Huntington v. Love

• Decision Date: 14 January 1910
• Citation: 106 P. 185,56 Wash. 674
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: HUNTINGTON et ux. v. LOVE et al. SAME v. PACIFIC SECURITY STORAGE & WAREHOUSE CO.

106 P. 185

56 Wash. 674

HUNTINGTON et ux. v. LOVE et al.

SAME v. PACIFIC SECURITY STORAGE & WAREHOUSE CO.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 14, 1910

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; M. L. Clifford Judge.

Two cases by John Huntington and wife against L. L. Love and another, and against the Pacific Security Storage & Warehouse Company. From a judgment dismissing the action, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

B. W Coiner, Walter Christian, and P. C. Sullivan, for appellants.

T. W Hammond and S. F. McAnally, for respondent.

CROW J.

These two actions were commenced by Mary C. Huntington, by Alfred J. Huntington, her guardian ad litem, to redeem from tax sales certain real estate in the city of Tacoma. L. L. Love and J. H. Spencer were defendants in one action, and the Pacific Security Storage & Warehouse Company, a corporation, was defendant in the other; they being the several holders of the tax titles. As the two actions involved the same issues of fact and law, they were consolidated and tried together. After they had been commenced, John Huntington, husband of Mary C. Huntington, by amendment of the complaint, was made an additional party plaintiff. The trial judge made findings of fact and conclusions of law on which an order of dismissal was entered. The plaintiffs have appealed.

Mary C. and John Huntington were intermarried in 1879, and thereafter, but prior to 1895, acquired as community property the real estate involved in this action. The appellants contend that Mary C. Huntington became insane about December, 1895; that she has been insane ever since; that during such insanity certain state, county, and municipal taxes assessed against the community real estate became delinquent; that about December, 1904, the tax liens were foreclosed; that under such foreclosure proceedings and by mesne conveyances the respondents acquired their respective tax titles; that prior to the commencement of this action tenders of all the delinquent and subsequent taxes, with penalty, interest, and costs were made by appellants to the respondents; and that Mary C. Huntington is now entitled to redeem the property from the tax sales. The regularity of the tax foreclosure proceedings is not questioned, but appellants predicate the right of redemption upon the insanity of Mary C. Huntington and on section 8696, Pierce's Code, which, in part, reads as follows: 'If the real property of any minor heir, or any insane person, be sold for nonpayment of taxes or assessments, the same may be redeemed at any time after sale and before the expiration of one year after such disability has been removed upon the terms specified in this section on the payment of interest at the rate of fifteen per cent. per annum on the amount for which the same was sold, from and after the date of sale, and in addition the redemptioner shall pay the reasonable value of all improvements made in good faith on the property, less the value of the use thereof, which redemption may be made by themselves or any person in their behalf.' The respondents deny the alleged insanity of Mary C. Huntington, and contest her right to redeem even if insane. The trial judge found: That the real estate was the community property of Mary C. and John Huntington. That the respondents had acquired the tax titles under the foreclosure proceedings. That sufficient tenders had been made to them by appellants. '(4) That theretofore, and about the month of December, A. D. 1896, this plaintiff, Mary C. Huntington, became insane, and ever since said time has been, and is now, insane. (5) That during the insanity of the said Mary C. Huntington, and prior to the year 1904, certain state, county, and municipal taxes were levied and assessed against the above-described premises.'

Upon the findings the trial judge held that Mary C. Huntington was not entitled to redeem, because during the entire period in controversy her husband, John Huntington, was of sound mind, and, having the management and control of the community property, had neglected to pay the taxes; that the community was not insane; and that the community was not, nor was either member thereof, entitled to redeem, the wife only being insane. The appellants excepted only to the conclusions of law and decree. They now contend that, upon the findings made, a decree for redemption should have been entered in their favor. The respondents filed written exceptions to findings 4 and 5, and other findings, contending that they were not supported by the evidence. Although judgment was entered in respondents' favor, they have caused a statement of facts to be prepared and certified in support of their contention that the findings are not sustained by the evidence.

Respondents insist that, to make the statute applicable and entitle the appellants to the right of redemption, it must appear: (a) That the redemptioner is the owner of the property; (b) that the redemptioner was insane; and (c) that the action has been commenced in time. Discussing the first proposition, they contend that the community (not either spouse) was the owner of the real estate, and that one spouse--especially the wife--cannot redeem when it appears, as in this case, that the husband has at all times been of sound mind, that he had the management and control of the community property, and that he had failed to pay the taxes. Appellants, commenting on these three contentions, say: 'If, by the use of the word 'owner,' in the first requirement announced by the respondents, is meant the technical holder in whose name the legal title to the real estate sought to be redeemed stands, it has no justification under the language of the statute. The word 'owner' does not appear in the redemption statute anywhere in relation to the...