Hurlburt v. Black

• Decision Date: 24 May 2019
• Docket Number: No. 17-2449,17-2449
• Citation: 925 F.3d 154
• Parties: Larry Albert HURLBURT, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Juliet J. BLACK, Defendant - Appellee, and Joseph A. Bledsoe, III, Trustee. National Association Of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys; National Consumer Bankruptcy Rights Center, Amici Supporting Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

925 F.3d 154

Larry Albert HURLBURT, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.Juliet J. BLACK, Defendant - Appellee,andJoseph A. Bledsoe, III, Trustee.

National Association Of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys; National Consumer Bankruptcy Rights Center, Amici Supporting Appellant.

No. 17-2449

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: March 20, 2019

Decided: May 24, 2019

ON REHEARING EN BANC

WYNN, Circuit Judge:

In this bankruptcy case, we are asked to overrule a twenty-two-year-old decision of this Court holding that Chapter 13 debtors may not bifurcate a narrow subset of undersecured home mortgage loans into separate secured and unsecured claims and "cram down" the unsecured portion of such loans. See Witt v. United Cos. Lending Corp. (In re Witt ), 113 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 1997). As explained further below, we now align our circuit with every other court that has considered this issue to hold that the plain text of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2) authorizes modification of such claims, not just the payment schedule for such claims, including through bifurcation and cram down. See, e.g. , Am. Gen. Fin., Inc. v. Paschen (In re Paschen ), 296 F.3d 1203, 1209 (11th Cir. 2002) ; First Union Mortg. Corp. v. Eubanks (In re Eubanks ), 219 B.R. 468, 471–73 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, we overrule our decision in Witt .

I.

The facts material to this appeal are not in dispute. In May 2004, debtor Larry Albert Hurlburt purchased real property located at 130 South Navassa Road, Leland, North Carolina (the "Property"), from Juliet J. Black for $ 136,000. Hurlburt paid Black $ 5,000 in cash at closing. Black financed the remaining $ 131,000 of the purchase price through a promissory note executed by Hurlburt in Black’s favor, which note was secured by a purchase-money deed of trust naming Black as beneficiary. Under the mortgage agreement between Hurlburt and Black, the $ 131,000 principal accrued interest at 6% per annum, payable over 119 months in installments of $ 785.41, with a balloon payment of all remaining principal and accrued interest due on May 26, 2014. In the event of default, interest on the balance would begin to accrue at a rate of 8% per annum. Hurlburt used the property as his primary residence from the purchase date until the present day.

Hurlburt failed to pay the balance owed upon maturation of the loan. On January 29, 2016, Black initiated a foreclosure action in Brunswick County, North Carolina, claiming Hurlburt owed her approximately $ 136,000 under the mortgage. On April 13, 2016, Hurlburt filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which petition stayed Black’s foreclosure action. In his petition, Hurlburt valued the Property at $ 40,000. That same day, Hurlburt brought an adversary proceeding against Black seeking to quiet title in the Property. On June 13, 2016, Black filed a proof of claim totaling $ 131,000, comprising a $ 40,000 secured claim and a $ 91,000 unsecured claim. The next day, Black filed an amended proof of claim totaling $ 180,971.72¹ but declined to identify the amount of the claim that was secured or unsecured as she "[did] not know the value of the collateral." J.A. 88. Hurlburt filed an objection to Black’s proof of claim.

On June 24, 2016, Hurlburt filed an amended complaint in the adversary proceeding seeking to acquire quiet title or avoid the deed of trust, while maintaining his statutory objection to Black’s claim. Approximately six months later, the bankruptcy court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Black, finding the deed of trust was valid. See Hurlburt v. Black (In re Hurlburt ), No. 16-00031-5-SWH-AP, 2016 WL 7076980, at *3 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Dec. 5, 2016).

In February 2017, following the bankruptcy court’s decision, Hurlburt filed a proposed Chapter 13 repayment plan, seeking to bifurcate Black’s claim into secured and unsecured components. Under the proposed plan, Black would hold a fully secured claim for $ 41,132.19, which amount Hurlburt calculated by subtracting a senior Brunswick County tax lien totaling $ 5,867.81 from the Property’s recently appraised value of $ 47,000.² The plan proposed treating the remainder of Black’s claim as unsecured, with Black receiving no payment for that portion of her claim. On February 23, 2017, Black filed an objection to the amended plan contending that Witt barred the plan’s proposed modification and bifurcation of her claim and asserting that she was entitled to a secured claim in the full amount due under the mortgage agreement, plus interest.

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. In an opinion filed June 7, 2017, the bankruptcy court first held that Hurlburt’s plan would "modify" Black’s rights under the note and deed of trust. In reaching that conclusion, the bankruptcy court first noted that "whereas the note itself requires repayment of $ 131,000 at 6 percent, the proposed plan would require only repayment of $ 41,132.19 at 4.5 percent." Hurlburt v. Black (In re Hurlburt ), 572 B.R. 160, 169 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2017). The plan’s proposed changes to the loan principal and interest rate also had the effect of modifying "what constitutes a default under the note," the court explained. Id. Having found that Hurlburt’s proposed plan modified Black’s rights under the note and deed of trust, the bankruptcy court further held that the plan violated 11 U.S.C. § 1322 because, under Witt , that provision barred modifying claims secured by a security interest on a debtor’s principal residence, like Black’s, into secured and unsecured components. See id. at 170–71.

The district court affirmed the reasoning and judgment of the bankruptcy court in an opinion and order entered December 19, 2017. Hurlburt v. Black (In re Hurlburt ), No. 7:17-CV-169-FL (E.D.N.C. Dec. 19, 2017). Two days later, Hurlburt filed a timely Notice of Appeal. A Fourth Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s order in an unpublished, per curiam opinion issued on August 8, 2018. Hurlburt v. Black (In re Hurlburt ), 733 Fed. App'x 721 (4th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (per curiam). On January 8, 2019, this Court granted Hurlburt’s request for a rehearing en banc, thereby vacating the panel opinion. Hurlburt v. Black (In re Hurlburt ), 747 Fed. App'x 168 (4th Cir. 2019) (mem.).

II.

Hurlburt’s appeal requires that we construe several provisions in the Bankruptcy Code. When construing a statute, we "first and foremost strive to implement congressional intent by examining the plain language." Minor v. Bostwick Labs., Inc. , 669 F.3d 428, 434 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). "[U]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Kennedy v. St. Joseph’s Ministries, Inc. , 657 F.3d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). In interpreting the plain language of the statute, we also look to "the specific context in which the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Minor , 669 F.3d at 434–35. We review de novo questions of statutory construction. In re Sunterra Corp. , 361 F.3d 257, 263 (4th Cir. 2004).

A.

Congress enacted the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act with the overarching goal of providing debtors with a "fresh start." H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 118 (1978). Among other changes, Congress significantly revamped Chapter 13 to better "facilitate adjustments of the debts of individuals with regular income through flexible repayment plans funded primarily from future income." 8 Collier on Bankr. (MB) ¶ 1322.01 (2018). To that end, a debtor seeking relief under Chapter 13 may file with the bankruptcy court a proposed plan for repaying claims, like Black’s, asserted against the debtor. See Assocs. Comm. Corp. v. Rash , 520 U.S. 953, 956, 117 S.Ct. 1879, 138 L.Ed.2d 148 (1997). Subject to confirmation by the court, that plan may "modif[y] the rights of secured and unsecured creditors." Tidewater Fin. Co. v. Kenney , 531 F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 2008).

Section 1325 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the criteria a debtor’s proposed repayment plan must meet for a bankruptcy court to confirm the plan. Of particular relevance, Section 1325(a)(5) provides that a court can confirm a plan’s proposed treatment of a secured claim if one of three conditions is satisfied: (1) "[t]he secured creditor accepts the plan," (2) "the debtor surrenders the property securing the claim to the creditor," or, as Hurlburt seeks to do here, (3) "the debtor invokes the so-called ‘cram down’ power." Rash , 520 U.S. at 956–57, 117 S.Ct. 1879. Under the cram down option, which is set forth in Section 1325(a)(5)(B), "the debtor is permitted to keep the property over the objection of the creditor; the creditor retains the lien securing the claim, ... and the debtor is required to provide the creditor with payments, over the life of the plan, that will total the present value of the allowed secured claim ...." Id. at 957, 117 S.Ct. 1879 (emphasis added); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B).

Section 506(a)(1), which governs the value of the allowed secured claim, provides, in relevant part:

An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property ... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest ... is less than the amount of such allowed claim.

Id. § 506(a)(1).

In other words, Section 506(a)(1) "provides that a claim is secured only to the extent of the value of the property on which the lien is fixed," whereas "the remainder of that claim is considered unsecured." United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc. , 489 U.S. 235, 239, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). Accordingly, when an allowed claim is undersecured—when the claimed amount exceeds the value of the property securing the claim—"Section 506(a)(1) requires the bifurcation of the...