Hunt v. Baldwin
| Decision Date | 02 August 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-99-00579-CV.,14-99-00579-CV. |
| Citation | 68 S.W.3d 117 |
| Parties | Louva HUNT, Appellant, v. Miles Edward BALDWIN, Irene Baldwin, William J. Rohrbach, Jr., and Sullins, Johnston, Rohrbach & Magers, P.C., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
John Joseph Hardig, Houston, for appellants.
Robin Morris Green, Lubbock, Jack W. Tucker, Jr., Houston, Kent Frank Brooks, Dallas, for appellees.
Panel consists of ANDERSON, HUDSON, and SEYMORE, JJ.
Appellant, Louva Hunt, appeals the judgment entered in favor of appellees, Miles Edward Baldwin, Irene Baldwin, William J. Rohrbach, Jr., and Sullins, Johnston, Rohrbach & Magers, P.C. We affirm.
Hunt and her former husband, James R. Lovell, executed and delivered to Chester Wilkey, Fern Wilkey, Lyndal Wilkey, and Mildred Wilkey, two promissory notes in the original principal sums of $160,100 and $400,000. Ed and Irene Baldwin acquired the notes, which were secured by real estate located in Moore County, Sherman County, and Dallam County, Texas, from the Wilkeys in a sale and exchange agreement. Hunt and Lovell sold the property, which secured the notes, to Melroe Farms, Inc., a corporation owned by Irving L. Melroe and Edward H. Melroe. The Melroes guaranteed to pay and assumed the unpaid balances on the notes. The Melroes ultimately defaulted on the notes.
On March 7, 1983, the Baldwins sued Hunt, Lovell, and the Melroes in the United States District Court for the Northern District Court of Texas, Amarillo Division for collection of the notes. A final judgment in that case was entered on March 15, 1985 (the "1985 judgment"), awarding the Baldwins $698,723.09 against Hunt, Lovell, and the Melroes, jointly and severally. The judgment, however, further provided:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that while JAMES R. LOVELL and wife, LOUVA H. LOVELL, are jointly and severally liable to the Plaintiffs for the full amount of such judgment mentioned above, they are, however, entitled to full indemnity from Defendants IRVING L. MELROE and EDWARD H. MELROE for the total amount of such judgment, together with interest accumulating thereon and all other costs of suit.
In June 1985, Irving Melroe filed bankruptcy in Colorado. The Baldwins filed a proof of claim in the Melroe bankruptcy proceeding based on the 1985 judgment. Hunt, however, did not file a claim for indemnity in the Melroe bankruptcy under the 1985 judgment. The Baldwins and the Irving Melroe bankruptcy estate entered into a settlement agreement in which the Baldwins acquired an interest in the Michigan-Chestnut Partnership for $25,000. Hunt alleges the Michigan-Chestnut interest was valued at $500,000 to $1,000,000, and the Baldwins ultimately received several hundred thousand dollars in payments from the Michigan-Chestnut interest, which, according to Hunt, are more than sufficient to satisfy the 1985 judgment.
On December 7, 1989, Lovell filed bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas Amarillo Division. Although the Baldwins filed a claim in the Lovell bankruptcy proceeding, they did not file any objections to Lovell's discharge. On April 17, 1990, Lovell received a discharge of all indebtedness, including the 1985 judgment.
After the Melroes and Lovell were discharged in bankruptcy, Hunt was the only remaining defendant liable on the 1985 judgment. To keep the 1985 judgment from going dormant, the Baldwins wrote William Rohrbach, on September 11, 1994, and requested issuance of a writ of execution against Hunt. On January 24, 1995, Rohrbach signed an affidavit and request for issuance of writ of execution against Hunt, which he filed with the clerk of the United States District Court in Amarillo. On January 27, 1995, pursuant to the affidavit and request for issuance of writ of execution, the clerk of the federal court issued the writ of execution. Rorhbach forwarded the writ of execution to the Sheriff of Donley County, Texas. On March 4, 1995, the sheriff served the writ of execution on Hunt. Pursuant to the writ, two heifers were seized and sold, with the Baldwins ultimately receiving the proceeds of the sale.
The amount of the original judgment as stated in the affidavit, request for issuance of the writ of execution, and the writ of execution was incorrect because credits for payments previously made on the judgment were not reflected. Another lawyer in Rohrbach's firm had been handling the Baldwin's claim in the Lovell bankruptcy proceeding. Although the Baldwins had informed the other attorney that payments had been made on the 1985 judgment, Rohrbach was not aware of those payments when he signed the affidavit and requested the writ of execution.
Hunt sued the Baldwins, Rohrbach, and the Sullins, Johnston, Rohrbach & Magers lawfirm, asserting claims for abuse of process, conversion, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, money had and received, wrongful execution, common law and statutory usury, attorney's fees for usury, and conspiracy. Hunt also sought a declaratory judgment for all amounts owed to Hunt as a result of all appellees' collection efforts; alternatively, Hunt sought a declaratory judgment for the amount, if any, that remained unpaid on the 1985 judgment. Hunt also sought attorney's fees under the Declaratory Judgments Act.
The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of appellees on Hunt's claims for usury, abuse of process, wrongful execution, conversion, money had and received, fraud, and conspiracy. Also, the trial court submitted Hunt's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress to the jury, which found against Hunt on that claim.1 With regard to Hunt's declaratory judgment action, the trial court determined that Hunt was entitled to $189,255.21 in credits on the 1985 judgment.2 Although the trial court submitted a question on reasonable and necessary attorney's fees under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, the jury found Hunt was not entitled to any attorney's fees.3
In her first issue, Hunt claims the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the "trial court's granting of appellees' affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel" with respect to the Michigan Chestnut and Cogswell & Wherle4 collections. Although it is not entirely clear, we interpret Hunt's complaint as challenging the trial court's granting a directed verdict on those affirmative defenses. Hunt bases her assertion that the trial court granted a directed verdict on the following exchange between the trial court and her trial counsel, which occurred well into the trial:
MR. STEVENSON (Counsel for Hunt): Your Honor, as we started the trial, we had a lengthy motion in limine that was heard by the Court, specifically on the Baldwins' motion in limine and more particularly with respect to Items 1 and 2 concerning the Michigan-Chestnut Partnership Interests, the values associated therewith, and the defendants' argument in the case that somehow res judicata or collateral estoppel would preclude us from making any mention of the Michigan-Chestnut Partnership, the evaluation thereof or the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of that partnership in Denver. As I understood the Court's ruling in the motion in limine, the Court has ruled that we are not to mention anything other than essentially the $25,000 value and the other items that came out of the distributions in the bankruptcy; except for the valuation of the Michigan-Chestnut Partnership and any amounts that were ultimately acquired as a result of that interest. Do I understand the Court's ruling correctly?
THE COURT: That's correct.5
While the above quoted dialogue between Hunt's trial counsel and the trial court refers to res judicata and collateral estoppel, its emphasis is clarification of the trial court's ruling on the Baldwin's motion in limine, which sought to exclude such matters because they were "irrelevant, prejudicial or incompetent to the material issues in this cause."6 Moreover, Hunt has not shown where in the record the trial court granted a directed verdict on any of the Baldwins' affirmative defenses by either oral or written order. While it appears from counsel's statement that there might have been some sort of discussion of the Baldwins' affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel in a pretrial hearing, we have no record of it. Further review of the record establishes that when Hunt attempted to introduce evidence pertaining to the value and amount of collections from the Michigan-Chestnut interest, the trial court sustained the Baldwins' objection based on relevance. Hunt has not shown that the trial court granted a directed verdict on the Baldwins' affirmative defenses of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Hunt's first issue is overruled.
In her second issue, Hunt contends the trial court erred in: (1) excluding the Michigan-Chestnut, Cogswell & Wherle, and Melroe bankruptcy settlement evidence; (2) granting directed a directed verdict and in refusing to submit jury questions on her claims for usury, wrongful execution, abuse of process, conversion, fraud, conspiracy, money had and received, and malice; and (3) determining the amount of credits on the 1985 judgment without evidence of the Michigan-Chestnut and Cogswell & Wherle collections.
Hunt claims the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the Michigan-Chestnut and Cogswell & Wherle collections and the Melroe bankruptcy settlement. Specifically, Hunt complains that the Michigan-Chestnut interest sold for $25,000 as part of the Melroe bankruptcy settlement, when it was actually valued at $500,000 to $1,000,000. She further maintains the 1985 judgment was satisfied by the several hundred thousand dollars in payments the Baldwins ultimately received from the Michigan-Chestnut interest.
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