Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Haehn
| Decision Date | 06 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 17AP-342,17AP-342 |
| Citation | 2018 Ohio 4837,125 N.E.3d 287 |
| Parties | The HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Chris HAEHN et al., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
On brief: Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A., and Daniel A. Friedlander, Cleveland, for appellee.
On brief: Kaltenbach Vargo, LLC, and James G. Vargo, for appellant Chris Haehn.
DECISION
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Chris Haehn, appeals a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the foreclosure sought by plaintiff-appellee, The Huntington National Bank ("Huntington"). For the following reasons, we affirm that judgment.
{¶ 2} On March 12, 2004, Haehn executed a note in which he promised to pay $244,000, plus interest, to his lender, Sky Bank. Haehn also granted Sky Bank a mortgage on his residence, located at 93 W. King Avenue, to secure the note.
{¶ 3} In 2007, Sky Bank merged into Huntington. At that point, Huntington assumed Sky Bank's interest in Haehn's note and mortgage.
{¶ 4} From 2004 to late 2009, Haehn made regular mortgage payments each month. However, Haehn did not remit any payments in November or December 2009. When Haehn made a payment in January 2010, Huntington accepted the payment and applied it to Haehn's account as the payment due on November 1, 2009. Haehn made another payment in February 2010, which Huntington accepted and applied to Haehn's account as the payment due on December 1, 2009.
{¶ 5} On April 24, 2010, Huntington mailed to Haehn a notice of its intention to accelerate the amount due on Haehn's mortgage and foreclose on his residence. In relevant part, the notice stated:
(Emphasis sic; Pl.'s Ex. 6.)
{¶ 6} According to the payment records maintained by Huntington, Huntington received mortgage payments from Haehn on April 16, April 29, April 30, June 3, July 28, and September 14, 2010.1 Each of these payments consisted of a check for $1,593.82, the amount of Haehn's monthly payment. While Huntington accepted these payments, it did not apply them to Haehn's account. Rather, Huntington returned these payments to Haehn because each was insufficient to bring his account current.
{¶ 7} On July 1, 2010, Huntington filed a complaint in foreclosure against Haehn.2
After Haehn filed his answer, the parties engaged in at least two attempts to mediate their dispute. Each attempt was unsuccessful.
{¶ 8} On May 16, 2014, Haehn moved for summary judgment. Haehn asserted that in the notice of acceleration, Huntington wrongly stated that he had defaulted on his loan in January 2010, and Huntington miscalculated the amounts due to cure the purported default. Due to these alleged defects in the notice of acceleration, Haehn argued that Huntington failed to comply with all the conditions precedent for filing for foreclosure. Haehn also maintained that he had cured any default by submitting multiple mortgage payments to Huntington in March and April 2010. Finally, Haehn argued that Huntington waived any right to accelerate and foreclose because it accepted payments from Haehn.
{¶ 9} Huntington responded to Haehn's summary judgment motion with an opposing memorandum filed June 5, 2014. Haehn replied to Huntington's response on June 13, 2014. In the reply, Haehn stated that the trial court should strike Huntington's memorandum in opposition because Huntington filed it six days late.
{¶ 10} After the close of briefing, on August 1, 2014, Huntington filed the affidavit of Michael Mantilla, who worked for Huntington as a litigation specialist, to support Huntington's memorandum in opposition. On August 4, 2014, Haehn moved to strike that affidavit because Huntington did not file it timely. Haehn also moved to strike Huntington's memorandum in opposition to its August 4, 2014 motion to strike because Huntington filed it 21 days late.
{¶ 11} On October 14, 2014, the trial court issued a decision denying Haehn's motions to strike and his motion for summary judgment. With regard to the motion to strike Mantilla's affidavit, the trial court concluded that it would consider the affidavit because the court had held the motion for summary judgment "in abeyance based on the parties' representations that they were working to settle [the] case." (Oct. 14, 2014 Decision & Entry at 5.) With regard to the motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that given the conflicting evidence, questions of fact remained regarding whether Huntington had provided Haehn with a proper notice of acceleration and whether Haehn had defaulted on the note.
{¶ 12} The trial court conducted a bench trial on November 12, 2014. During trial, Mantilla testified to the facts set forth above. Mantilla also identified copies of Haehn's note and mortgage, documents establishing the merger of Sky Bank into Huntington, the payment history for Haehn's loan, and the notice of acceleration Huntington mailed to Haehn. The trial court admitted each of these documents into evidence.
{¶ 13} Haehn also testified at trial. During his testimony, Haehn denied receiving the notice of acceleration.3 Haehn also claimed that his loan was not in default on April 30, 2010 because he had made payments in March and April 2010 in excess of the cure amount.
{¶ 14} On August 7, 2015, the trial court entered a decision granting judgment in Huntington's favor. The trial court ordered Huntington's counsel to submit to the court an appropriate judgment entry and decree of foreclosure within 30 days of the date of the decision. Huntington's counsel, however, failed to comply with the trial court's order.
{¶ 15} On February 9, 2016, the trial court issued an entry entitled "SUPERINTENDENCE RULE 40 ENTRY." In its entirety, the entry stated:
This Court, after a review of the above case, has found that plaintiff has failed to prosecute this action. This is to notify you that pursuant to Superintendence Rule 40 of the rules governing the Courts of Ohio, this action will be dismissed for want of prosecution on or about the 9th day of February 2016, unless plaintiff can show in writing, within ten (10) days good cause why such action should not be dismissed.
The Franklin County Clerk of Courts ("clerk") recorded the February 9, 2016 entry as a dismissal of the case for want of prosecution, and the clerk terminated the case.
{¶ 16} Approximately four months later, on June 27, 2016, Huntington filed a motion for leave to file the attached judgment entry/foreclosure decree instanter. The attorney who signed the motion indicated that she had recently taken over the handling of the case and sought to correct the prior attorney's lapse.
{¶ 17} Haehn responded to Huntington's motion with a motion to strike. Haehn argued that the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to act because it had entered a dismissal order.
{¶ 18} In a decision and entry dated January 27, 2017, the trial court vacated its February 9, 2016 entry, denied Haehn's motion to strike, and granted Huntington leave to file the proposed final judgment entry. On April 12, 2017, the trial court entered a judgment entry ordering foreclosure.
{¶ 19} Haehn now appeals the April 12, 2017 judgment, and he assigns the following errors:
{¶ 20} By his first assignment of error, Haehn argues that the trial court erred in vacating the February 9, 2016 entry and granting Huntington's motion for leave to file the proposed final judgment entry. We disagree.
{¶ 21} Haehn contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sua sponte vacate the February 9, 2016 entry because that entry constituted a final, appealable order. Haehn asserts that the February 9, 2016 entry dismissed the action under Civ.R. 41(B)(1), and that that dismissal operated as an adjudication on the merits because the trial court did not otherwise specify in the entry. We interpret the February 9, 2016 entry differently.
{¶ 22} In that entry, the trial court unambiguously conveyed its intent to comply with Sup.R. 40(A)(1), which provides that "[c]ases that have been on the docket for six months without any proceedings taken in the case * * * shall be dismissed, after notice to counsel of record, for want of prosecution, unless good cause be shown to the contrary." To fulfill this purpose, the entry stated, "This is to notify you * * * this action will be dismissed * * * unless plaintiff can show * * * good cause why said action should not be dismissed." (Feb. 9, 2016 Entry.) Thus, the entry warned that the trial court would dismiss the action if Huntington did not offer a good reason for its delay in following the August 7, 2015 order to...
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