Hunter v. Empire State Sur. Co.
| Decision Date | 13 March 1913 |
| Parties | HUNTER v. EMPIRE STATE SURETY CO. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Polk County; Hugh Brennan, Judge.
Appellee brought this action to recover for loss alleged to have been suffered by her on account of the alleged theft of property covered by a policy of burglary insurance. There was a judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Modified and affirmed.Miller & Wallingford and Oliver H. Miller, all of Des Moines, for appellant.
Clinton L. Nourse, of Des Moines, for appellee.
The only matter complained of by appellant is that the trial court allowed interest on the verdict. The material facts bearing on this question are that plaintiff in her petition asked judgment for $2,772, with interest thereon at 6 per cent. per annum from September 25, 1909. The evidence was to the effect that the property was stolen on September 25, 1909. The policy provided that any loss should be payable immediately upon the submission of proofs of loss. The proofs of loss were received by defendant November 20, 1909. The court instructed the jury: “If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that on or about the 25th day of November, 1909, some one entered the premises of the plaintiff and stole property therefrom which belonged to the plaintiff, and which was covered by this policy, then your verdict will be for the plaintiff.” And further: “* * * To the amount you so find you will add interest at 6% from November 20, 1909, to this date, and and this sum shall be the amount of your verdict.” Some of the above dates are not correctly stated. June 6, 1911, a sealed verdict was returned, which upon being opened the next morning was found to read as follows: “We the jury, find for the plaintiff, and fix the amount of her recovery at $1,850 at 6% interest.” The italicized part was written in by the jury; the balance being on a typewritten form submitted by the court. In its motion for a new trial defendant objected to interest being allowed on the verdict in this way: “If for any reason this motion should be overruled, the defendant shows to the court that judgment should not be entered in this case on the verdict returned for more than $1,850, for the reason that, if the verdict in this case was or is irregular or improper in form, the court could require the jury to reform it or place it in proper form, but the court cannot change or vary the verdict, and, if judgment be rendered against the defendant, it should be rendered for but the sum of $1,850.” The motion for new trial was overruled, and on July 13, 1911, judgment was rendered against the defendant for the sum of $1,850, with interest at 6 per cent. per annum from the 20th day of November, 1909, and for costs, and the defendant excepted. The interest so added amounted to about $175. The evidence is before us, and is such that a verdict for any amount between $1,600 and $2,050 would have support.
[1][2] 1. The statute provides the verdict of the jury shall be sufficient in form if it expresses the intention of the jury. Code, § 3731. And it is the duty of the court to put the verdict of the jury in form if necessary. Code, § 3732. Appellee contends that a court is justified in modifying or reforming a verdict, or putting it into form so as to effectuate the intention of the jury wherever there is certain and unmistakable data in the case upon which to base such action (and cites Edwards v. McCaddon, 20 Iowa, 520; Stevens v. Campbell, 6 Iowa, 544; McGregor v. Armill, 2 Iowa, 30); that in arriving at the intention of the jury it is proper to look at the nature of the case, the issues made, and the language used by the jury. Cassel v. Western Stage Co., 12 Iowa, 49; Armstrong v. Pierson, 15 Iowa, 477; Fromme v. Jones, 13 Iowa, 483. The correctness of these rules is not disputed. Counsel for plaintiff also insists that as the court required the jury to find the market value of the property the evidence was such that the jury could not have found the value to be less than $1,850, and that, therefore, it is certain that the jury could not have allowed less than that amount, and that they intended to add interest thereto. We do not so understand the record. The property taken consisted of clothing, teaspoons, and diamonds. There was a difference of opinion of the witnesses as to the values. Counsel say that the lowest valuation put upon all the property was $2,063. The quantity of diamonds was 8 1/4 carats. Some of the witnesses placed the value as low as $135 per carat, or a total for the diamonds of $1,113.75. Add to this the valuation put upon the clothing and spoons by plaintiff $475, and we have $1,588.75. Some of the clothing had been worn from five to seven years. The opinions of the witnesses on the question of values are not binding on the jury. They may use their own judgment in such matters in connection with the evidence of the...
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