Huntsville City Bd. of Educ. v. James Stranahan. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 10 May 2013
• Docket Number: 2110252 and 2110286.
• Citation: 130 So.3d 204
• Parties: HUNTSVILLE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION v. James STRANAHAN. Huntsville City Board of Education v. Dwight Holmes.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

130 So.3d 204

HUNTSVILLE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION

v.James STRANAHAN.

Huntsville City Board of Education

v.Dwight Holmes.

2110252 and 2110286.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

March 1, 2013.

Certiorari Denied May 10, 2013

Alabama Supreme Court 1120699.

Edward E. Wilson, Jr., of Lanier Ford Shaver & Payne, P.C., Huntsville, for appellant.

Robert C. Lockwood and Christopher L. Lockwood of Wilmer & Lee, P.A., Huntsville; and Sabrina L. Comer of Comer & Gundlach, PLLC, Montgomery, for appellees.

On Applications for Rehearing

THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.

This court's opinion of November 2, 2012, is withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor.

On April 25, 2011, the superintendent for the Huntsville City Board of Education (“the Board”), Dr. Ann Roy Moore (“the superintendent”), notified James Stranahan and Dwight Holmes, among others, of her intention to seek the termination of their employment with the Board. Stranahan and Holmes were employed as mechanics for the Board. As the basis for the terminations, the superintendent stated in the notices that, because of adverse financial conditions, the Board was required to terminate the employment of some of its employees and that the Board had implemented a Reduction in Force (“RIF”) policy to accomplish that task. Stranahan and Holmes each contested the proposed termination of his employment pursuant to the RIF policy. We note that these actions are governed by the former Fair Dismissal Act (“the former FDA”), § 36–26–100 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, which has been repealed and replaced by the Students First Act (“the SFA”), § 16–24C–1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, effective July 1, 2011. See also Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile Cnty. v. Christopher, 97 So.3d 163, 171 (Ala.Civ.App.2012) (holdingthat portions of the SFA that provide that the SFA is effective upon its passage were substantive in nature and, therefore, that the SFA could not have retrospective application). It is undisputed that Stranahan and Holmes were nonprobationary employees under the former FDA.

On May 17, 2011, the Board approved the termination of the employment of Stranahan and Holmes, among others, and Stranahan and Holmes each sought review of that decision pursuant to former § 36–26–105, Ala.Code 1975. On September 14, 2011, a hearing officer received ore tenus evidence in Stranahan's action, and on November 19, 2011, the hearing officer entered a decision reversing the decision of the Board. On October 7, 2011, a hearing officer conducted a hearing in Holmes's action, and on December 1, 2011, the hearing officer entered a decision reversing the decision of the Board.

The Board filed timely requests for an appeal in both actions. See former § 36–26–104(b), Ala.Code 1975. This court accepted the appeals. Stranahan's appeal was assigned appeal number 2110252, and Holmes's appeal was assigned appeal number 2110286. This court ordered, ex mero motu, that the two appeals be consolidated.¹

On appeal, the Board first argues that the hearing officers each erred in determining that the Board did not provide Stranahan and Holmes proper notice of the intended termination of their employment. We note that the facts pertaining to this issue are undisputed, and, therefore, the argument involves whether the hearing officers properly applied the law to the undisputed facts. Accordingly, this court reviews this issue de novo. Ex parte Soleyn, 33 So.3d 584, 587 (Ala.2009).

The former FDA provided that a notice of termination to a nonprobationary employee “shall state the reasons for the proposed termination, shall contain a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the termination is taken for one or more of the reasons listed in Section 36–26–102, and shall state the time and place for the board's meeting on the proposed termination....” Former § 36–26–103(a). The former FDA provided that the employment of nonprobationary employees such as Stranahan and Holmes may be terminated “for failure to perform his or her duties in a satisfactory manner, incompetency, neglect of duty, insubordination, immorality, justifiable decrease in jobs in the system, or other good and just causes.” Former § 36–26–102, Ala.Code 1975.

The termination notices sent by the superintendent to Stranahan and Holmes stated, in pertinent part:

“You are hereby given notice of my intention to recommend termination of [your employment as] a Mechanic for Huntsville City Board of Education as provided in § 36–26–102, Ala.Code 1975. The reason for the proposed termination is as follows: justifiable decrease in jobs in the system or other good and just causes.

“The facts showing that the termination is taken for one or more of the reasons listed in § 36–26–102, Ala.Code 1975, are as follows:

“1) Due to financial circumstances, the Board must reduce the number of its employees. To accomplish this, the Board had adopted a Reduction in Force plan. The selection of the employees to be terminated is based upon the job classifications affected by the Reduction in Force plan and years of service within the Huntsville School System (those with fewer years of service in each specifically identified area are to be terminated before those with greater seniority).”

The hearing officer reviewing Stranahan's action found that the notice quoted above was “very vague and [did] not provide sufficient information to an employee to mount a defense.” The hearing officer in Holmes's action found the notice vague and ambiguous and stated that it “provide[d] no factual rationale relative to the Board's decision to terminate.” In reaching their decisions, both hearing officers concluded that the notices did not sufficiently apprise Stranahan and Holmes that the reason for the termination of their employment, or that the termination of employment of other mechanics, was a cost-savings measure.

The Board contends that its statement of the basis for the proposed terminations of Stranahan's and Holmes's employment was a sufficient “short and plain statement of the facts” under former § 36–26–103(a). The Board argues that the former FDA did not require that it include in its “short and plain statement of the facts” a detailed explanation of proration of state funding, the funding of school boards, and the Fiscal Accountability Act, § 16–13A–1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975.

In Bishop State Community College v. Archible, 33 So.3d 588 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) (“Archible ”), this court addressed whether a notice of termination under the former FDA was sufficient under former § 36–26–103. In that case, two employees were notified of the intent to terminate their employment with Bishop State, a community college subject to the former FDA. The notices that the employees received stated an identical factual basis for each employee's termination, specifically: “ ‘You committed financial improprieties in relation to the receiving of financial aid and scholarships.’ ” Archible, 33 So.3d at 590. This court originally held that, considering the notice and the surrounding circumstances, that notice was sufficient under the former FDA. Bishop State Cmty. Coll. v. Archible, 33 So.3d 577, 584 (Ala.Civ.App.2008). On certiorari review, our supreme court held that this court had erred in considering the “surrounding circumstances” in determining whether the notice provided to the employees by Bishop State was sufficient, and it reversed this court's judgment. Ex parte Soleyn, 33 So.3d at 587. In so holding, our supreme court stated:

“Section 36–26–103 provides the exclusive means by which an employer such as Bishop State may terminate employees such as Archible and Soleyn. Under § 36–26–103(a), Bishop State was clearly obligated to provide each employee with a notice of intent to terminate his employment that ‘state[d] the reasons for the proposed termination’ and that ‘contain[ed] a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the termination [was] taken for one or more of the reasons listed in Section 36–26–102.’ ”

Ex parte Soleyn, 33 So.3d at 588.

In Archible, supra, on remand from the supreme court's decision in Ex parte Soleyn, supra, this court stated:

“This court has held that, in order to afford minimal due process to an employee under the [Fair Dismissal] Act, the notice of proposed termination must advise the employee ‘ “of the cause or causes for his [or her] termination in sufficient detail to fairly enable him [or her] to show any error that may exist.” ’ State Tenure Comm'n v. Page, 777 So.2d 126, 131 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (quoting James v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 484 F.Supp. 705, 715 (S.D.Ala.1979), quoting in turn Stewart v. Bailey, 556 F.2d 281, 285 (5th Cir.1977)); see also State Tenure Comm'n v. Jackson, 881 So.2d 445, 449 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (stating that the notice of proposed termination should be ‘sufficiently detailed to provide an adequate opportunity for [the employee] to prepare a defense to those charges'). In the present cases, the notices of proposed termination do not meet the requirement of setting forth a ‘short and plain statement of the facts.’ Neither notice set forth what ‘financial improprieties' had been committed so as ‘to provide an adequate opportunity for [the employees] to prepare a defense to those charges.’ Jackson, 881 So.2d at 449. The language used is so vague as to fall below the minimum due process that must be afforded an employee under the Act.”

Archible, 33 So.3d at 590–91.

In the present case, the Board cited a “justifiable decrease in jobs in the system” as the reason for the proposed terminations. See former § 36–26–102, Ala.Code 1975. In the notices, the Board then explained that reason by citing financial circumstances that necessitated the imposition of the RIF policy, and it explained the manner in which the employees whose employment was to be terminated under the RIF policy would be selected. Thus, the notices of termination provided by the Board explained that the Board's current financial...