Hunter v. Feild

• Decision Date: 06 July 1914
• Docket Number: (No. 101.)
• Parties: HUNTER v. FEILD et al.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

169 S.W. 813

HUNTER v. FEILD et al.

(No. 101.)

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

July 6, 1914.

Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court; John E. Martineau, Chancellor.

Action by W. A. Feild and others against A. J. Hunter. Decree for complainants, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with direction to dismiss the complaint for want of equity.

Appellees were plaintiffs below in a suit brought to enforce a trust against certain lands in Pulaski county, formerly owned by their father, Silas Feild, who died in September, 1897, leaving him surviving, in addition to the plaintiffs, certain other children and grandchildren. At the time of his death Silas Feild was the owner of considerable real estate situated in Pulaski, Desha, and other counties in this state; indeed he was described as being "land poor," and such appears to have been the case, as he was heavily involved, and his lands produced but little income. The complaint alleged, and there was proof tending to show, the following facts: The heirs of Silas Feild agreed that the eldest son, O. B. Feild, should administer upon the estate of his father, and this son duly qualified and acted as such administrator, until the estate had been administered upon and the administrator discharged. That it was agreed the administrator should serve without pay, and that appellant, who was a son-in-law of the intestate, should assist the administrator in all clerical matters and in making the settlements, and that he, too, should serve without pay, yet the administrator appears to have been allowed the statutory commissions. That at the death of the said Silas Feild the lands involved in this litigation were under mortgage to one B. J. Brown, who was demanding the payment of his money. That appellee W. A. Feild applied to his father-in-law, C. Luchesi, and obtained a loan to be made appellant, with which he should buy in as trustee, for the benefit of his wife and the other heirs of Silas Feild, the property, which was about to be sold under the decree ordering the foreclosure of the Brown mortgage, and that pursuant to this agreement, the property was sold by the commissioner of the court to appellant, and that although appellant took the title to the land in his name individually, his purchase and the conveyance to him was as trustee. This sale took place February, 6, 1899. That upon the discharge of the administrator, appellant took charge of and exercised general supervision over the affairs of the estate, including lands not embraced in the Brown mortgage, and made sales of these lands and paid the taxes thereon, and the complaint further alleged that appellant has made no proper settlement of the money he has received and disbursed, and now repudiates his trust and claims to own individually the lands bought by him at the foreclosure sale. The answer was a general denial of the material allegations of the complaint, and the case presents several sharply defined questions of fact. There are a number of minor contradictions in the testimony, but the record is voluminous, and we shall discuss only those features of the evidence which we regard as controlling in determining the relationship of the parties to each other.

In addition to the evidence stated, appellees offered evidence to the following effect: That the said Luchesi, who was the father-in-law of W. A. Feild, loaned the appellant the money with which to purchase the land, and loaned it upon the understanding that the land should be purchased by appellant as trustee, that after this purchase certain taxes on the property there sold appellant were paid by the administrator and heirs of the Feild estate, and that appellant stated from time to time he only wanted his money returned with interest thereon and compensation for his trouble in managing the affairs of the estate. And it was testified that appellant explained that he bought the land and took the title to himself individually, and not as trustee, because some of the Feild heirs were minors and he could dispose of the property to better advantage by taking the title in his own name.

The moving spirits in this litigation appear to have been W. A. and O. B. Feild, who invited all the other heirs to join with them in the institution and prosecution of this lawsuit, but only two of the heirs accepted this invitation, the others declined to take part in it, and were not joined as defendants, and the case proceeded to final decree between appellant and the heirs who were plaintiffs. The case of the plaintiffs depended chiefly upon the testimony of O. B. Feild and W. A. Feild and his father-in-law, Mr. Luchesi, and the other heirs who testified derived most of their information from these two brothers. It is undisputed that the loan to Mr. Brown had been past due for some time and the Feild heirs had defaulted in the payment of interest and application had been made to several agents who made loans on real property for a loan to repay the Brown mortgage, but all of them had declined to make a loan on the lands described in the Brown mortgage in a sufficient sum to pay that mortgage. A few days before the sale, according to the evidence of appellant, he announced his purpose to W. A. and O. B. Feild to make the land bring the debt it secured, or to buy it in himself at the sale, and that his purpose in so doing was to save the remainder of the real estate from a sale under an execution which would issue on the deficiency judgment, if the land failed to bring the debt. Appellant discussed the question of a loan with Mr. Luchesi, and he declined to make the necessary loan on the property described in the Brown mortgage. Luchesi appears to have gone with appellant to the cashier of the Pulaski Trust Company, and to have discussed the loan with that officer, but the point is in dispute as to how the loan was negotiated. Mr. J. F. Lenon, the cashier of the bank, testified that as representative of Coffin and Ragland he made the loan to appellant, and that later Luchesi bought this loan and had the mortgage transferred to him, and he further testified that he made the loan directly to appellant, and that there was no intimation that he was borrowing the money to use as trustee. A strong circumstance which supports appellant's contention is that he was unable to raise the money to pay off the mortgage by the use of property belonging to the Feild estate, and his loan was made upon the security of the mortgaged property and the home of appellant in the city of Little Rock, in which the Feild heirs had no interest whatever, and he repaid this loan out of his own funds. Moreover, the negotiations for this loan show the purpose for which it was being made, it being explained that appellant intended to see that the mortgaged property sold for enough to pay the mortgage debt, and that if this was done and some one else became the purchaser appellant would not desire this loan made. When the sale was made appellant was not the purchaser of all the lands. O. B. Feild purchased a small tract of the land, but assigned his certificate to appellant for the amount of the bid, and the second wife of Silas Feild bid on and bought a portion of the land. The commissioner executed his deed to appellant for the lands purchased by him, and testified that no intimation was given to him that appellant was not purchasing for his own account. After this, appellant negotiated the sale of lands belonging to the estate, not embraced in the mortgage, and there appears now to be no question that he fairly accounted for all of the money so received, notwithstanding the allegations of the complaint to the contrary. Immediately after his purchase appellant declared his willingness to...