Hunt v. Arthur Kill Corr. Facility

Decision Date05 October 2012
Docket Number11-CV-2432(RRM)(LB)
PartiesDAWN T. HUNT, v. ARTHUR KILL CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

BLOOM, United States Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff, Dawn T. Hunt, brings this pro se action against defendant Arthur Kill Correctional Facility pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as codified, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), as codified, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117. Plaintiff alleges that defendant failed to accommodate her disability, subjected her to a hostile work environment based on her gender, and retaliated against her for filing a charge of discrimination. Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Honorable Roslynn R. Mauskopf referred defendant's motion to me for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). It is respectfully recommended that defendant's motion to dismiss should be granted for the following reasons.

BACKGROUND
I. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff has been employed as a corrections officer at Arthur Kill Correctional Facility since 2005. (Compl. at 15, Pl.'s New York State Division of Human Rights Charge of Discrimination dated August 20, 2009 ("NYSDHR Charge").)1 In February 2007, plaintiff "became disabled ... due to a workplace accident." (Id.) Although plaintiff does not identify what her disability is, she alleges that defendant "was aware of [her] disabilities and refused to accommodate [her] with light duty on July 19, 2008." (Id.) Plaintiff further states that she was medically cleared to return to work on May 8, 2009, but defendant "sent [her] home." (Id.)

Plaintiff also states that she was sexually harassed by defendant. Specifically, on May 26, 2009, Sergeant Sindoni "made a comment regarding [plaintiff's] work pants," saying that "[plaintiff] really look[ed] good in those pants." (Id.) In addition, after telling plaintiff "you got fired, you're caught selling real estate and picking up furniture," another sergeant "look[ed] [plaintiff] up and down with a smirk ... ." (Id. at 19, Plaintiff's EEOC Letter.). This sergeant continues to look at plaintiff in this manner "to no end." (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that personnel employed by defendant spoke to her in a hostile and rude manner when she submitted medical documentation and personal leave slips. (Id. at 17-18.) For example, one officer told plaintiff "in a very demeaning tone, 'Pull you hair back and follow directive.'" (Id. at 18) Tanya Patterson of defendant's personnel office told plaintiff that the "facility is out to get your job" because plaintiff was "out on comp," that the Deputy Superintendent of Administration did not like plaintiff, and that plaintiff was a problem because she was selling real estate while out on Workers Compensation. (Id.) Plaintiff further asserts that she was unjustly given "formalcounsel" for "3 days AWOL;" that her phone is monitored; and that she was only given four hours leave for a Workers Compensation Hearing. (Id.)

Finally, plaintiff asserts that defendant retaliated against her for filing her August 20, 2009 charge of sexual harassment with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (Am. Compl. ¶ 8.)2 Plaintiff alleges that shortly after she returned from leave without pay for an unspecified reason, which began on June 21, 2009 and ended on June 16, 2010, she was "brought up on charges [on August 5, 2010] for [an] alleged crime that happened [in] 2007." (Id.) Plaintiff was removed from payroll as of August 5, 2010 and asked to resign. (Id.)

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced this pro se action on May 19, 2011. (ECF No. 1.) The original complaint attached an April 11, 2011 letter from the EEOC, resending plaintiff's notice of right to sue, which is dated February 23, 2011. (Id. at 6-7.) Defendant filed a letter requesting permission to move against the complaint in lieu of filing an answer, asserting that monetary damages under the ADA were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that plaintiff failed to state a claim because she did not identify her disability and the alleged harassment was not pervasive or severe. (ECF No. 9.) The Court held an initial conference on October 14, 2011 to inform plaintiff of defendant's intent to move against the complaint. (ECF Nos. 12-13.) The Court noted that plaintiff could file an amended complaint as of right to try to cure the alleged deficiencies. Plaintiff was granted several months to retain an attorney and file an amended complaint. Although she remains pro se, plaintiff filed an amended complaint on January 17, 2012. (ECF No. 16.)

Defendant moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that (1) defendant is an improper defendant, (2) plaintiff's ADA claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, (3) plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and her suit is time-barred, and (4) plaintiff fails to state a claim under Title VII or the ADA. (ECF No. 24.) Plaintiff has not opposed defendant's motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review

On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court "must accept as true all material facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Sharkey v. Ouarantillo, 541 F.3d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Merritt v. Shuttle, Inc., 245 F.3d 182, 186 (2d Cir.2001)). On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court also must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.

The Court has the "obligation to construe pro se complaints liberally, even as [it] examine[s] such complaints for factual allegations sufficient to meet the plausibility requirement." Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). "It is well-established that the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted 'to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'" Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)) (other citations omitted); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) ("A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider, in addition to the complaint, documents that plaintiff attached to the pleadings, documents referenced in the complaint, documents that plaintiff relied on in bringing the action which were in plaintiff's possession or of which plaintiff had knowledge, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. Halebian v. Berv, 644 F.3d 122, 131 (2d Cir. 2011).

II. Improper Defendant

Plaintiff sues Arthur Kill Correctional Facility as her employer. However, because correction officers, such as plaintiff, are employed by the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"), formerly known as New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS"), Arthur Kill Correctional Facility is not the proper defendant in this employment discrimination action. See Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 369 (2d Cir. 2002) (describing DOCS as a corrections officer's employer); Brown v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 583 F. Supp. 2d 404, 410 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (dismissing employment discrimination claims against a correctional facility because DOCS is a corrections officer's employer). Accordingly, the Court should grant defendant's motion to dismiss against Arthur Kill Correctional Facility on this basis. The remainder of defendant's motion to dismiss and the Court's analysis presumes that plaintiff intended to file this action against DOCCS.

III. ADA Claim

DOCCS first argues that plaintiff's claims under the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment states that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend XI. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court against state governments unless the state waives its immunity or Congress validly abrogates that immunity. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). The Supreme Court has held that Congress did not validly abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted Title I of the ADA. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 (addressing Title I of the ADA3). This means that the states are not subject to the ADA. Moreover, New York has not waived its immunity for claims arising under the ADA. Trivedi v. N.Y. State Unified Court Sys. Office of Court Admin., 818 F. Supp. 2d 712, 722 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

"The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to 'state agents and state instrumentalities' that are, effectively, arms of a state." Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist....

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