Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Thompson
| Decision Date | 21 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 26265.,26265. |
| Citation | 24 N.E.3d 621 |
| Parties | The HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Vivian L. THOMPSON, et al., Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Mike L. Wiery and Rachel M. Kuhn, Solon, OH, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Vivian L. Thompson, Dayton, OH, for Defendant–Appellant.
FROELICH
, P.J.
{¶ 1} Vivian L. Thompson appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment to The Huntington National Bank on its claims for a monetary judgment on a note and a decree of foreclosure regarding rental property that Thompson owned. For the following reasons, the trial court's judgment will be affirmed.
{¶ 2} In November 2003, Thompson borrowed $134,000 from The Huntington National Bank to purchase the property located at 140 Lexington Avenue in Dayton, Ohio. She signed an adjustable rate note, which identified Huntington as the lender, and an accompanying mortgage. In March 2010, Thompson and Huntington entered into a loan modification agreement.
{¶ 3} On February 8, 2013, Huntington filed a foreclosure action against Thompson, seeking a monetary judgment on the note, foreclosure of the mortgage, and the sale of the property. Huntington alleged that Thompson had defaulted on the note, the loan modification agreement, and the mortgage as of July 1, 2012, and that there remained due and owning $118,443.73, plus interest. The bank attached to the complaint a copy of the adjustable rate note, the loan modification agreement, and the mortgage.
{¶ 4} On January 31, 2014, Huntington moved for summary judgment against Thompson. In support of its motion, Huntington submitted the affidavit of Marvin DeLong, a litigation specialist with Huntington, who authenticated various documents related to Thompson's loan and mortgage. The documents provided evidence of the loan and mortgage, of Thompson's default, of Huntington's compliance with conditions precedent to bringing its foreclosure action, and of the amount owed. Huntington further relied on the request for admissions that it sent to Thompson; the bank argued that, because Thompson failed to respond to the request for admissions, those matters should be deemed admitted, pursuant to Civ.R. 36(A)(1)
.
{¶ 5} In March 2014, Thompson filed several documents to oppose the summary judgment motion. She claimed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, that Huntington was not the real party in interest, and that there was no evidence of default or the sending of a letter of default. Thompson further claimed that DeLong's affidavit was hearsay and implicitly moved for the affidavit to be stricken. She further argued that the trial court should not deem that she had admitted the statements in Huntington's request for admissions. Finally, she stated that Huntington could not bring its action because it had not registered its fictitious name with the State of Ohio. Thompson reiterated her assertions in an affidavit.
{¶ 6} On April 10, 2014, the magistrate issued a decision granting Huntington's motion for summary judgment and denying Thompson's request to strike DeLong's affidavit. Thompson objected to the magistrate's ruling. On May 13, 2014, the trial court overruled her objections and adopted the magistrate's decision. On May 28, 2014, the trial court granted Huntington judgment on the note in the amount of $118,443.73, plus interest, foreclosed the equity of redemption, and ordered the property sold.
{¶ 7} Thompson appeals from the trial court's judgment, raising seven assignments of error.
{¶ 8} Thompson's first assignment of error states:
The Trial Court erred in entering a Summary Judgment that is void ab initio because the Montgomery County, Common Pleas Court of Ohio is a foreign corporation pursuant to 1703.01(C), Appellee is a foreign corporation pursuant to 1703.01(A)(B) and the process is a foreign corporation pursuant to 1703.01(E) and none of the foreign corporations above got consent from the Department of State, United States District Court or the Appellant to give the court jurisdiction.
{¶ 9} In her first assignment of error, Thompson claims that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that Huntington failed to get permission from the federal government to bring its foreclosure action in the trial court. Thompson cites R.C. 1703.01
, which defines the terms “domestic corporation,” “foreign corporation,” “state,” “articles,” and “process” for purposes of Ohio's foreign corporation statutes, R.C. Chapter 1703. She also references 28 U.S.C. 1330, which concerns the jurisdiction of federal district courts regarding actions against foreign states.
{¶ 10} The Supreme Court of Ohio recently addressed whether courts of common pleas have subject matter jurisdiction over foreclosure actions. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, –21 N.E.3d 1040. It stated:
. Jurisdiction has been “provided by law” in R.C. 2305.01, which states that courts of common pleas have “original jurisdiction in all civil cases in which the sum or matter in dispute exceeds the exclusive original jurisdiction of county courts.” This court has long held that the court of common pleas is a court of general jurisdiction, with subject-matter jurisdiction that extends to “all matters at law and in equity that are not denied to it.” We have also long held that actions in foreclosure are within the subject-matter jurisdiction of a court of common pleas. * * *
(Citations omitted.) Kuchta at ¶ 19–20. The supreme court has thus made clear that courts of common pleas, including the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, have subject matter jurisdiction over foreclosure actions, such as the case before us. Title 28 of the United States Code, which addresses the federal judiciary, has no relevance.
{¶ 11} In addition, R.C. Chapter 1703 does not preclude an action by Huntington in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. R.C. 1703.03
requires foreign corporations to obtain a license from the Ohio Secretary of State in order to transact business in Ohio. Under R.C. 1703.29, “no foreign corporation that should have obtained such license shall maintain any action in any court until it has obtained such license.”
{¶ 12} Here, the mortgage identifies Huntington's address as located in Columbus, Ohio. Thus, the record suggests that Huntington is a domestic corporation, not a foreign corporation. Thompson does not provide evidence that Huntington is a foreign corporation.
{¶ 13} Even accepting, for sake of argument, that Huntington is a foreign corporation, “R.C. 1703.031(A)
exempts a federally chartered bank, savings bank or savings and loan from the licensing requirement of R.C. 1703.01 to R.C. 1703.31.” Citibank v. Eckmeyer, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2008–P–0069, 2009-Ohio-2435, 2009 WL 1452614, ¶ 27. “Business activities of national banks are controlled by the National Bank Act (NBA or Act), 12 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., and regulations promulgated thereunder by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).” Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 6, 127 S.Ct. 1559, 167 L.Ed.2d 389 (2007). The mortgage indicates that Huntington is a national banking association organized and existing under the laws of the United States. Thus, any restrictions in R.C. Chapter 1703 on Huntington's ability to bring suit in Ohio would be preempted by federal law, and R.C. 1703.29 would not apply. Eckmeyer at ¶ 24–39; MidFirst Bank v. Speigelberg, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98765, 2013-Ohio-587, 2013 WL 655244, ¶ 6.
{¶ 14} Thompson's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 15} Thompson's second assignment of error states:
The Trial Court erred in entering a Summary Judgment that is void ab initio because because [sic] the summary judgment violates her Seven[th] Amendment rights and the court only had jurisdiction for $15,000 or more.
{¶ 16} In this assignment of error, Thompson cites to the monetary limits set forth in the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and R.C.1907.03
and 2305.01 to claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter summary judgment against her.
provides that, except as stated in R.C. 2305.03, “the court of common pleas has original jurisdiction in all civil cases in which the sum or matter in dispute exceeds the exclusive original jurisdiction of county courts * * *.” “[C]ounty courts have exclusive original jurisdiction in civil actions for the recovery of sums not exceeding five hundred dollars and original jurisdiction in civil actions for the recovery of sums not exceeding fifteen thousand dollars.” R.C. 1907.03. Thompson correctly states that this action falls within the monetary jurisdiction of the common pleas court.
{¶ 18} The Seventh Amendment creates the right to a jury trial in civil matters. It states that, “where the...
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