Hunter v. State

• Decision Date: 16 March 2007
• Docket Number: No. 63, Sept. Term, 2006.,63, Sept. Term, 2006.
• Citation: 397 Md. 580,919 A.2d 63
• Parties: Maurice Galen HUNTER v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

919 A.2d 63

397 Md. 580

Maurice Galen HUNTER v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 63, Sept. Term, 2006.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 16, 2007.

Brian M. Saccenti, Asst. Public Defender (Nancy S. Forster, Public Defender, on brief), for petitioner.

Brian S. Kleinbord, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER,^* CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.

CATHELL, J.

This case arises from the conviction of Maurice Galen Hunter, petitioner, for one count of first degree burglary under Maryland Code (2002), § 6-202 of the Criminal Law Article¹ for which he was sentenced to 15 years in prison. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals, relying on Fisher v. State, 128 Md.App. 79, 736 A.2d 1125 (1999), affirmed the judgment of the trial court. This Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari filed by petitioner's appellate counsel but denied both the petitioner's pro se petition for a writ of certiorari and the State's conditional cross-petition. Hunter v. State, 394 Md. 478, 906 A.2d 942 (2006). Petitioner presents two questions for review:

"1. In a criminal trial, is it error for the judge to allow the prosecutor to ask the defendant whether the police witnesses were lying?

"2. If the answer to the preceding question is yes, did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the error was harmless, particularly where the underlying facts were contested, the jury sent out notes suggesting that they were struggling with some of the factual issues, and the prosecutor's closing argument augmented the prejudicial effect of the error."

We hold that, under the circumstances of the instant case, the trial judge erred, as a matter of law, by permitting the State to ask the defendant if other witnesses were lying. We are unable to say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not affect the verdict.

I. Facts

Late in the afternoon of April 10, 2002, Dorothy Johnson returned to her home on 6707 Yataruba Drive in Baltimore County. She discovered that a basement window on the front of her house had been forced open while she was at work. After inspecting her house, she found that an engagement ring, a combination DVD-VCR player, three cameras, DVD's, CD's, food, money, a wedding band, and a cell phone were missing.

On that same day, April 10, 2002, petitioner pawned Ms. Johnson's engagement ring and other items not related to the 6707 Yataruba Drive address. On or about May 1, 2002, petitioner was arrested for the burglary at 6707 Yataruba Drive and other related crimes.² He was tried, in the instant case, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on October 1, 2003, on the charge of burglary in the first degree.

At trial, the manager of the pawnshop testified that petitioner was a long-time customer who usually retrieved the items he pawned. The pawnshop manager was unaware of the police coming to the pawnshop to look for anything petitioner had pawned on any prior occasion.

Detective Tyrone Knox testified that after petitioner was taken into custody, he confessed to the burglary at 6707 Yataruba Drive. Detective Knox also testified that petitioner directed the detectives to 6707 Yataruba Drive and pointed it out as the location of the burglary.

At trial, petitioner denied committing the burglary at 6707 Yataruba Drive. He also denied confessing to the burglary and pointing out the address. On direct examination, petitioner testified that he came into possession of the ring when he encountered an old friend, David Hairston, outside the pawnshop. According to petitioner, he was on his way into the pawnshop to pawn some of his own items when Hairston gave him the ring to pawn in exchange for half of the proceeds. Petitioner testified that he provided Hairston's name to the police.

The relevant portions of the State's cross-examination ensued:

"[The State:]: Mr. Hunter, it is your testimony then that Detective Knox who just came in here and testified lied, right?

[Petitioner:]: I didn't say that.

[Defense Counsel:] Objection.

[Petitioner:] I'm not even going to say he lied.

[Defense Counsel:] Mr. Hunter, just a moment.

[The State:] I'll withdraw the question, Your Honor.

[The Court:] He answered it.

[Defense Counsel:] Move to strike.

[The Court:] Move to strike the fact that he says no, he didn't say that. It's okay with me. I'll strike it.

. . .

"[The State:] And if the detective were to testify that Mr. Hairston, his name was never brought up to him, that would be a lie?

[Defense Counsel:] Objection.

[The Court:] Overruled.

[The State:] Would that be a lie?

[Petitioner:] I — to be honest with you, I told him numerous people, numerous names.

. . .

"[The State:] You never told the police how you broke into that house, right?

[Petitioner:] No.

[The State:] And you definitely told them about Mr. Hairston?

[Petitioner:] Yes.

[The State:] So if the detective were to testify that Mr. Hairston's name — that you never brought up Mr. Hairston's name to him, that would be a lie?

[Defense Counsel:] Objection. Asked and answered, Your Honor.

[The Court:] No, overruled. Cross examination.

[Petitioner:] I guess it would be a lie.

. . .

"[The State:] Sir, you don't personally or didn't personally have anything against Detectives Ramsuer or Knox before this incident, did you?

[Petitioner:] No, I didn't even know them.

[The State:] So they wouldn't have anything personal against you, would they?

[Petitioner:] I would assume not.

[The State:] Can't think of a reason that they would come in and lie about you?

[Petitioner:] Couldn't even tell you.

. . .

"[The State:] In 1992, isn't true that you were actually convicted of a first degree burglary?

[Petitioner:] Yes.

[The State:] And also of a misdemeanor theft?

[Petitioner:] Yes.

[The State:] But your telling the truth today?

[Petitioner:] Yes, I'm telling the truth.

[The State:] And the detective was lying?

[Petitioner:] I'm telling the truth."

Following petitioner's testimony, the State called Detective Ramseur as a rebuttal witness. Detective Ramseur testified that petitioner had made statements to him about his involvement in a burglary at 6707 Yataruba, that he pointed out that address as the one he had burglarized and, to the best of the Detective's recollection, petitioner never mentioned the name David Hairston.

Then, in its closing argument, the State made reference to the conflicting testimony of the Detectives and petitioner on three separate occasions:

"You would have to believe that both of these detectives came in here and lied to you. . . . You would have to believe that these detectives[,] in some mass conspiracy to convict Mr. Hunter[,] have come in here and lied to you.

. . .

"Ladies and gentlemen, you would have to believe that those two detectives are the biggest liars in the world in order to believe Mr. Hunter's story."

Following closing arguments, the trial court charged the jury with instructions and the jury began to deliberate at 4:20 p.m. (the trial began shortly after lunch that same day). The jury concluded its deliberations at 7:40 p.m. that same night. In its three hours and twenty minutes of deliberations, the jury sent four notes to the trial court. The first question was about pawnshop tickets and a police report not in evidence. Then the jury, at 5:05 p.m., wanted to know whether petitioner had signed a statement or confession. The existence or non-existence of a signed confession was not in evidence. The jury's third note came out at 6:45 p.m. and suggested that the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict. The trial court brought the jury into the courtroom and encouraged them to try and reach a verdict. At 7:05 p.m., the jury asked a confusing question about possession of stolen property to which the court responded that it did not understand the question. No further communications between the court and jury took place until, at 7:40 p.m., the jury returned a verdict finding petitioner guilty of burglary in the first degree.

II. Standard of Review

In a criminal context, we "`will not reverse for an error by the lower court unless that error is "both manifestly wrong and substantially injurious."'" Lawson v. State, 389 Md. 570, 580, 886 A.2d 876, 882 (2005) (quoting I.W. Berman Props. v. Porter Bros., 276 Md. 1, 11-12, 344 A.2d 65, 72 (1975) (quoting Rotwein v. Bogart, 227 Md. 434, 437, 177 A.2d 258, 260 (1962))). We have often said that if an appellant or petitioner establishes error in a criminal case, "unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed `harmless' and reversal is mandated." Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976); see State v. Logan, 394 Md. 378, 388, 906 A.2d 374, 381 (2006); Lawson, 389 Md. at 581, 886 A.2d at 882; Spain v. State, 386 Md. 145, 161, 872 A.2d 25, 34-35 (2005); Archer v. State, 383 Md. 329, 361, 859 A.2d 210, 229 (2004); Merritt v. State, 367 Md. 17, 31, 785 A.2d 756, 765 (2001). Thus, in a criminal case, upon a showing that an error is manifestly wrong and substantially injurious we will reverse the judgment of a lower court and, generally, we will only find the error to be harmless if we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not influence the verdict.

III. Discussion

A.

"In a criminal case tried before a jury, a fundamental principle is that the credibility of a witness and the weight to be accorded the witness' testimony are solely within the province of the jury." Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 277, 539 A.2d 657, 662 (1988) (citing Battle v. State, 287 Md. 675, 685, 414 A.2d 1266, 1271 (1980)); Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650, 678-679, 759 A.2d 764, 779 (2000); Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 153, 729 A.2d 910, 921 (1999). Generally, the rule is that it is "error for the...