Huntington v. Clallam Grain Co.

• Decision Date: 07 December 1933
• Docket Number: 24636.
• Citation: 27 P.2d 583,175 Wash. 310
• Parties: HUNTINGTON v. CLALLAM GRAIN CO.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

27 P.2d 583

175 Wash. 310

HUNTINGTON v. CLALLAM GRAIN CO.

No. 24636.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 7, 1933

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Clallam County; John M. Ralston, Judge.

Action by John W. Huntington, a minor, by Ida W. Huntington, his guardian ad litem, against the Clallam Grain Company. A verdict was rendered for plaintiff for only part of sum demanded, and from an order granting a new trial on plaintiff's motion, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Ralph S. Pierce and Edwin J. Cummins, both of Seattle, for appellant.

Trumbull Severyns & Trumbull, of Port Angeles, for respondent.

STEINERT Justice.

This is an action for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by a minor, plaintiff herein, as the result of having been struck by a truck negligently operated by defendant's employee. The case was tried to a jury which rendered a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $2,500. The plaintiff moved for a new trial on several statutory grounds including, among others, that of 'inadequate damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.' The motion was granted, the order based thereon reciting that a new trial was awarded the plaintiff 'for the reason and upon the ground that the damages awarded to plaintiff are inadequate.' From this order, the defendant has appealed.

The question of negligence and consequent liability of the appellant is not in any way presented by this appeal. The only question Before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting respondent's motion after a trial to the jury on the merits.

The law upon this and closely kindred questions has been so thoroughly settled in this state that little more is necessary than a reference to the authorities.

Where the evidence is conflicting, as it was in this case, it is wholly within the discretion of the trial court to grant or to deny a motion for new trial upon the ground that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict, or that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, or that the amount awarded is, in the opinion of the trial court, either excessive or inadequate; and the ruling of the trial court on such questions will not be disturbed, in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. Aboltin v. Heney, 62 Wash. 65, 113 P. 245; Bernard v. City of North Yakima, 80 Wash. 472, 141 P. 1034; Hawn v. Yakima County, 93 Wash. 87, 160 P. 7; Nelson v. Pacific Coast Casualty Co., 96 Wash. 43, 164 P. 594; Shead v. Riser, 136 Wash. 270, 239 P. 562; Daigle v Rudebeck, 154 Wash. 536, 282 P. 827; McGinnis v Brandt, 158 Wash. 656, 291 P. 709; Norland v. Peterson, 169 Wash. 380, 13 P.2d 483.

In the case of Daigle v. Rudebeck, supra, a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff therein in the sum of $1,018.10. The plaintiff moved for a new trial on a number of grounds, among them being 'inadequacy of the verdict by reason of passion and prejudice, erroneous assessment of damages, in that the amount was too small, and that the verdict is not in accordance with the effective proof which shows that the plaintiff was entitled to recover (if entitled to recover at all) a greater amount than was allowed by the jury.' The order granting the motion contained the following recitation: '* * * That the said motion for new trial is granted upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict in that the amount awarded by the jury is not in conformity with the evidence adduced at the trial and is inadequate though not so far inadequate as to indicate passion or prejudice.' (Italics ours.)

From the above quotation, it will be noted that, while the verdict was found by the court to be inadequate in amount, it was not so far inadequate as to indicate passion or prejudice. Despite this fact, this court said on page 540 of 154 Wash., 282 P. 827, 828: 'From the order which we have quoted it will be seen that the trial court in this instance granted the motion, not only upon the ground of the inadequacy of the verdict, but upon the further and additional ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict in that the amount awarded by the jury is not in conformity with the evidence adduced at the trial. On those grounds, and particularly when as here there was substantial undisputed evidence calling for an award for general damages, we think the trial court cannot be said to have abused his discretion. It is the duty of the trial court to see that substantial justice is done, and, if he believes that the amount of damages awarded to the prevailing party is inadequate, it is as much his duty to grant a new trial as it would be upon the motion of the defendant, if the amount were excessive.'

In Norland v. Peterson, supra, we said on page 382 of 169 Was h., 13 P.2d 483: 'The trial court, in passing upon a motion for new trial based upon the ground that the verdict of the jury is inadequate or...