Hunt v. City of Toledo

• Decision Date: 08 August 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:10 CV 2896
• Parties: MICHAEL HUNT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF TOLEDO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

MICHAEL HUNT, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.CITY OF TOLEDO, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:10 CV 2896

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

Dated: August 8, 2012

AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 636 and FED. R. CIV. P. 73, the parties have consented to the undersigned Magistrate Judge conduct all proceedings in this civil rights case filed pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983. On July 30, 2012, the Magistrate granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts One, Three, Four, Five and Six but retained jurisdiction over Count Two of Plaintiffs' Complaint. A conference was conducted on July 31, 2012, during which Defendants made an oral motion for reconsideration. After consideration of the parties' written and oral arguments, the Magistrate finds that Defendants' arguments are well taken and grants the motion for reconsideration. The Magistrate amends the Memorandum Decision and Order toincorporate review of Count Two, Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims (Docket No. 41). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count Two of Plaintiffs' Complaint (Docket No. 28).

II. THE ISSUE

In Count Two, Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant City of Toledo and Sweat violated Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights to be free of excessive force during the service of a search warrant.

Defendants claim that even assuming that Plaintiffs can establish a colorable constitutional violation of excessive force, Plaintiffs have failed to allege or prove a custom or policy of the City of Toledo and Detective Sweat is entitled to a finding of qualified immunity. Defendants seek an order dismissing Count Two or Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims and granting their Motion for Summary Judgment.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW.

Summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Averill v. Gleaner Life Insurance Society, 626 F. Supp.2d 756, 761 (N. D. Ohio 2009 (citing Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986)). The moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. (citing Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2552-2553). The burden shifts to the nonmoving party who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Incorporated, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986) (quoting FED. R.CIV. P. 56(e)).

Once the burden of production shifts, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. Id. It is insufficient "simply [to] show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. (citing Matsushita Electric Industrial Company v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (1986)). Rather, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the [unverified] pleadings" and present some type of concrete evidentiary material in support of its position. Id. (citing Celotex, supra, 106 S. Ct. at 2553).

In deciding the motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party will be believed as true, all doubts will be resolved against the non-moving party, all evidence will be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all inferences will be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. (citing Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services, Incorporated, 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2076 (1992)). Summary judgment shall be rendered only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing Celotex, supra, 106 S. Ct. 2552).

IV. THE CITY'S LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983.

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must set forth facts that, when construed favorably, establish (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting under the color of state law. Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F. 3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2254 (1988); Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). Section 1983 does not permit a plaintiff to sue a local government entity on the theory of respondeat superior. Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444F.3d 725, 752 (6th Cir. 2006) cert. denied sub. nom Tarter v. Gregory, 127 S. Ct. 962 (2007) (citing Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036-2038 (1978)).

A plaintiff may only hold a local government entity liable under Section 1983 for the entity's own wrongdoing. Id. A local government entity violates Section 1983 where its official policy or custom actually serves to deprive an individual of his or her constitutional rights. Id. A city's custom or policy can be unconstitutional in two ways: 1) facially unconstitutional as written or articulated, or 2) facially constitutional but consistently implemented to result in constitutional violations with explicit or implicit ratification by city policymakers. Id. Where the identified policy is itself facially lawful, the plaintiff "must demonstrate that the municipal action was taken with 'deliberate indifference' as to its known or obvious consequences. A showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice." Id. (citing Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1389-1390 (1997) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204 (1989)). "Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action." Id. (citing Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1391). In other words, the risk of a constitutional violation arising as a result of the inadequacies in the municipal policy must be "plainly obvious." Id. at 752-753 (citing Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1392; see also Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 865 (6th Cir. 1997)).

Count Two of Plaintiffs' Complaint is construed, in part, as a 42 U. S. C. § 1983 claim against Defendant City of Toledo based upon respondeat superior liability for the use of excessive force by Defendants Sweat and/or Doe. Reiterating that the City of Toledo may only be held liable where the entity itself committed the wrong or caused their employees to violate a person's constitutional rights, the Magistrate finds that Plaintiffs have merely identified conduct that is notproperly attributable to the municipality. Fault and causation are not readily obvious in this case yet Plaintiffs have not alleged that the City of Toledo is the final policymaking authority with respect to the conduct challenged in the lawsuit or that through deliberate conduct, the City of Toledo was the moving force behind the injury alleged. Neither have Plaintiffs identified a causal link between an obvious municipal policy nor custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Plaintiffs are foreclosed from recovering from the Defendant City of Toledo for the actions of Defendants Sweat and/or Doe under principles of respondeat superior.

V. DEFENDANT SWEAT'S LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983.

Defendant Sweat contends that as a matter of law, he is entitled to summary judgment on the basis that excessive force was not used when Plaintiffs were handcuffed and placed on the floor with hands atop their heads (Docket No. 36, Attachment 8, pp. 52-53 of 65). Alternately, presuming that Defendant Sweat used excessive force, he asserts protection from liability by qualified immunity because his actions arose in the course of performing his official duties.

Plaintiffs allege that when executing a search warrant, the "police officers" subjected them to unreasonable force when they displayed and brandished a gun "accompanied with dire threats of their usage against Plaintiffs." These acts are inapposite to the protections of the Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force during the execution of a search warrant. It is Plaintiffs' contention that Defendants are not entitled to the protection from liability provided by qualified immunity.

A. PRINCIPLES OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.

Through the use of qualified immunity, the law shields 'governmental officials performing discretionary functions . . . from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonablyhave been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.' " Baker v. City of Hamilton, Ohio, 471 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Department, 389 F.3d 167, 172 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3037 (1987)). The Supreme Court instructs lower courts to perform a two-tiered inquiry to determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. (citing Saucier v. Katz, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001)). Courts should first determine whether "the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Id. (citing Saucier, 121 S. Ct. at 2156). If the plaintiff establishes that a constitutional violation occurred, a court must next consider "whether the right was clearly established." Id. (citing Saucier, 121 S. Ct. at 2156). When a defendant raises a defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. (citing Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 2006)).

The Supreme Court has emphasized that the qualified immunity analysis "must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the...