Hunt v. Burrage, 11634.
| Decision Date | 25 May 1935 |
| Docket Number | No. 11634.,11634. |
| Citation | 84 S.W.2d 1098 |
| Parties | HUNT v. BURRAGE. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; Towne Young, Judge.
Suit by C. R. Adkins and others against C. M. Joiner, wherein H. L. Hunt, individually and as trustee, and others filed motion to have land dismissed from receivership, and wherein Richard W. Burrage filed a plea in intervention. From an order refusing to set aside a decree in favor of the intervener, H. L. Hunt, individually and as trustee, appeals.
Appeal dismissed.
McEntire, James & Clower, of Tyler, for appellant.
John W. Pope, Sr., and J. Lee Zumwalt, both of Dallas, for appellee.
In a suit in a district court of Dallas county, styled C. R. Adkins et al. v. C. M. Joiner, a receiver was appointed. As a part of the property passing into the possession of the receiver, there were 500 acres of land known as the Daisy Bradford tract, and also 80 acres of land on which Joiner well No. 3 is located. A master in chancery was appointed to pass upon the claims of various parties in this receivership, and to report his conclusions to the court.
On April 7, 1931, appellee, Richard W. Burrage, filed a plea in intervention in the original suit and claimed an undivided interest of 2 acres in the 500-acre tract of land and an undivided interest of 8/12000 in the 80-acre tract. This plea in intervention was referred to the master in chancery. While this claim of appellee was pending before such master in chancery, appellant, H. L. Hunt, individually and as trustee, joined by a number of others, filed a motion in the original suit, alleging that they were the sole owners of the said 500-acre tract, and prayed that it be dismissed from the receivership. Appellee was not a party to this motion, nor did he have knowledge that such motion was filed. The court granted the motion and dismissed the 500-acre tract from the proceedings by an order which stated, in effect, that such order was entered without prejudice to any other claimant's interest in the land.
Appellant, both individually and as trustee, was a party to the original suit, in which the receiver was appointed, but appellee only became a party by intervention. After the 500-acre tract was thus dismissed from the receivership, the master in chancery filed a report on appellee's intervention, finding in effect that appellee was the owner of an undivided 2-acre interest in the 500-acre tract, and was owner of an 8/12000 interest in the 80-acre tract. The court approved the master's report and judgment was entered April 4, 1932, decreeing appellee's title to such interest. Appellant was not served with notice of this hearing of the master's report on appellee's claim, and had no knowledge of such hearing at the time the judgment on the claim was entered. At this time appellant claimed to be the sole owner, individually and as trustee for another party of this 500-acre tract.
On or about May 1, 1932, subsequent to the judgment entered allowing appellee an interest in the land in question, and after appellant had notice of the judgment in favor of appellee, appellant organized a corporation known as the Hunt Production Company, and transferred by deed the 500-acre tract of land owned by him in a 4/5 interest, and as trustee in a 1/5 interest, to such corporation, and placed the title to the land in such corporation. As a result of the forming of this corporation and the deeding of such tract of land to it, appellant thereafter, neither individually nor as trustee, owned any interest in the title to the said 500-acre tract. Individually, appellant was issued stock of the corporation to the amount of a 4/5 interest, and the person for whom he acted as trustee was issued stock to the amount of a 1/5 interest, less 1 share of stock nominally issued to a third party, for the purpose of incorporation. Appellant was made president of the corporation, the other party vice president, and the one to whom the 1 share of stock was issued was made secretary-treasurer. On May 25, 1932, appellant filed what we will denominate a bill of review, praying that the judgment entered in favor of appellee, April 4, 1932, be set aside, and alleged what appears on the face of the allegations to be good grounds for setting such judgment aside. In the allegations, appellant did not disclose that he, individually and as trustee, had parted with all title and interest in said 500-acre tract, and that such interest was now owned by the Hunt Production Company, a corporation. Appellee did not know of this fact until a witness for appellant testified to the fact of the organization of the corporation, and also to the fact that appellant had transferred the entire interest held by him to such corporation, and that said land was now owned by such corporation. The...
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...be aggrieved by the judgment in favor of appellees awarding the leasehold title to minerals in which they have no interest. Hunt v. Burrage, 84 S.W.2d 1098, (Tex.Civ.App.) 1935, writ dismissed. In the case of Schwarz v. Smith, 160 Tex. 280, 329 S.W.2d 83, the Supreme Court said: 'Petitioner......
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...statement of the litigation between the parties hereto leading up to the time of the trial of this case will be found in Hunt v. Burrage, Tex.Civ.App., 84 S.W.2d 1098; Id., Tex. Civ.App., 95 S.W.2d 202; Hunt Production Co. v. Burrage, Tex.Civ.App., 104 S. W.2d 84, and Burrage v. Hunt Produc......
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