Hunter v. Cleveland Co-Operative Stove Company
| Decision Date | 25 February 1884 |
| Citation | 18 N.W. 645,31 Minn. 505 |
| Parties | John C. Hunter, Assignee, v. Cleveland Co-operative Stove Company |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the district court for Clay county.
Plaintiff in his amended complaint, alleges that he "is the owner in fee and in the possession of the following described real estate, situate in the county of Clay," etc (describing it;) that the defendant is an Ohio corporation and "claims an estate or interest in said described real property adverse to the title of said plaintiff." Judgment is demanded that "the defendant disclose the estate or interest in the above-described real estate claimed by it, and that the same, as against the title of this plaintiff, be declared unlawful and void," and for costs.
The defendant, in its answer, denies plaintiff's ownership and possession, and alleges the recovery and docketing of a judgment for $ 1,065, by defendant, against one Wilhelmina S Douglas in the district court for Clay county, on March 4 1879, and the recovery and docketing, in the same court on the same day, of two other judgments against Douglas, one for $ 85.34, in favor of Lyman Brothers, and the other for $ 272.75, in favor of one Kimback, at which time Douglas was owner in fee of the property in question.
The answer further alleges that after the rendition and docketing of these judgments, Douglas made a general assignment of all her property to F. A. Elder and W. H. S. Brady, for the benefit of creditors; that Elder and Brady resigned, and the judge of the district court for Clay county appointed plaintiff as assignee. That afterwards, and on November 12, 1879, plaintiff, as such assignee, moved the same court for an order vacating the judgments, and on January 7, 1880, obtained an order vacating them, which order was, however, reversed by the supreme court, on September 13, 1880. (See Cleveland, etc., Stove Co. v. Douglas, 27 Minn. 177.) That on February 23, 1881, an execution issued on each of the judgments, by virtue of which the sheriff duly levied on the land, and on April 30, 1881, sold it to defendant for $ 2,150, and executed and delivered to it the statutory certificate of sale, which was duly recorded prior to the bringing of this action, (which was begun June 23, 1881.)
The reply denies that the judgments pleaded in the answer were rendered in any actions pending, or were rendered or docketed on the date stated in the answer, and further alleges that on March 3, 1879, Douglas, being a resident of Clay county, and owner in fee of the real estate in question, made the general assignment pleaded in the answer, which was filed in the office of the clerk of the district court for Clay county on March 4, 1879, at 7.30 o'clock A. M., at which time there were no judgments of record or docketed against Douglas; that in September, 1879, the assignees resigned and were by the judge of the court removed, and plaintiff appointed in their stead, the judge, in the order of appointment, transferring to plaintiff all the property of Douglas, including the land in question.
The reply further alleges that on March 3, 1879, the defendant, Lyman Brothers, and Kimback, each procured Douglas to make in his favor a statement for confession of judgment, which statements were delivered to the clerk of the court, at his residence, on March 4, 1879, at 7 A. M., 7.10 A. M., and 7.20 A. M., respectively. That at about 9.30 A. M. of the same day, and no earlier, and before the indorsement of any judgment on any of the statements, or entry of any judgment in the judgment-book, or the making or filing of any judgment-roll, in any of the cases, the clerk made entries of pretended judgments in the docket of the court, falsely showing, in substance, that judgments had been entered on March 3d and docketed on March 4th, against Douglas, in favor of defendant, for $ 1,065, in favor of Lyman Brothers, for $ 79.91, and in favor of Kimback, for $ 272.75. That there was not, prior to October 16, 1879, any paper on file or of record in any of the cases, except the statement for confession of judgment and the false docket entry, nor had any judgment been rendered or entered, nor any judgment-roll filed, in any of them. That on October 16, 1879, the parties in whose favor the confessions were made, for the purpose of defrauding plaintiff and the general creditors of Douglas, caused the clerk of the court to indorse on each of the statements, and to enter in the judgment-book, a pretended judgment in each case for the amount confessed, and to antedate such pretended judgments as of March 4, 1879, and to indorse on each statement such pretended judgment so antedated, and to make up and file in each case a judgment-roll as of the date March 4, 1879 -- all which was done by the clerk; and that the several executions on which the land was sold to defendant were issued at the instance of the judgment creditors, when they all knew the facts in regard to the pretended judgments and void docket entries, and for the purpose of defrauding plaintiff and the general creditors of Douglas.
At the trial before Stearns, J., the plaintiffs in each of the confessed judgments moved that each of the docket entries, executions, and all subsequent proceedings thereunder, be amended by substituting March 4th, in place of March 3d, wherever the latter date occurs. The motion was denied.
In regard to these judgments, the court found, in substance, that the statements for confession of judgment were made March 3, 1879; that on March 4, 1879, at 7 o'clock, 7.10 and 7.20 A. M., respectively, the statements were delivered to the clerk of the court by the attorneys for the parties in whose favor they were made, with directions to file them and enter judgments thereon. That at 8 o'clock A. M. of the same day the clerk made the docket entries as stated in the reply, the general assignment of Douglas having been filed at 7.30 A. M. That in October, 1879, and not before, the clerk indorsed on the statements and entered in the judgment-book the judgments authorized by the confessions, which judgments bear date March 4, 1879.
The court also found that the motion to vacate the judgments was made by plaintiff, and with the result as stated in the answer, and was made on the ground "that the confessions were insufficient and did not warrant the entry of any judgment." It was also found that "the charges of fraud and collusion by and between the said clerk and attorneys of the defendant, charged in the plaintiff's reply, are not true."
As a conclusion of law the court held the plaintiff entitled to judgment, adjudging him to be owner of the premises in question, free from any estate, interest or lien of defendant, and for costs.
Judgment affirmed.
Briggs & Elders, for appellant.
The records of the judgments show their entry and docketing prior to the filing of the voluntary assignment, and these records cannot be collaterally impeached by the parties, or by their privies in estate. Ferguson v. Kumler, 25 Minn. 183; Dayton v. Mintzer, 22 Minn. 393.
An assignee for creditors is not a bona fide purchaser. He is in privity with his assignor, has only the rights the latter had at the time of the assignment, and stands in his shoes, representing him alone, and with no title or right superior to his. Gere v. Murray, 6 Minn. 213, (305;) Bennett v. Ellison, 23 Minn. 242; Ruble v. McDonald, 18 Iowa 493; Roberts v. Corbin, 26 Iowa 315; Warner v. Jameson, 52 Iowa 70; Estabrook v. Messersmith, 18 Wis. 545; Hawks v. Pritzlaff, 51 Wis. 160; Wakeman v. Barrows, 41 Mich. 363; Honsel v. Cremer, 13 Neb. 298; Vandyke v. Christ, 7 Watts & S. 373; Brownell v. Curtis, 10 Paige, 210; In the Matter of Howe, 1 Paige, 124; S. C., 19 Am. Dec. 395, and note, p. 399. And see Clark v. Stanton, 24 Minn. 232 Kingman v. Barton, Id. 295; Flower v. Cornish, 25 Minn. 473. This last case held that prior to the act of 1877, (Gen. St. 1878, c. 41, § 27,) the assignee could not attack even fraudulent conveyances of his assignor. That act merely provides that he shall represent the creditors as against fraudulent transfers and conveyances only, and have the rights they would have "to avoid such fraudulent conveyances and transfers."
The cases cited showing that Douglas...
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