Hunt v. Plavsa
| Decision Date | 02 April 1951 |
| Citation | 103 Cal.App.2d 222,229 P.2d 482 |
| Parties | HUNT et al. v. PLAVSA et al. Civ. 17826. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
W. Verne Ahrens, Los Angeles, for appellants.
Marlan Proctor, Walter B. Gieselman, Burbank, for respondents.
Defendants have appealed from a judgment quieting the title of plaintiffs to certain real property. The appeal is upon the judgment roll. The complaint was in the usual form to quiet title, alleging that plaintiffs were the owners and entitled to possession of certain described property; that the defendants claimed an interest adverse to plaintiffs, and that such claims were without right. Damages were also sought for the unlawful withholding of possession of a portion of the property by defendants. Defendants by their answers denied the allegations of the complaint, and as a 'further defense' alleged that they were and for a long time had been owners and in possession of certain mining claims situate in and a part of the real property.
The trial court found that the plaintiffs were the owners and entitled to possession of all of the property in question with the exception of three described parcels to which defendants had acquired title by adverse possession.
The contentions of appellants are based on the fact that the land in question, being a portion of section 16, township 5 north, range 12 west, S.B.B. & M., is 'school land'--that is, a portion of one of the sections in each township which, if not mineral or otherwise disposed of, was granted by Congress to the State of California in aid of public schools by the Act of March 3, 1853, 10 Stats. at L. 244, 246. It is argued that the trial court was without jurisdiction in the matter because the question of the mineral character thereof remained open until determined by the Secretary of the Interior.
The present appeal, is here upon the judgment roll. And as is said in Kompf v. Morrison, 73 Cal.App.2d 284, 286, 166 P.2d 350, 352, 'It is elementary and fundamental that on a clerk's transcript appeal the appellate court must conclusively presume that the evidence is ample to sustain the findings, and that the only questions presented are as to the sufficiency of the pleadings and whether the findings support the judgment.' In this type of appeal, since 'the evidence is not before this court, we are confined to a determination of the questions as to whether the complaint states a cause of action; whether the findings are within the issues; whether the judgment is supported by the findings and whether reversible error appears upon the face of the record.' Montaldo v. Hires Bottling Co., 59 Cal.App.2d 642, 646, 139 P.2d 666, 668. Appellants cannot, by designating for inclusion in the clerk's transcript documents not properly a part of the judgment roll, or by requesting that the exhibits received in evidence be transmitted to the appellate court, enlarge the scope of the appellate court's review. Estate of Larson, 92 Cal.App.2d 267, 268, 269, 206 P.2d 852.
Appellants attempt to meet this objection by asserting that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. They argue that every court must take judicial knowledge of the extent and boundaries of the territory within which it can exercise jurisdiction; that 'It is common knowledge that in California every section 16 is a school section'; and hence that any complaint which attempts to quiet title to a parcel of land in any section 16 in this state without alleging that said section 16 was previously found by the Secretary of the Interior of the United States to be not known to be mineral in character is subject to demurrer on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as well as on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The contention that title to every sixteenth section of land within the boundaries of this state vested originally in the state is based upon a false premise. Appellants overlook that the seventh section of the act of Congress excepts from the congressional grant therein every sixteenth section where 'any settlement, by the erection of a dwelling house, or the cultivation of any portion of the land, shall be made upon the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections, before the same shall be surveyed, or where such sections may be reserved for public uses, or taken by private claims, other land shall be selected by the proper authorities of the State in lieu thereof'. (Italics supplied.) See also Bullock v. Rouse, 81 Cal. 590, 22 P. 919; Ivanhoe Mining Co. v. Keystone Consol. Mining Co., 102 U.S. 167, 175, 26 L.Ed. 126.
Appellants rely primarily upon West v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 200, 49 S.Ct. 138, 139, 73 L.Ed. 265, and Ames v. Empire Star Mines Co., 17 Cal.2d 213, 110 P.2d 13. The first-cited case involved, however, a suit to enjoin action which had been initiated by the Secretary of the Interior in the local land office to determine whether the particular school land involved was known to be mineral in character when the survey thereof was accepted by the Department of Interior. It was held that the dismissal without formal hearing of an earlier land office proceeding by a predecessor in office of the Secretary of the Interior did not constitute a determination of the fact in issue. It was held that under the Act, 'If the land was then known to be mineral' (when the survey thereof was approved in 1903) 'the title confessedly did not pass by the act; * * * If it was not then known to be mineral, the legal title passed to the state on that date'. The court then held that where, as here, an act granting public lands excludes those known to be mineral, the determination of the fact whether a particular tract is of that character rests with the Secretary of the Interior; that the issuance of a patent by him or other action equivalent thereto imports a determination, conclusive as against collateral attack, of the non-mineral character of the land. The court found, however, that no such determination had been made.
In Ames v. Empire Star Mines Co., 17 Cal.2d 213, 110 P.2d...
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