Hunt v. Nebraska Public Power District, 4:99CV3030 (D. Neb. 9/27/2000)
| Decision Date | 27 September 2000 |
| Docket Number | 4:99CV3030 |
| Parties | LYNDA HUNT, Plaintiff, v. NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
The plaintiff filed a complaint (filing 1) alleging a violation of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) [EPA], and the Nebraska wage discrimination law, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-1221 (Reissue 1993) (Count I), a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-1104 (Reissue 1993) (Count II), a breach of contract claim based on the defendant's promise to promote the plaintiff and increase her pay (Count III), a breach of contract claim based on the defendant's promise to continue the plaintiff's employment and monitor her for 90 days (Count IV), and a claim for damages based on the intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V). A six-day trial was held, and the plaintiff's equal pay claim (Count I) was submitted to the jury.1 A verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff, awarding her $5,596.00 in back pay and $100,000.00 in damages for emotional distress associated with the defendant's failure to pay her at a rate equal to the rate received by a man for substantially equal work. The defendant has moved for judgment as a matter of law, and has alternately requested either a new trial or a remittitur (filing 65). Also, the plaintiff has moved to amend the judgment (filing 61) and has applied for an allowance of attorneys fees and non-taxable expenses (filing 73). I have concluded that there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis to support a finding that the plaintiff and her former supervisor performed equal work, and therefore as a matter of law the plaintiff's equal pay claim must fail. I shall grant the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law.
The plaintiff, Lynda Hunt, began working as a part-time clerk at the Plattsmouth office of the Nebraska Public Power District [NPPD] in October 1979. At that time, her duties consisted mainly of handling the mail and filling in for the two full-time clerks working in the office. She became a full-time clerk on March 1, 1980, when one of the original full-time clerks, Sandy Farris, left for a job in Omaha. The other full-time clerk, Dorothy Debacker, was promoted to Farris's position, and the plaintiff filled the position vacated by Debacker.
Art Schleicher served as the supervisor of the Plattsmouth office from the time the plaintiff began work as a part-time clerk until his retirement in 1984. Schleicher was replaced by Jim Bellows, who supervised the office until Jerry Craft became supervisor in approximately 1987. The plaintiff applied for the supervisor position herself in both 1984 and 1987, but was not selected for the position. When Craft retired in 1995, his position was not filled. The plaintiff assumed many of Craft's duties following his retirement, and William Lofquest supervised the plaintiff until the end of her employment at NPPD in 1997. Shortly after Craft's retirement, the plaintiff asked for either a pay increase and a new job title, or relief from the added duties and responsibilities she had assumed. The plaintiff testified that Lofquest told her she would receive a pay increase and a job title change for taking on the additional duties, but these incentives never materialized.
Occasionally, the plaintiff's supervisors provided her with feedback or evaluations that expressed concern regarding the plaintiff's communication with customers and co-workers. During the period of her part-time employment, the plaintiff began having difficulties communicating with Dorothy Debacker. These problems continued when the plaintiff became a full-time clerk, intensified somewhat when the office became "computerized" beginning in 1984, and endured until Debacker retired in 1994. These communication problems were documented in the plaintiff's performance appraisals by more than one of her supervisors, and also in writings the plaintiff would occasionally provide to her supervisors in order to express her concerns regarding Debacker. In May 1987, both the plaintiff and Debacker were placed on six months' probation due to their "communication problem" in the office. The probationary period did not appear to completely resolve the issue, however, as indicated by a memo that the plaintiff wrote to Craft in October 1991. In that memo, the plaintiff accused Debacker of failing to communicate, playing childish games, and of being jealous of the plaintiff's abilities to get the job done. The plaintiff wrote another complaint regarding Debacker to her supervisor in March 1993, wherein she stated that their communication problem had been difficult for her to deal with for 13 years.
Thereafter, communication difficulties continued to be an issue for the plaintiff. In September of 1995, the plaintiff received a written reprimand following complaints from both a customer and another NPPD employee alleging that the plaintiff spoke to them rudely. The plaintiff then began expressing concerns regarding Debacker's replacement, Cathy Cundall, to Lofquest. The plaintiff indicated that she and Cundall had reached a dead end, and the plaintiff's patience was growing thin. In the wake of this writing, the plaintiff was placed on a one-week paid suspension in September of 1996. The suspension letter cited the plaintiff's need to work as a part of a team, get along with other employees, and provide better customer service. The suspension upset the plaintiff, and as a result she became ill for a few days and sought counseling.
Following her February 1997 performance appraisal, which cited persisting communications problems, the plaintiff was placed on 90 days' probation. The plaintiff was fired on March 18, 1997, soon after her probationary period began.
Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). When presented with a motion for judgment as a matter of law,
[T]he district court must (1) consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, (2) assume that all conflicts in the evidence were resolved in favor of the prevailing party, (3) assume as proved all facts that the prevailing party's evidence tended to prove, and (4) give the prevailing party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the facts proved. That done, the court must then deny the motion if reasonable persons could differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.
In support of its motion for judgment as a matter of law, the defendant argues that the evidence does not support the jury's finding of liability on the equal pay claim, because the plaintiff did not perform work that was substantially equal to that of her former supervisor, Jerry Craft.
The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that she received a lower rate of compensation than a male for performing "equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility. . . ." Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974); 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). The Eighth Circuit has elaborated upon this burden:
Whether two jobs entail equal skill, equal effort, or equal responsibility requires practical judgment on the basis of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Skill includes such considerations as experience, training, education, and ability. Effort refers to the physical or mental exertion necessary to the performance of a job. Responsibility concerns the degree of accountability required in performing a job.
Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 960 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 653 F.2d 1243, 1245 (8th Cir. 1981). Jobs may be considered "equal" for the purposes of the EPA although they are not identical. Id. at 961. However, two jobs are unequal under the EPA where one position carries additional responsibility. Id.
The defendant argues that the plaintiff has failed to meet her burden, even when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to her. Specifically, the defendant argues that prior to his retirement, Craft had full-time supervisory duties as District Office Supervisor that the plaintiff never assumed or performed.
According to the plaintiff's own testimony, when Craft retired, William Lofquest took on the responsibility of completing the performance appraisals of the employees in the Plattsmouth office of the Nebraska Public Power District. (Hunt Testimony [Hunt], 88:18-20; 96:11 — 21). These performance appraisals not only provided important feedback for the office employees, but also affected...
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