Hunt v. State

• Decision Date: 28 April 1894
• Citation: 26 S.W. 206
• Parties: HUNT v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

26 S.W. 206

HUNT v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 28, 1894.

Appeal from district court, Grayson county; T. J. Brown, Judge.

E. W. Hunt was convicted of murder in the first degree, and appeals. Affirmed.

Standifer & Eppstein and C. H. Smith, for appellant. R. L. Henry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HURT, P. J.

Appellant was indicted in the district court of Grayson county on March 18, 1893, charged with the murder of his wife, May Hunt. He was tried April 15, 1893, found guilty of murder of the first degree, and his punishment assessed at death. His motion for a new trial was overruled, and he appeals to this court.

A witness (Walker) testified that a document handed to him was an application for an attachment in this cause, made by defendant, Hunt; that the defendant signed the same; that defendant was under arrest and in the custody of an officer at the time he signed the same; that the signature to said application, and the signature, "E. W. Hunt," to two letters shown him, were made by the same person, and that the signature to the application and the writing of the two letters are the same. Another witness testified that the two letters shown him, addressed to Miss Frye, and signed, "E. W. Hunt," and the signature, "E. W. Hunt," made to the application for attachment, were all written by the same person. To this testimony the defense objected on the ground that the signing of the application was an act required by law in order to secure his rights in the trial of said cause and was an act done while defendant was under arrest and unwarned. The objection was overruled, and the testimony admitted. The state then offered in evidence the two letters referred to, and the defense objected on the ground that the execution of said letters by defendant had not been proved by legal and sufficient evidence. This objection was overruled, and the letters admitted. All of this is presented by bills of exception. In reference to this matter, counsel for appellant contends that, under the rule which excludes the admission and confessions of a defendant made while in custody and unwarned, the state could not prove the signature to the application made by him under like conditions. To this proposition we do not assent. The act of signing the document was neither an admission nor a confession by defendant. It was not an act tending to show guilt. It does not come within the letter or the reason of the rule. The fact that defendant was in custody when he signed the application would not likely affect the signature in any manner so as to render it unfit for use as a standard of comparison. That he did sign it was no evidence against him. There was no error in this matter.

2. A confession of the defendant, made to the witness Rich, was in evidence, to the effect: "I killed her with that axe. I had to do it. She was coming at me with a dagger, and I had to kill her to save my life. I am going to plead guilty, and may, by so doing, save my life." The court submitted to the jury the issue of self-defense, and no objection is urged to the charge upon that issue, except in that it did not inform the jury that defendant was under no obligation to retreat before killing to save his own life. No objection was made to the charge upon this subject at the time it was given, and no instruction was asked upon the subject of retreat. The objection was urged for the first time in the motion for a new trial. Under such circumstances, counsel admit that the matter presents no reversible error unless appellant has sustained injury. The question, then, is: Has appellant been injured by the failure to so charge the jury? We are of opinion that under the circumstances of this case no possible injury could result to the defendant. His statement is clear, plain, and emphatic: "She was coming at me with a dagger, and I had to kill her to save my life." To the reasonable mind this presents but one inquiry: Did defendant speak the truth in saying that she was coming at him with a dagger? No ordinary juror or person would pause to inquire as to the possibility, the practicability, or the obligation to retreat to avoid slaying. If the jury believed this statement of defendant, he was entitled to an acquittal, and the jury were, in effect, so informed in the charge given.

3. The question of defendant's sanity was raised by evidence in the case. The jailer having charge of defendant after his arrest testified that he had two spells in which he was wild. "Looked like he did not know what he was doing. Tore up his blankets, and stuck the pieces out through the bars of his cell." At first he thought he was crazy, but, when he had the second attack, the witness thought the insanity feigned. It was a hard matter for witness to say whether or not defendant knew right from wrong. Quarles, a prisoner in the jail, thought the defendant crazy. When he had his spells, would know nothing. Appellant's mother testified that, when he was about 10 years of age, a horse ran away with him, and he was injured in the head, and since said injury defendant had never been right in his mind, — a marked change existed ever since the injury. She testified to many irrational acts: He struck his sister once without cause or provocation. He would talk of driving herds of thousands of cattle to Mexico; talk of building railroads to Mexico when he had no means. His eyes would dance and fill with water. He and his family lived on a farm in Wilson county in 1892. His wife went on a visit to her people in Bosque county, and in October, without notice to any one, he left, leaving his cotton in the field, his corn in the pen, his house locked up, and went to Walnut Springs. No one in Wilson county knew or heard anything about him, after he left, until the murder and his arrest. Did not think that defendant knew the nature and quality of his acts. Did not think he would know right from wrong. Lusk, a witness from Wilson county, had known him four years. He testified to delusions of defendant and spells of delirium. Thought him insane. At times he would not know right from wrong. Williams, a witness from Wilson county, had known him several years. Did not think he had been right since he had known him. Testified to wild and irrational talk. Kroeger, a witness from Wilson county, had known him 18 years. Knew him when he was hurt. Testified to many irrational acts. Thought he would know right from wrong; it was hard to say. Dr. Wilson testified that he had been seven years in charge of lunatic asylums; that the universal tendency with young people affected with insanity, if not cured, is to grow worse as they grow older, and especially is this the case where insanity is induced by blows upon the head which have affected the brain. Persons who have been insane for 10 or 15 years are seldom, if ever, cured. There are times in the career of those most rabidly insane, and whose minds are completely destroyed, when no external manifestations of insanity can be observed, even by experts. The mind may be completely disordered, but the external and observable evidence of it may be wanting. There was put in evidence a judgment...