Hurd v. Nelson

• Decision Date: 21 February 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-92,85-92
• Parties: Dale H. HURD, Appellant (Defendant), v. Darla Mae NELSON, formerly Darla Mae Hurd, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 767

714 P.2d 767

Dale H. HURD, Appellant (Defendant), v. Darla Mae NELSON, formerly Darla Mae Hurd, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 85-92.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Feb. 21, 1986.

David A. Hampton, Rock Springs, for appellant.

Dennis L. Sanderson, Afton, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, and URBIGKIT, JJ., and ROONEY, J. (Ret).

BROWN, Justice.

This appeal results from an order wherein the district court found appellant Dale Hurd liable to appellee Darla Mae Nelson (formerly Darla Mae Hurd) for appellant's breach of the parties' stipulation and settlement agreement. Such agreement was entered into between the parties pursuant to their divorce and made a part of the divorce decree. Appellant raises the following issue for our consideration:

"Whether the trial Court abused its discretion in awarding Plaintiff $12,500.00 for Defendant's breach of the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement for failure to remodel the parties' house and to complete the construction of the shop building for the Plaintiff."

We will affirm.

The parties were divorced on June 8, 1981. On May 22, 1981, the parties signed a stipulation and settlement agreement which was incorporated into the divorce decree. This agreement provided, inter alia, the following:

"4. The Plaintiff shall be awarded as her sole and separate property, free and clear of any claims or demands by the Defendant, the following described property:

"A. The physical possession of the house and real estate in Grover, Wyoming, for a period of ten (10) years or until the Plaintiff should remarry, whichever first occurs at which time the house and real property shall be sold and the proceeds shall be divided equally between the parties. The Plaintiff is hereby given the first right to purchase the Defendant's equity in the house and real property at a rate equal to the highest bona fide offer of a third party given to the parties. It is further understood and agreed that the Defendant will pay for the remodeling of the house to the Plaintiff's satisfaction at a cost not to exceed the sum of $10,000.00 and that this remodeling shall be completed no later than June 1, 1982. It is further understood and agreed that the Defendant shall pay for the completion of the construction of a shop and storage building which is planned to be erected upon the real property of the parties and that the Plaintiff shall be entitled to rent the space in this building on such terms and conditions as she deems advisable and that she may retain the rental income solely and separately for herself." (Emphasis added.)

Appellant did contribute between $2,000 and $3,000 for the remodeling of the house, as well as another $800 expenditure for basement carpeting. He testified, however, that he estimated it would take an additional $6,000 to complete the remodeling of the house.

Appellant contributed approximately $12,000 in materials for the construction of the shop, but did not pay for any labor, except $700 which was paid by appellant to a contractor who did some work on the shop. Members of appellee's church eventually erected the shop at no charge.

Appellee then filed a petition for order to show cause why the terms of the divorce decree should not be enforced. ¹ Appellee sought to collect from appellant the costs of remodeling the house and the construction of the shop. After a hearing on the matter, the court rendered judgment finding, inter alia:

"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:

" * * *

"2. That judgment be entered against the Defendant in the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($12,500.00) for the Defendant's breach of the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement for failure to remodel the parties' house and to complete the construction of the shop building for the Plaintiff.

" * * *

"4. Judgment shall be entered against the Plaintiff in the sum of ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE DOLLARS ($1,125.00) for Defendant's share of the rental value of the house from September 21, 1984 until February 21, 1985. The Plaintiff may continue to occupy the house until sold. Provided, however, she shall continue to pay the Defendant the sum of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE DOLLARS ($225.00) per month as rental for the use and occupancy of the property of the parties.

"5. That the above payments of the parties shall be made through the Clerk of the District Court in and for the County of Lincoln, State of Wyoming.

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the property of the parties be sold and the judgment amounts of TWELVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($12,500.00) and ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED NINETY-FOUR DOLLARS AND EIGHTY CENTS ($1,894.80), if not previously satisfied, may be deducted from the purchase price and paid to the Plaintiff. The ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE DOLLARS ($1,125.00) owed by the Plaintiff to the Defendant shall be deducted and paid to the Defendant. The remaining balance of the proceeds from the sale of the property be divided equally between the parties.

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party shall pay for their own costs and attorney's fees for this hearing."

As previously noted, appellant asks whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding appellee $12,500 for appellant's alleged breach of the agreement. We have oft stated our applicable standards of review. When reviewing cases on appeal, we accept the evidence presented by the prevailing party as true, leaving out of consideration entirely evidence presented by the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, giving every favorable inference that fairly and reasonably may be drawn from the successful party's evidence. Stockton v. Sowerwine, Wyo., 690 P.2d 1202 (1984); and Zanetti v. Zanetti, Wyo., 689 P.2d 1116 (1984). Furthermore, a trial court's findings carry with them every finding of fact that fairly and reasonably can be drawn therefrom. Zanetti v. Zanetti, supra; and Meeker v. Lanham, Wyo., 604 P.2d 556 (1979).

Turning to the facts of this case, appellant admitted he was responsible for contributing up to $10,000 for the remodeling of the house. He further testified he had contributed between $2,000 and $3,000 toward such end, but he estimated the total cost of remodeling the house would be $6,000. And he admitted that he had not paid the full cost of remodeling up to $10,000 as he expressly agreed to. Appellee testified there was still work to be done on the house to complete its remodeling. She also testified she borrowed $3,000 to pay a contractor for his work and appellant never paid her the $3,000 she borrowed.

Appellee testified she could not afford to pay for the cost of labor to construct the shop, even though appellant purchased the materials, so her church members eventually did the work for her free of charge.

In its closing remarks, the court stated the basis for awarding appellee $12,500:

"THE COURT: All right. The agreement in this case that the parties entered at the time of their divorce provided that the Defendant will pay for the remodeling of the house to Plaintiff's satisfaction, not to exceed $10,000. In that regard, Mrs. Hurd testified that she had spent $3,000 but the remodeling wasn't complete. Mr. Hurd testified that in his estimation, it would cost $6,000 to do not only what was complete, but what Mrs. Hurd had done up to this point. In other words, a total figure of $6,000.

"With respect to the shop, the agreement provided that the Defendant shall pay for the completion of the construction of a shop and storage building. Mr. Hurd testified that $12,000 was paid for materials; $700 for labor; and Mrs. Hurd testified that $12,000 for material--She agreed with that, but she disagreed with the labor, indicating that she felt the labor was worth some $12,000. The Court notes the appraised value of that shop and further notes that appraisals are guestimates at the time that they are made. Educated guesses, to be sure, but nevertheless, guesses. The Court also notes the fact that it's in dispute whether or not--the exact amounts, if any, which Mr. Hurd paid Mrs. Nelson in cash. The Court believes that the sum of $12,000 for materials is reasonable and the sum of $8,000 for labor is reasonable; making a total of $6,000 in remodeling for the house, $20,000 for the completion of the shop, a total of $26,000. Now, the testimony was by Mr. Hurd that he paid $700 in labor for the shop. That's not disputed. Mrs. Nelson admits $800 for carpet as part of the remodeling costs and the sum of $12,000 is admitted for materials, making a total of $13,500. That leaves a difference between the cost of remodeling and completion of the shop and the materials and labor of some $12,500, which Mr. Hurd owes Mrs. Nelson."

Appellant contends the court awarded appellee a windfall by awarding her damages for labor in the construction of the shop which was provided free of charge by members of appellee's church. It is generally recognized in tort law that compensation received by the plaintiff from a collateral source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer, cannot be deducted from the damages for which the defendant is liable. Such proposition is commonly referred to as the collateral source rule or doctrine.

"Under the collateral source rule or doctrine, which is a well-established rule in the law of damages, a wrongdoer is not entitled to have the damages to which he is liable reduced by proving that plaintiff has received or will receive compensation or indemnity for the loss from a collateral source, wholly independent of him, or, stated more succinctly, the wrongdoer may not be benefited by collateral payments made to the person he has wronged. This is an established exception to the general rule that damages in negligence actions must be compensatory. * * * " 25 C.J.S. Damages § 99(a), p. 1011 (1966).

"In tort cases, the plaintiff may receive benefits from a third party who is in no way connected with the defendant, and receipt of these benefits from the source...