Hunt v. Washington
| Decision Date | 21 April 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-1259,93-1259 |
| Citation | 25 F.3d 1053 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Seventh Circuit Rule 53(b)(2) states unpublished orders shall not be cited or used as precedent except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case in any federal court within the circuit. Leshurn HUNT, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Odie WASHINGTON, Warden, Dixon Correctional Center, et al., Defendants/Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Before FAIRCHILD, FLAUM, and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
Leshurn Hunt, a prisoner of Illinois, appeals the judgment of the district court dismissing his civil rights suit, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Hunt was attacked by his cellmate, Corgiss Ross, while he slept. Ross pulled the sheets off Hunt and pulled his underwear off while, at the same time, placing himself on top of Hunt in order to perform sexual intercourse. Hunt was able to fend off Ross. Ross pushed the security button in the cell. Henson was the first officer on the scene. Although Hunt told him that Ross had attempted to rape him, Henson suggested that Ross and Hunt remain cellmates. Hunt complained, so Henson called for assistance. Officers Humphrey, Housenga, and Eubanks arrived. The officers escorted Ross out of the cell, but apparently only for a few moments. The record suggests that, despite being apprised of the attempted rape, the officers forced Hunt to remain in the cell with Ross overnight.
In his complaint, Hunt alleged that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to protect him from Ross; by placing a known sexual offender in his cell; by failing to protect him from unforeseen harm; by failing to provide him with medical assistance in the form of psychiatric help for his mental and psychological problems; and by placing him, following his release from segregation, in the same wing of the prison as an inmate with whom he had previous problems. Hunt further alleged that the defendants violated his due process rights by failing to have an adequate policy in place for screening inmates before placing them in the general population and in the various cells; by placing him in disciplinary segregation for an incident unrelated to his room assignment; and by placing him in pre-hearing segregation in a non-emergency situation.
Although we agree with the district court's dismissal of most of Hunt's claims, we disagree with the court's dismissal of Hunt's Eighth Amendment claim that prison officials deliberately failed to protect Hunt from the probability of repeat sexual attacks by Ross or others. The Eighth Amendment requires the state to protect prisoners from each other. Duane v. Lane, 959 F.2d 673, 676 (7th Cir.1992). Prison officials are liable for failing to prevent an injury inflicted upon one inmate by a fellow inmate where the officials have displayed deliberate indifference to the inmate's constitutional rights. Id. "That is, the officials must 'want[ ] harm to come to the prisoner,' or, at least, must possess 'total unconcern for a prisoner's welfare' in the face of 'serious risks.' " Id. (). Negligence is not enough; a prisoner must show either actual knowledge of the danger or danger objectively so great that actual knowledge of the danger can be inferred. Id.
A pro se complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980). We must accept as true the factual allegations of Hunt's complaint, see id., and we must view the allegations in a light most favorable to Hunt. Wolfolk v. Rivera, 729 F.2d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir.1984). Because Hunt's allegations, if true, are sufficient to establish that the officers possessed a total unconcern for Hunt's welfare in the face of a serious risk of injury to Hunt, Hunt's Eighth Amendment claim should not have been dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
For the reasons stated in the attached order of the district court, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court with respect to all of Hunt's claims but his claim that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from further sexual attack. For the reasons stated above, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court insofar as it dismisses that claim, and we REMAND this case for further proceedings consistent with this order.
Odie Washington, Warden Dixon CC, Richard Dusing, Asst.
Warden of Operations, John Doe, 11-7 Shift Commander, Lt.
Humphrey, Lt. Housenga, Lt. Cavazos, Sgt. Eubanks, c/o
Henson, Capt. Floyd Gardner, 3-11 Shift Commander, Lt. Rick
Reubin, Defendants.
Jan. 12, 1993.
ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, LeShurn Hunt, an inmate at the Dixon Correctional Center in Dixon, Illinois, has filed this action pro se against various defendants who are Illinois correctional officials and officers at Dixon Correctional Center, alleging that they deprived him of certain Constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Specifically, plaintiff makes the following claims: (1) defendants violated his Constitutional rights when they failed to protect him from a dangerous situation; (2) defendants violated plaintiff's rights by placing a known sexual offender in his cell; (3) defendants do not have an adequate policy in place for screening inmates before placing them in the general population and in the various cells; (4) defendants failed to protect him from unforeseen harm; (5) defendants failed to provide him with medical assistance in the form of psychiatric help for his mental and psychological problems; (6) defendants violated his rights by placing him in disciplinary segregation for an incident unrelated to his room assignment; (7) the incident in which plaintiff was involved did not constitute an emergency and it was not necessary that plaintiff be taken to segregation; and (8) defendants' lack of investigation violates his rights insofar as once plaintiff was released from disciplinary segregation, he was confronted by an inmate with whom he had previous problems, as they were placed in the same wing in another unit.
Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss, contending that plaintiff: (1) has failed to allege a cognizable injury under Sec. 1983; (2) has not demonstrated that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety concerns; (3) has failed to allege personal involvement of the named defendants in the constitutional deprivations; and (4) has no constitutional right to remain in the general prison population pending a disciplinary hearing.
FACTS
On a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint and views those allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Gillman v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 878 F.2d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir.1989). Accordingly, the following relevant allegations in the complaint will be accepted as true for purposes of this motion.
On February 17, 1992, at approximately 2:00 a.m., plaintiff was attacked by his cellmate, Corgiss Ross, while he slept. Ross pulled the sheets off of plaintiff and pulled his underwear off, while, at the same time, placing himself on top of plaintiff in order to perform sexual intercourse. Plaintiff kicked Ross and jumped up, reaching for the light. Ross stood near the door to the cell in the nude pushing the security button, stating that the "Devil" had made him do it.
Defendant Henson approached the cell and stated that he did not want to get them into trouble. Despite plaintiff having told Henson of the attempted rape, Henson suggested that they both lock up back in the cell. Plaintiff then threatened Henson to get some help. Henson called for assistance.
Defendants Humphrey, Housenga and Eubanks arrived and also tried to get plaintiff to go back into the cell with Ross, even though they had been apprised of the attempted rape. After Humphrey, Housenga and Eubanks made several threats to send plaintiff to the segregated area of the facility, plaintiff had to convince them that Ross was the aggressor and that he was in fear for his life because Ross was a far bigger inmate than he. Plaintiff further told these defendants that he wanted Ross out of his cell or they could take him to segregation.
The next day, February 18, 1992, plaintiff contacted defendant Cavazos about an assignment with a smaller-sized cellmate. Allegedly, Cavazos told plaintiff that he had either two choices: inmate Marsh, who was 6'4" tall and approximately 230 lbs., or inmate Pendleton, who stood 6'5", weighed 220 lbs and was known throughout the institution to be a sexual offender. Plaintiff told Cavazos that these choices were unacceptable to him.
Plaintiff, who is 5'5" tall and approximately 120 lbs., informed Cavazos that he would like to have inmate Milton, who was similar in size and stature to plaintiff, placed in his cell with him. Plaintiff informed Cavazos about the previous night's incident and suggested that the incident could have been prevented if inmate Milton had been put in his cell with him. Cavazos merely laughed and replied, "All that Ross was trying to do was to get him a little."
Later that day, at approximately 3:30 p.m., plaintiff was informed by Control Officer Nolan that Pendleton, whom plaintiff claims is a homosexual and rapist, was going to be his roommate, but only for a short period of time. Plaintiff complained to defendants Reubin and Gardner and told them of his previous night's experience. Reubin stated...
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