Hunt v. City of Boston
| Decision Date | 04 September 1890 |
| Citation | 25 N.E. 82,152 Mass. 168 |
| Parties | HUNT v. CITY OF BOSTON. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from superior court, Suffolk county; CHARLES P. THOMPSON, Judge.
Petition for a jury to assess damages for land taken by the board of park commissioners of Boston under Laws Mass.1875, c. 185. The petitioner brings exceptions.
P.A. Collins and F.L. Evans, for petitioner.
Andrew J. Bailey, for defendant.
A witness for the petitioner who gave his opinion as an expert of the value of the land taken was asked by the petitioner to state all the reasons upon which he founded his judgment as to the value to which he had testified. The witness stated, among other reasons, the knowledge he had of sales of land in the neighborhood, the sales not being such as were competent evidence of the value of the petitioner's land. The petitioner asked for the particulars of such sales, but the court excluded them, and did not allow the witness to state as a reason for his opinion the specific prices paid for particular lots of land. We think that the evidence was properly excluded. A party cannot put in evidence incompetent facts under the guise of fortifying the opinion of his witness, even if the evidence might have been properly admitted on cross-examination to test the opinion of the expert. As the sales were not evidence they were only the acts or declarations showing the opinions of third persons. The fact that the witness founded his judgment upon opinions expressed by declarations or acts of third persons did not make such declarations or acts competent either as substantive evidence or to sustain the opinion of the witness. Such evidence goes far beyond stating the grounds or reason of the opinion. See Dickenson v. Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546;Edmands v. Boston, 108 Mass. 535;Keith v. Lothrop, 10 Cush. 454. A witness for the petitioner, who had testified that his opinion of the value of the land was formed from sales of land that he knew of, was asked on cross-examination what lot of land of the sale of which he knew was nearest to petitioner's land, and specified the lot. On re-examination the witness was asked at what price the land was sold, and the question was properly excluded. The price was not competent in itself, and was not made so by the examination of the respondent. The petitioner offered to prove the price at which two lots of lands about 800 feet from the petitioner, on the opposite side of the same ...
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State ex rel. Herman v. Wilson
...direct testimony about the terms of a particular transaction should not have been admitted over objection. See Hunt v. City of Boston, 152 Mass. 168, 171, 25 N.E. 82; Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 195 Mass. 100, 106, 80 N.E. 799. See also by analogy Tigar v. Mystic River Bridge Authority, 329 M......
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Commonwealth v. Anestal
...of unnecessary and prejudicial evidence.” Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 105, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982), citing Hunt v. Boston, 152 Mass. 168, 171, 25 N.E. 82 (1890). The prosecutor simply extracted the details of the incidents from Burgess by use of leading questions, making no effort to use ......
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Simon v. Solomon
...opinion should not, of course, serve as a channel for the introduction of unnecessary and prejudicial evidence. See Hunt v. Boston, 152 Mass. 168, 171, 25 N.E. 82 (1890). In the present case, however, the judge's warnings that the jury should determine for themselves the credibility of witn......
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Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority
...direct testimony about the terms of a particular transaction should not have been admitted over objection. See Hunt v. City of Boston, 152 Mass. 168, 171, 25 N.E. 82; Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 195 Mass. 100, 106, 80 N.E. 799. See also by analogy Tigar v. Mystic River Bridge Authority, 329 M......