section 13267, Revised Statutes 1929, upon which plaintiff bases his claim, is included among the statutes which constitute the highest type of approved legislation -- for the protection of the health and safety of the public. State ex rel. Wabash Ry. Co. v. Shain, 106 S.W.2d 900; Smith v. Harbison Walker Refractories Co., 100 S.W.2d 916; Dodd v. Independence Stove & Furnace Co., 51 S.W.2d 114; Boll v. Condie-Bray Glass & Paint Co., 321 Mo. 92, 11 S.W.2d 48; Monarch Vinegar Works v. Railroad Co., 285 Mo. 543; State v. Whitaker, 160 Mo. 68; 59 C. J. 1106, 1121; Lore v. Amer. Mfg. Co., 160 Mo. 608; State ex inf. v. West Side St. Ry. Co., 146 Mo. 155; Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 53, 53 L.Ed. 400; Grenada Lbr. Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U.S. 443, 54 L.Ed. 831; Cropper v. Titantium Pigment Co., 47 F.2d 1041; Oriental Oil Co. v. Brown, 106 S.W.2d 136; Solan & B. v. Pasche, 153 S.W. 674; Defenbaugh v. U. P. Ry. Co., 171 P. 647; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. State, 143 S.W. 913; Galveston H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Enderle, 170 S.W. 276. (2) The essential requirement of the title to a legislative act is that it should not mislead. It is sufficient if the title indicates the general subject of the act and the provision of the act be not incongruous or unrelated. The constitutional provision is to be liberally construed; otherwise, it would create a greater evil than it was intended to remedy. State ex rel. Sekyra v. Schmoll, 313 Mo. 693, 282 S.W. 702; State v. Mullinix, 301 Mo. 385, 257 S.W. 121; State ex rel. Garesche v. Roach, 258 Mo. 541, 167 S.W. 1013; State v. Price, 229 Mo. 670, 129 S.W. 650.

Hyde, C. Bradley and Dalton, CC., concur.

OPINION

HYDE

This is an action for damages for disability (from rheumatism, arthritis, and neuritis) alleged to have resulted from exposure while plaintiff was working for defendant. Violation of Section 13267, Revised Statutes 1929, is claimed to make defendant liable. Plaintiff had a verdict for $ 14,000 and defendant has appealed from the judgment entered.

Defendant assigns as error the refusal of its instruction, in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence, directing a verdict at the close of the evidence. Defendant contends that Section 13267, Revised Statutes 1929, is unconstitutional both because of being too vague and indefinite (citing Secs. 22 and 30, Art. II, Const. of Mo.; and Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, Const. of U.S.); and because the Legislature, in adopting the Act, did not comply with Section 28, Article IV, of the Constitution of Missouri. [See Laws 1917, p. 323.] The Act, including title, was as follows:

"An act to provide for the erection, maintenance and equipment of suitable buildings for the protection of the safety, health and comfort of employees engaged in the construction and repair of freight and passenger cars and car trucks used within this State, providing a penalty for the violation of the same, and fixing the time for this act to become operative.

"Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:

"Section 1. Houses for Employees Required, etc. -- Every person, firm, corporation, or receiver of such person, firm or corporation, engaged within this state in the construction or repairing of passenger or freight cars or car trucks used in the transportation of passengers or freight by rail, shall erect and maintain a building or buildings at every point or place within this state where such construction or repairing is done, and where six or more men are regularly employed on such work. The building or buildings provided for in this section shall be so constructed and equipped as to fully protect all employees engaged in such construction or repair work from exposure to cold, rain, sleet, snow and all inclement weather during the hours of employment of such employees, providing that the provisions of this act shall not apply where ordinary light repairs are required. The term, light repairs, as used in this act shall be such repairs as can be made to cars in switching yard in thirty minutes or less, or which may be made in less time than would be required to switch such car or cars to the repair building provided for in this Act.

"Sec. 2. Violation -- Penalty. -- Any person, firm, corporation or receiver of such person, firm or corporation who shall violate the provisions of this act or shall require men regularly employed by them in the construction and repair of such passenger and freight cars to work outside of the building as provided for in this act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof in any court of competent jurisdiction shall be fined in the sum of not less than $ 100.00 nor more than $ 500.00, for such offense and each day of such violation shall constitute a separate offense.

"Sec. 3. Take Effect -- When. -- This act shall take effect and be in force on and after the first day of January, 1918.

"Approved April 10, 1917."

The enforcement of Section 13267, Revised Statutes 1929 (Sec 6832, R. S. 1919) as a criminal statute (as provided in Sec. 13268, R. S. 1929, Sec. 2 of original act) has been enjoined on the ground that it was unconstitutional (upon defendant's first ground above stated, except that applicability of amendments to the U.S. Constitution was not ruled), in Wabash Ry. Co. v. O'Bryan, 285 F. 583; and we note that the entire act (Secs. 13267 and 13268, R. S. 1929) was repealed by our last Legislature. [Laws 1939, p. 475.] Plaintiff, however, contends that if Section 13268, making noncompliance a misdemeanor, be eliminated from consideration, Section 13627 would remain a valid remedial statute upon which civil liability for damages caused by noncompliance could be based. Our prior decisions, concerning statutes making general provisions for health and safety of employees, are in accord with this contention. [See Boll v. Condie-Bray Glass Co., 321 Mo. 92, 11 S.W.2d 48; Smith v....