Hunt v. County of Shasta

Citation225 Cal.App.3d 432,275 Cal.Rptr. 113
Decision Date19 November 1990
Docket NumberNo. C005922,C005922
PartiesJohn Dowell HUNT, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. COUNTY OF SHASTA, et al., Defendants and Appellants.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals

Mark A. Wasser, Robert S. Fisher of McDonough, Holland & Allen, Sacramento, David R. Frank, Shasta County Counsel, Redding, for defendants and appellants.

Dwight L. Herr, Santa Cruz County Counsel, Jonathan Wittwer, Santa Cruz Chief Deputy County Counsel, Santa Cruz, Nancy N. McDonough, Gen. Counsel for California Farm Bureau Federation, Bruce S. Flushman of Washburn, Briscoe & McCarthy, San Francisco, for California Land Title Ass'n, as amici curiae on behalf of defendants and appellants.

Dale C. Campbell of Weintraub, Genshlea, Hardy, Erich & Brown, Sacramento, Robert A. Rehberg, Esq., W. Leonard Wingate of Wells, Wingate, Small & Graham, Redding, for plaintiffs and respondents.

William M. Pfeiffer, Vice President & General Counsel, Judith K. Herzberg, Senior Counsel, Barry B. Barfield, Counsel for California Ass'n of Realtors, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiffs and respondents.

SCOTLAND, Associate Justice.

Having decided to sell portions of their property located in Shasta County, plaintiffs asked defendants for a determination that the property complied with the Subdivision Map Act.

Government Code section 66499.35 provides that, upon the request of an owner of real property, the county board of supervisors shall determine whether the property complies with the provisions of the Subdivision Map Act. (Gov.Code, § 66410 et seq.; further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise specified.) If the board determines that the property complies, it must issue a certificate of compliance so stating. If it determines that the property does not comply, the board must issue a certificate of compliance or conditional certificate of compliance informing the owner of conditions which must be fulfilled before a development permit will be granted. (Ibid.) The board's decision is subject to judicial review. However, any action or proceeding to attack, review, set aside, void or annul the board's decision must be commenced and service of summons effected within 90 days after the date of the decision. (§ 66499.37.)

Disregarding its statutory duty, the Shasta County Board of Supervisors (Board) issued neither a certificate of compliance nor a conditional certificate because two of its members recused themselves, and the remaining three could not agree whether plaintiffs' parcels complied with the Subdivision Map Act.

Almost three years later, plaintiffs sought judicial relief. Among other things, they asked for a declaration that the parcels complied with the Act and for a writ of mandate directing defendants to issue the requested certificates of compliance.

Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that plaintiffs' action was untimely under the 90-day rule of section 66499.37. Plaintiffs disagreed, claiming the Board took "no action" on their application and thus failed to render a "decision" that could commence the 90-day period for judicial review. In support of this contention, plaintiffs cited section 25005 which provides in pertinent part: "No act of the board shall be valid or binding unless a majority of all the members concur therein." (See Dry Creek Valley Assn., Inc. v. Board of Supervisors The trial court rejected defendants' argument that the action was time barred and entered summary judgment for plaintiffs.

(1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 839, 845, 135 Cal.Rptr. 726; 58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 706, 707 (1975).)

As explained below, we conclude that, although it was not valid or binding within the meaning of section 25005, the Board's less than majority vote which, in effect, rejected plaintiffs' request for certificates of compliance was final for the purpose of permitting judicial review. Were it otherwise, the Board's failure--for lack of a majority vote with no further action contemplated--to issue a certificate or conditional certificate of compliance would be irremediable. 1 It follows that, as a matter of legislative intent, the Board's vote triggered the 90-day rule of section 66499.37. Accordingly, we find that this action is barred by the statute of limitations and shall reverse the judgment without reaching the merits of the claim underlying the action.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Before the regulation of subdivisions began in California, members of the Daniel Hunt family acquired numerous parcels in Shasta, Modoc and Lassen counties and created what was known as the "Hunt Ranch." The Shasta County portion of this ranch covers almost 16,000 acres spread over four noncontiguous sections and is comprised of approximately 80 parcels which were originally created by the issuance of federal land patents, railroad deeds and other deeds between 1862 and 1922.

In 1967, a title report on the Hunt Ranch described it as containing 49 parcels. When the ranch was sold in 1974, the title company revised its report to indicate that the ranch contained 40, rather than 49, parcels. Since then, a 40-parcel description has been used in numerous transactions, including the 1982 sale to plaintiffs Hunt and Wood. 2

In 1985, plaintiffs desired to sell 25 of the original parcels comprising the Hunt Ranch. At the suggestion of the county planning department, they asked the Board to issue certificates of compliance verifying that the 25 separate parcels were in fact lawful parcels which could be developed.

The planning department acknowledged that the parcels had been lawfully created between 1862 and 1922. Nonetheless, it recommended that the certificates be denied because the original legal descriptions had not been maintained in subsequent conveyances. The department concluded that, as a result of these conveyances, the parcels had merged into four noncontiguous parcels, and any resubdivision would require county approval.

On April 23, 1985, the Board held a hearing on plaintiffs' application. One of the five supervisors declared a conflict of interest and disqualified himself from voting. After hearing testimony and argument, the Board asked for written statements summarizing the parties' positions and continued the matter to April 30, 1985. On April 30, a second supervisor disqualified himself due to a conflict of interest. The remaining supervisors voted two to one to deny the certificates. County counsel then announced that no action had been taken on the applications because a majority of the five-member Board did not concur. (§ 25005.)

Although section 66499.35 required issuance of either a certificate of compliance or a conditional certificate of compliance 3 Because in 1974 the Hunt Ranch deeds contained no "express written statement of the grantor" as required by Civil Code section 1093, plaintiffsbelieved that their parcels remained separate and distinct and could be sold and developed without county review and approval. After they made known their plan to auction off certain parcels, plaintiffs learned through the media that Shasta County officials had concerns about the auction. In a statement reported in a local newspaper, the county counsel indicated that, despite the legislation enacting Civil Code section 1093, he still regarded the Hunt Ranch as only four legally saleable parcels. This publicity adversely affected the success of the auction.

(see generally California Subdivision Map Act Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1987) § 8.9, pp. 206-208), the Board did not do so following the divided vote. However, plaintiffs did not pursue judicial review of this breach of duty. Instead, they sought relief from the Legislature and successfully sponsored a bill to add section 1093 to [225 Cal.App.3d 439] the Civil Code. As enacted, this section provides in pertinent part: "Absent the express written statement of the grantor contained therein, the consolidation of separate and distinct legal descriptions of real property contained in one or more deeds ... into a subsequent single deed ... does not operate in any manner to alter or affect the separate and distinct nature of the real property so described.... [p] This section does not constitute a change in, but is declaratory of, the existing law." (Stats.1985, ch. 911, § 1; eff. Jan. 1, 1986.)

In January 1987, plaintiffs asked defendants to confirm that certain of the Hunt Ranch parcels were legally created and had not merged. Plaintiffs cited Civil Code section 1093 in support of their request. In reply, county counsel suggested that the newly-enacted statute did not constitute an accurate declaration of the law which existed prior to the statute's enactment. County counsel then stated, "I think we may both safely conclude that Civil Code § 1093 is not a particularly strong source of support for your position. If the Legislature ever looks into the circumstances under which it was slipped into the Civil Code, I am confident that the section will evaporate at least as quickly as the 'law' it invented." As late as March 1988, the county planning department and county counsel's office continued to take the position that the Hunt Ranch parcels had merged by deed into four noncontiguous parcels.

In anticipation of holding a second public auction to sell parcels in dispute, plaintiffs filed this action on March 24, 1988, almost three years after the Board's failure to issue the certificates or conditional certificates of compliance. They requested (1) a declaration that the parcels are legal and have not merged through subsequent conveyance, (2) a permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from falsely stating that the parcels are invalid or from refusing to process building permits on that basis, and (3) a writ of mandate directing defendants to issue any requested certificates of compliance.

As previously noted, the trial court reject...

To continue reading

Request your trial
35 cases
  • Hensler v. City of Glendale
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • July 25, 1994
    ...Map Act disputes occurs 'as expeditiously as is consistent with the requirements of due process of law.' " (Hunt v. County of Shasta (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 432, 442, 275 Cal.Rptr. 113.) As the Court of Appeal recognized here and in Hunt, section 66499.37 applies by its terms to any action in......
  • Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • August 2, 1994
    ...the properly pleaded allegations as true and also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. (See Hunt v. County of Shasta (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 432, 440, 275 Cal.Rptr. 113; April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 805, 815, 195 Cal.Rptr. The complaint asserts, and it is......
  • Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • September 30, 1994
    ...the properly pleaded allegations as true and also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. (See Hunt v. County of Shasta (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 432, 440, 275 Cal.Rptr. 113; April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 805, 815, 195 Cal.Rptr. The complaint asserts, and it is......
  • American Airlines, Inc. v. County of San Mateo
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • April 8, 1996
    ... ... (Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 714-715, fn. 3 [117 Cal.Rptr. 241, 527 P.2d 865]; Hunt v. County of Shasta (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 432, 440 [275 Cal.Rptr. 113]; April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 805, 815 [195 ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT