Hurley v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 21 June 1905
• Citation: 188 Mass. 443,74 N.E. 677
• Parties: HURLEY v. COMMONWEALTH. GOUGH v. SAME.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

188 Mass. 443

74 N.E. 677

HURLEY

v.COMMONWEALTH.

GOUGH

v.SAME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 21, 1905.

Error to Superior Court, Suffolk County.

Consolidated proceedings by the commonwealth against one Hurley and against one Gough for contempt of court. There were judgments adjudging defendants guilty of contempt, and they bring error. Modified.J. Frank Adams and Stebbins, Storer & Burbank, for plaintiffs.

Frederick H. Nash, for the Commonwealth.

KNOWLTON, C. J.

These are two writs of error brought by plaintiffs, each of whom was found guilty of contempt of court, and sentenced to be punished by imprisonment.The first question before us is whether a writ of error lies in such a case. The general rule at common law does not permit a proceeding for contempt to be revised by a higher court upon an appeal or writ of error. In Re Yates, 4 Johns. 318-369, Chief Justice Kent, stating the rule, and referring to the Earl of Shaftsbury's Case, 1 Mod. 144, said in conclusion: ‘The court in that case seem to have laid down a principle from which they never have departed, and which is essential to the due administration of justice. This principle that every court, at least of the superior kind, in which great confidence is placed, must be the sole judge, in the last resort, of contempts arising therein, is more explicitly defined and more emphatically enforced in the two subsequent cases, The Queen v. Paty and The King v. Crosby.’ In Vilas v. Burton, 27 Vt. 56-60, we find language of Chief Justice Redfield as follows: ‘Proceedings for contempt in one court are not revisable in another court. * * * If it be said that the power to punish at discretion is a dangerous power to trust to a single magistrate, however high, we can only say it is one which the law of England has always seen fit to repose there, and one which in these times ordinarily is very little liable to abuse.’ Similar statements of the law are found in many other opinions. See In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564-595, 15 Sup. Ct. 900, 39 L. Ed. 1092;In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448, 54 C. C. A. 622;Tyler v. Hamersley, 44 Conn. 393, 26 Am. Rep. 471;State v. Towle, 42 N. H. 540;In re Cooper, 32 Vt. 253;Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331;Johnston v. Com., 1 Bibb (Ky.) 598; Passmore Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. 9-20,67 Am. Dec. 374;Ex parte Martin, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 456, 26 Am. Dec. 276; Rapalje on Contempts, § 141. But in many of the states statutes have been passed which have been construed to authorize appeals or writs of error in proceedings for contempt, and the tendency of judicial decision in recent years has been to open for revision rulings on questions of law in this class of cases as well as in others. In this commonwealth the question whether a writ of error will lie has never been decided, although a case of this kind was entertained without question of the jurisdiction by counsel, or formal consideration of it by the court. Telegram Newspaper Company v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294, 52 N. E. 445,44 L. R. A. 159, 70 Am. St. Rep. 280. This case can hardly be considered a binding authority, inasmuch as the plaintiff in error was held to have no standing on the merits, and the result did not depend upon the right of the court to take jurisdiction. But the fact that jurisdiction was assumed without question is significant of the general view of the justices, even though the question was not raised. If we have jurisdiction of these cases, it is under Rev. Laws, c. 193, § 9, which is as follows: ‘A judgment in a criminal case may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed upon a writ of error, for any error in law or in fact.’ The provision of Rev. Laws, c. 156, § 3, is broad and sweeping, in these words: ‘The Supreme Judicial Court shall have general superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction, to correct and prevent errors and abuses therein, if no other remedy is expressly provided,’ etc. It is contended that the words ‘judgment in a criminal case’ were not intended to include a sentence to punishment for a contempt of court, and it is certainly doubtful whether the Legislature had in mind a case of this kind. A proceeding for contempt is not a criminal case, in the sense that all the provisions of our statutes in regard to criminal practice and procedure are applicable to it. But contempts of court are often classified as criminal and civil, and, while the line of division between these two classes is not easily definable, since civil contempts often include elements of wrong which are peculiarly characteristic of criminal contempts, it is universally recognized that an offense committed directly against the authority and dignity of the court, as distinguished from mere disobedience of an order made for the benefit of a party, is therefore called a criminal contempt. The punishment of such an offense is solely for the vindication of public authority and the majesty of the law. In general, the proceedings leading up to the punishment should be in accordance with the principles which govern the practice in criminal cases. In a broad sense, the prosecution of such an offender is a criminal case, and the sentence to punishment is a judgment. Considering together the statutes quoted above, we are of opinion that we do no violence to the general purpose of the Legislature in holding that a sentence to punishment for a distinctively criminal contempt is a judgment in a criminal case, which may be re-examined upon a writ of error.

The first error alleged in the proceedings is that the matter was not properly brought before the court, since no affidavit was filed as a foundation for further proceedings. A prosecution for contempt of court is sui generis. It calls for the exercise by the court of its summary power to punish for conduct tending to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. This power is inherent in the superior courts, because it is essential to the execution of their orders and the maintenance of their authority, and it has been recognized and used from the earliest times. If a contempt is committed in the presence of the judge, no complaint or process is necessary to give the court jurisdiction of the offender, but the court may act upon its judicial knowledge, and the contemnor may be taken into custody at once. If the contempt, instead of being direct, is indirect and constructive, knowledge of it should first be brought to the court in a way to justify formal action. This is usually by an affidavit setting forth the facts of which complaint is made. While most of the technical requirements of criminal statutes have to...