Hunter v. Lincoln Stages, Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 April 1931
• Docket Number: 22870.
• Citation: 161 Wash. 634,297 P. 179
• Parties: HUNTER et ux. v. LINCOLN STAGES, Inc., et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

297 P. 179

161 Wash. 634

HUNTER et ux. v. LINCOLN STAGES, Inc., et al.

No. 22870.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 2, 1931

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; E. D. Hodge, Judge.

Action by Harry Hunter and wife against the Lincoln Stages, Inc. and another. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal.

Reversed and remanded.

Whittemore & Truscott, of Seattle, and Ellis & Evans, of Tacoma, for appellants.

John E Belcher and Selden & Lee, all of Tacoma, for respondents.

HOLCOMB J.

In this action respondents alleged in their complaint that on February 14, 1930, about 3:00 p. m., Mrs. Hunter was driving their Chevrolet sedan on the Pacific highway near Nisqually traveling in a northerly direction, and driving in a careful and prudent manner; that, when she reached a point on the highway near the old Nisqually station of the Northern Pacific Railway, the automobile driven by her was struck with great force and violence by the stage of appellant Lincoln Stages, Inc., causing severe and serious damage and injury to respondent Mrs. Hunter and damage to the automobile of respondents. The negligence alleged by respondents to have been the cause of the accident and injury was the automobile stage of the Lincoln Stages, Inc., was being propelled at a high and dangerous rate of speed and in too close proximity to the automobile of respondents. Appellant United States Casualty Company is the indemnitor of appellant Lincoln Stages, Inc., in the sum of $5,000 as required by law.

The answer of appellants denies any negligence on the part of the Lincoln Stages, Inc., and affirmatively alleges contributory negligence on the part of respondent Mrs. Hunter, the driver of the car. It further alleges that any injuries that were sustained were caused by the negligence of some person unknown by appellants and over whom appellants had no control.

The evidence on behalf of respondents tends to show that Mrs. Hunter and her friend, Mrs. Redmond, were driving in the Chevrolet coach from twenty to twenty-five miles an hour on the Pacific highway near Nisqually station; that in front of the Hunter Chevrolet was a Ford; that the Ford turned to the left to enter a roadway in the vicinity of Nisqually station; that the driver of the Ford gave no signal; that the Ford came to a virtual stop diagonally across the pavement; that the Ford stopped abruptly; that Mrs. Hunter applied her brake and traveled about the length of her car after she applied the brake. While part of the testimony of Mrs. Hunter's companion showed a total lack of appreciation of distance in yards or feet, she did ultimately testify that, when Mrs. Hunter saw the Ford car in front of her stopping, Mrs. Hunter had her foot on the brake of her car while approximately the length of her car. This was also testified to by Mrs. Hunter, and Mrs. Hunter testified that she had red rear lights which would always show when the foot brake was applied. Both also testified that Mrs. Hunter made a slow stop and gave a signal by holding out her hand on the left side of the car. Both Mrs. Hunter and her companion testified that when the Hunter car stopped the two righthand wheels were off the paved portion of the highway. The stage, coming from the rear, struck the Hunter car with sufficient force to drive the body of that car forward on the chassis, break the cast-iron front seats, and very severely snapped the neck of Mrs. Hunter so that she suffered temporary dislocation and a fracture of the body of the second cervical vertebra, torn ligaments of the neck, and other injuries.

At the close of the evidence on behalf of respondents, appellants moved for a directed verdict, which was denied. Evidence was introduced on behalf of appellants, and at the conclusion thereof a motion for a directed verdict was made and denied. A verdict was rendered in favor of respondents in the sum of $6,300, against which motions for judgment n. o. v., or for a new trial, were made, denied, and judgment entered on the verdict.

The first error urged and argued by appellants is that it was error to deny their motion for a nonsuit. It is argued that the trial court submitted the case to the jury under the theory of the application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.

The trial court denied the motion for a directed verdict or nonsuit on the ground that there was some evidence of negligence on the part of the stages company.

With that ruling of the court we agree. Respondents admit that there is no place for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in this case. There is no room for the contention that there was no evidence of negligence on the part...