Hunter-Boykin v. George Washington University

• Decision Date: 09 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-7039,A,HUNTER-BOYKI,96-7039
• Citation: 328 U.S. App. D.C. 22,132 F.3d 77
• Parties: 75 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1310, 72 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,199, 328 U.S.App.D.C. 22 Harrietppellant, v. The GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 77

132 F.3d 77

75 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1310,

72 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,199, 328 U.S.App.D.C. 22

Harriet HUNTER-BOYKIN, Appellant, v. The GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, Appellee.

No. 96-7039.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Sept. 8, 1997.

Decided Jan. 9, 1998.

John P. Racin, Washington, DC, argued the cause and filed the briefs, for Appellant.

Walter A. Smith, Jr. argued the cause, for Appellee. Robert B. Cave and Mark J. Larson, Washington, DC, were on the brief. Peter W. Tredick, Washington, DC, entered an appearance.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

Concurring Opinion filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge:

The summary judgment motion at issue in this case should have turned on the reasonable interpretation of the phrase "to toll the running of any statute of limitations period," as used in a letter agreement between the plaintiff and defendant. Rather than determine whether a reasonable juror could have read the phrase as the plaintiff did, however, the court below applied a set of legal rules that it thought required the phrase to be read as the defendant urged. Because we conclude that the wrong rules were applied and because a reasonable juror could have read the phrase as the plaintiff read it, we reverse the grant of summary judgment against her.

I

The plaintiff in this case, Dr. Harriet Hunter-Boykin, is an African American woman whom the defendant, The George Washington University ("GW"), hired as an Assistant Professor of Secondary Education on August 2, 1990. On July 19, 1993, Hunter-Boykin's attorney wrote to GW, advising the university that she was considering suing it for racial discrimination. The letter alleged that GW had discriminated against Hunter-Boykin in her original appointment by not offering her a tenure-track, higher-paid position that it offered a white applicant at the same time. Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 73-75.

According to the parties' calculations, a three-year statute of limitations governed Hunter-Boykin's contemplated suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and that period would expire on August 2, 1993, three years from the date of her original appointment. In order to provide breathing room in which to conduct settlement negotiations, the parties entered into an agreement "to toll the running of any statute of limitations period." The agreement, drafted by counsel for GW, was in the form of a letter from GW's counsel to Hunter-Boykin's counsel. Dated July 22, 1993, and signed by both attorneys, the letter stated: "This will confirm that we have agreed ... to toll the running of any statute of limitations period applicable to any purported claims ... beginning on the date of this letter through September 7, 1993." J.A. 76.

The parties agree that on the date of this letter agreement, July 22, 1993, Dr. Hunter-Boykin still had eleven days left before the statute of limitations would otherwise have run on her contemplated lawsuit. Thereafter, they entered into five additional and virtually identical letter agreements, changing only the beginning and ending dates of the time period during which the statute of limitations was "toll[ed]." The last letter was dated December 17, 1993, and continued the tolling "through January 7, 1994." J.A. 81.

On January 4, 1994, counsel for GW notified Hunter-Boykin that GW had rejected her discrimination claims. He warned that if she followed through on her threat of litigation, the University would defend its interests "with vigor." J.A. 137. Undeterred, Hunter-Boykin filed suit on January 10, 1994, three days after the end of the tolling period mentioned in the letter.

True to its word, GW did defend, and with vigor. It moved for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff had filed her complaint three days too late. Hunter-Boykin disagreed, arguing that to "toll" the statute of limitations means to "suspend" it. Since she had eleven days left to sue on the date the statute was first suspended, Hunter-Boykin contended that she had eleven days left to file her complaint when the last period of suspension ended on January 7, 1994. She was not late, she said; she had eight days to spare.

Defendant GW replied that, under District of Columbia law, private parties cannot agree to "suspend" the statute of limitations. A defendant can, however, agree to "waive" its right to assert a limitations defense for a discrete period. That, GW asserted, is what it did: it agreed not to assert its limitations defense if a complaint were filed during successive periods ending with the period defined in the last letter. See GW Summ. J. Reply Br. at 1, 5 (J.A. 122, 126). Moreover, GW argued, the scope of a waiver must be "absolutely clear and unequivocal." Because "the mere use of the word 'toll' plainly does not show the University's clear and unequivocal intent to waive its defense beyond January 7," GW asserted that Hunter-Boykin's complaint was time-barred. Id. at 5 (J.A. 126) (emphasis in original).

GW's motion for summary judgment was referred to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 504. The magistrate agreed with the parties' determination of the applicable limitations period and agreed that on July 22, 1993, when the parties entered into their first tolling agreement, Hunter-Boykin had eleven days left in which to sue. Magistrate's Opinion ("Mag Op.") at 5-6 (J.A. 155-56). Accepting much of GW's argument, however, the magistrate concluded that Hunter-Boykin had filed three days too late, and recommended that the district court grant the university's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 10-11 (J.A. 160-61). The court adopted the magistrate judge's report in its entirety and dismissed Hunter-Boykin's complaint with prejudice. J.A. 201-02.

II

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Jackson v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, 101 F.3d 145, 150 (D.C.Cir.1996). The question to be decided on a motion for summary judgment is "whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In a matter involving a contract, summary judgment is appropriate where the agreement "admits of only one reasonable interpretation." United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension v. Pittston Co., 984 F.2d 469, 473 (D.C.Cir.1993).

In deciding this case, the magistrate judge did not ask whether Hunter-Boykin's interpretation of "toll" as meaning "suspend" was reasonable. Instead, he first applied a rule that, "[i]n the absence of a specific tolling statute, disputing parties cannot by mutual agreement interrupt or suspend the running of a statute of limitations." Mag. Op. at 6 (J.A. 156). As there is no specific provision in the District of Columbia Code "that authorizes the parties to an action to suspend or defer the running of the statute of limitations," the magistrate held that "[s]uch an interpretation is contrary to the District of Columbia statute and should be rejected by this court." Id. at 7-8 (J.A. 157-58). However, although he determined that parties could not suspend the running of the statute of limitations, the magistrate agreed with GW that a defendant could "waive" its right to assert an affirmative defense. He therefore interpreted the agreement as a "waiver"--the only interpretation he regarded as lawful. Id. at 8 (J.A. 158).

Second, in interpreting the scope of the waiver, the magistrate again did not ask what a reasonable juror could find. Instead, he held that because the waiver stated a specific time period, he was "not prepared to enlarge that period absent persuasive evidence that defendant intended a date different from the date stated." Id. Finding such "persuasive evidence" lacking, the magistrate judge concluded that GW had waived its statute of limitations defense only until January 7, 1994. Id.

Because the magistrate's view of what the letter agreement meant clearly was colored by the two legal lenses he thought he was bound to employ, we consider the validity of those legal rules first. We then turn to the reasonable meaning of the agreement itself.

III

The first legal rule applied below--that in the absence of a specific authorizing statute, private parties cannot suspend the running of the statute of limitations--turns the usual rule of construction on its head. The usual rule is that "in the absence of a controlling statute to the contrary, the parties to a ... potential lawsuit may, by agreement, modify a statutory period of limitation." 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 25, at 56 (1987) (emphasis added). ¹ The usual rule is quite sensible, since a limitations defense is merely a "personal privilege," of which a party may choose not to avail itself. See Atchison & Keller, Inc. v. Taylor, 51 A.2d 297, 297 (D.C.Mun.App.1947); see also Feldman v. Gogos, 628 A.2d 103, 104 (D.C.1993). If individuals can give up considerably more important protections--including their Fifth Amendment rights in a criminal case--what reason could there be to deny them the ability to extend a civil statute of limitations? Indeed, this court asked itself just that question, and concluded that there was no satisfactory answer, in the course of deciding that a defendant can waive the protection of the statute of limitations in a criminal prosecution. See United States v. Wilson, 26 F.3d 142, 155 (D.C.Cir.1994).

Neither the magistrate, nor GW, cite any precedent from the District of Columbia for the proposition that specific statutory authority is required to permit private parties to agree to suspend a statute of limitations--and we have found none. Instead, the magistrate cited five opinions decided under the laws of other states. Four of those five did not involve the validity of private tolling agreements, ² and...