RI TEMPS v. Dept. of Labor and Training

• Citation: 749 A.2d 1121
• Decision Date: 27 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-73-M.P.,99-73-M.P.
• Parties: RHODE ISLAND TEMPS, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

749 A.2d 1121

RHODE ISLAND TEMPS, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW et al.

No. 99-73-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 27, 2000.

Present WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Michael K. Marran, for plaintiff.

Donald G. Elbert, Jr., Tiverton, for defendant.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

In this petition for certiorari, Rhode Island Temps, Inc., seeks review of a judgment entered by the District Court affirming an award of unemployment benefits to Karen Martino. Jurisdiction in this Court is pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L. 1956 § 42-35-16.

I Case Facts and Travel

The material facts are not in dispute. Rhode Island Temps, Inc. (Rhode Island Temps), is a temporary employment agency, headquartered in Warwick, Rhode Island. Karen Martino (Martino) had been employed by Rhode Island Temps in a variety of temporary clerical and secretarial positions, the last of which was a three-and-a-half-month-long temporary position that terminated on August 1, 1997. Subsequent to that date, Martino was offered and refused a first shift data entry position offered by Rhode Island Temps. She instead requested second shift work because she wanted to have first shift time open to search for permanent full-time employment. Rhode Island Temps, acceding to her request, offered her a second shift position in manufacturing for which she would receive on-the-job training. Martino this time refused, for the reason that she desired only office-type or clerical positions. Following that, her second refusal, Martino applied for unemployment benefits pursuant to the Rhode Island Employment Security Act (the Act), G.L. 1956 chapter 44 of title 28. After investigation, the Director of the Department of Labor and Training (the Director) denied her claim, finding that her refusal to accept first shift work was without good cause and that her refusal to accept the second shift manufacturing position was for personal reasons. Those findings by the Director rendered Martino ineligible for unemployment benefits pursuant to the provisions of § 28-44-20. He also found that her refusal to accept either position, in the absence of evidence of unsuitability, restricted her availability for work and justified denial of benefits pursuant to § 28-44-12. The Director then determined that Martino had been overpaid unemployment benefits for the weeks ending August 9, August 23, and September 6, 1997, and ordered her to reimburse the Department in the amount of $612 for those overpayments.

Martino appealed the Director's three decisions to a Referee of the Board of Review (the Referee). Following a hearing¹, the Referee first found that Martino's refusal of the first shift offer of data entry work did not disqualify her from benefits, but rather that her stated preference for second shift work in order to conduct a job search during first shift hours constituted good cause for purposes of § 28-44-20. The Referee next found that Martino's refusal of a second shift manufacturing position constituted good cause for purposes of § 28-44-20 because her previous work experience had been limited solely to clerical positions. Finally, the Referee found that Martino was available for and actively seeking work during first shift hours and that her stated preference for second shift work did not restrict her availability for work for purposes of § 28-44-12. The Director's decisions were thus reversed and Martino was granted unemployment benefits. Rhode Island Temps appealed the Referee's decision to the Department of Labor and Training Board of Review (the Board of Review). After hearing, the Board of Review affirmed all three decisions of the Referee. Rhode Island Temps then filed a timely appeal of the Board of Review's decisions to the District Court, Sixth Division, pursuant to § 42-35-15. There, the District Court trial justice affirmed the decision appealed from and ordered that unemployment benefits be paid to Martino. Rhode Island Temps then filed its petition for certiorari with this Court, alleging therein that the District Court trial justice had erred as a matter of law in affirming the Board of Review's decision, because: (1) Martino's refusal of suitable first shift employment was without good cause in contravention of § 28-44-20, (2) her refusal of suitable second shift manufacturing employment was also without good cause in contravention of § 28-44-20 and (3) her refusal of these positions without good cause restricted her availability for work in contravention of § 28-44-12.

II Standard of Review

We preface our analysis of the case before us by noting that Rhode Island Temps' petition for certiorari is filed pursuant to § 42-35-15 of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and our review is governed by the review standards set out in § 42-35-15. Powell v. Department of Employment Security, Board of Review, 477 A.2d 93, 95 (R.I.1984) (citing Berberian v. Department of Employment Security, Board of Review, 414 A.2d 480, 482 n. 2 (R.I.1980)). Section 42-35-15 provides in part:

"(a) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, [inferences], conclusions, or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error [of] law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."

Under the APA this Court reviews deferentially the factual determinations made by the factfinder in an administrative proceeding. See Poisson v. Comtec Information Systems, Inc., 713 A.2d 230, 233 (R.I.1998)

. On certiorari, we do not weigh the evidence but rather, as an extension of the administrative process, we limit the scope of our review to the record as a whole to determine whether any legally competent evidence exists therein to support the trial court's decision or whether the trial court committed error of law in reaching its decision. Wayne Distributing Co. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 673 A.2d 457, 459 (R.I.1996) (citing Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals v. Doe, 533 A.2d 536, 539 (R.I.1987)); see also Poisson, 713 A.2d at 233. We have previously defined legally competent evidence as "such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and means an amount more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance." Center For Behavioral Health, Rhode Island, Inc. v. Barros, 710 A.2d 680, 684 (R.I.1998) (quoting Newport Shipyard, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 484 A.2d 893, 897 (R.I.1984)). Despite our deference to the administrative process, however, we "retain the power to review all questions of law," Environmental Scientific Corp. v. Durfee, 621 A.2d 200, 208 (R.I.1993) (citing Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, 592 A.2d 841, 843 (R.I.1991)), and an administrative decision, inter alia, can be vacated for such errors of law. Durfee, 621 A.2d at 208.

III Section 28-44-20

The first issue before this Court is the question of whether an employee who refuses to accept suitable work in order to look for a permanent full time job has done so with good cause pursuant to § 28-44-20, thus entitling that employee to unemployment benefits. The District Court trial justice concluded that the Board of Review correctly applied § 28-44-20 to Martino's claim and concluded that under Huntley v. Department of Employment Security, 121 R.I. 284, 397 A.2d 902 (1979),² and under two District Court cases, Goodrich v. DET, A.A. 92-302, and Pizzarelli v. DET, A.A. 93-75, that "the work restriction was with good cause, and that it did not substantially impair the claimant's attachment to the labor market."³

The District Court trial justice also determined that in respect to Martino's refusal of the second shift manufacturing position, her refusal was likewise with good cause. The trial justice stated that "the Court has not found any cases directly on point, but believes that a claimant is not required to take a job outside of his/her regular field," and thus the position offered did not constitute suitable employment for purposes of the Act.

We first turn to the language of the Act itself. Section 28-44-20, refusal of suitable work, provides in part:

"(a) If an otherwise eligible individual fails, without good cause, either to apply for suitable work when notified by the employment office, or to accept suitable work when offered him or her, he or she shall thereby become ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits for the week in which that failure occurred * * *.

(b) `Suitable work' shall mean any work for which the individual in question is reasonably fitted, which is located within a reasonable distance of his or her residence or last place of work and which is not detrimental to his or her health, safety, or morals. No work shall be deemed suitable, and benefits shall not be denied under chapters 42-44 of this title to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work, under any of the following conditions:

(1) If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute;

(2) If the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work are substantially less favorable to the employee than those prevailing for similar work in the locality (3) If, as a condition of being employed, the individual...