Hunter v. State
| Decision Date | 22 August 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 279, 2000.,279, 2000. |
| Citation | 783 A.2d 558 |
| Parties | Daniel HUNTER, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Delaware |
Bernard J. O'Donnell and Nicole Marie Walker (argued), Office of Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant.
Peter Veith, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and STEELE, Justices. STEELE, Justice:
Daniel Hunter appeals the Superior Court's order that denied his motion to suppress cocaine police seized from him during a pat-down search. Following a bench trial, the trial judge found Hunter guilty of trafficking in cocaine and possession with intent to delivery and sentenced him to six years at Level V.1 Hunter filed a timely notice of appeal. Hunter argues that a police officer violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when the officer detained him solely on the basis of an outdated and invalid arrest warrant and then frisked him and ultimately seized cocaine from his trouser pocket. Hunter argues that reliance upon the outdated warrant cannot supply the probable cause necessary for a constitutionally valid arrest, search and seizure. Hunter further argues that the trial judge erred by placing on him the burden of establishing that a challenged warrantless search and seizure violated his constitutional rights. Because we find the police officer's warrantless search to be reasonable, we conclude that the trial judge did not err when he denied Hunter's motion to suppress and we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
The facts are not in dispute.2 In December 1997, Officer Michael F. Rodriguez, a Wilmington Police detective assigned to the federal Drug Enforcement Agency, began investigating Corey Medley, a friend of Hunter's, for trafficking in cocaine. Although his investigation of Medley had begun in December 1997, by April 2000, Rodriguez still had not located Medley. Sometime during his investigation, Rodriguez learned from an informant that Hunter and Medley were friends. While investigating Hunter as a possible lead to find Medley, Rodriguez learned that Hunter had an outstanding arrest warrant for failing to appear in Municipal Court for a traffic offense.
On April 20, 2000, Rodriguez learned from his partner that Medley, now a federal fugitive, might be at Hunter's house in Middletown. At approximately noon, Rodriquez drove to Hunter's house and began surveillance. Rodriguez watched two individuals, whose identity he could not determine, leave the house, get into a car and drive in a direction towards Newark. Rodriguez followed the car to Newark where he watched the two individuals enter a restaurant. Rodriguez followed them but did not immediately see them when he scanned the crowd. He then noticed the two coming out of a bathroom together. At that time, he identified the two as Medley and Hunter. Rodriquez placed Medley under arrest on a federal warrant and told him to place his hands on the wall. Rodriguez told Hunter that he was under arrest for the Municipal Court warrant and told him to place his hands on the wall.
Rodriguez testified that as he was holding Medley and radioing his partner, who was outside the restaurant, he saw Hunter remove his hand from the wall and place it in his "cargo pants"' right pocket.3 Rodriguez removed Hunter's hand from the pocket and placed it back on the wall. Fearing that Hunter might possess a weapon, Rodriguez testified that he:
conducted a frisk of that pocket. I frisked, pushed, securing it. When I did, I heard a crunch as if it was plastic bags. I felt chunky substances inside. Based on my training and experience, I know that cocaine is often cooked into crack cocaine.... So with that, I reached in and removed it. There were two plastic bags and each contained a white chunky substance.4
By removing what ultimately proved to be cocaine from Hunter's pocket, Rodriguez had seized the cocaine for the purpose of this Motion to Suppress. He then finished the process of arresting Medley and Hunter. Rodriguez later learned that the outstanding warrant on which he arrested Hunter had been cleared sometime before the arrest. Rodriguez testified that while he had inquired about Hunter sometime between December 1997 and February 1998, he had not inquired further between February 1998 and April 20, 2000, the date of the arrest, to determine whether the warrant for Hunter remained valid. Rodriquez explained that he had not inquired further to determine the warrant's validity because Medley, not Hunter, was the subject of his investigation. Both parties agree that at the time of the seizure complained of, the arrest warrant was outdated and invalid.
Hunter argues that the trial judge erred by placing the burden on him to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Rodriguez violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The State argues that the trial judge applied the correct burden, citing State v. Thomason5 for the broad proposition that on a motion to suppress, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that a challenged search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. When there are no issues of fact in dispute, this Court reviews de novo the trial judge's alleged errors in formulating and applying the law.6 Despite some arguable earlier confusion in the Delaware case law over which party bears the burden of proof on a motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search, the rule in Delaware should now be clear. The State bears the burden of proof.7 As such, any statement by the trial judge that placed the burden of proof on Hunter would be incorrect. This mere passing misstatement of law, however, does not affect our analysis of the trial judge's ultimate determination to deny the motion because the applicable law when applied to the undisputed facts here leads us to conclude that Rodriguez conducted a reasonable warrantless search and thus did not violate Hunter's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable warrantless searches and seizures.
The trial judge's evaluation of whether the police had probable cause to arrest or reasonable suspicion to approach Hunter is a mixed question of law and fact. To the extent that we examine the trial judge's legal conclusions, we review the trial judge's determinations for errors in formulating or applying legal precepts.8 To the extent the trial judge's decision is based on factual findings, we review to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the findings and to determine whether those findings were the result of a logical and orderly deductive process.9
At a hearing to suppress the cocaine Rodriguez seized from Hunter, Hunter argued that Rodriguez violated his Fourth Amendment rights when he relied upon an outdated and invalid arrest warrant to support his decision to stop Hunter. Hunter argued that reliance upon the outdated arrest warrant could not supply the probable cause required to make the arrest valid.
The State argued that because Rodriguez relied on the outdated arrest warrant in good faith, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should have applied. In the alternative, the State argued that Hunter's hand movement towards his pants' pocket served as an intervening event, providing Rodriguez with probable cause to frisk Hunter and thereby remove the taint of the outdated and invalid warrant.
The trial judge found it unnecessary to address the State's arguments; instead, the trial judge admitted the cocaine "absent a valid arrest warrant as discovered pursuant to a lawful protective detention and pat-down based on the officer's reasonable and articulable suspicion that Hunter was armed and dangerous."10 He based his decision primarily on the "automatic companion" rule, which provides that "[a]ll companions of the arrestee [(here Medley)] within the immediate vicinity, capable of accomplishing a harmful assault on the officer, are constitutionally subjected to the cursory `pat-down' reasonably necessary...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Lopez-Vazquez v. State
...WL 2219212, at *1; Cole, 922 A.2d at 359; Smith, 887 A.2d at 473; Garvey, 873 A.2d at 298; McAllister, 807 A.2d at 1123; Hunter v. State, 783 A.2d 558, 561 (Del.2001); Virdin, 780 A.2d at 1030; Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 860 (Del.1999); Downs v. State, 570 A.2d 1142, 1144 (Del.1990). 3. ......
-
State v. Stevens
...Ct. 2015), as corrected (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 14, 2015). 66. Chandler, 132 A.3d at 139 (Del. Super. Ct. 2015) (citing Hunter v. State, 783 A.2d 558, 560 (Del. 2001)); see State v. Preston, 2016 WL 5903002, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 2016) (quoting State v. Kang, 2001 WL 1729126, at *3......
-
Juliano v. State
...Constitution, the Delaware Constitution, or Delaware statutory law."121 This is an incorrect statement of our law. As we clarified in Hunter v. State , "on a motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search, the rule in Delaware should now be clear. The State bears the burden ......
-
State v. Parks
...held, therefore, under those factual circumstances, that the inevitable discovery exception did not apply. Id. at *2. 71. Supp. Hrg. at 87–88. 72.Hunter v. State, 783 A.2d 558, 560 ...