Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac

Decision Date26 May 1988
Docket NumberNo. 78-72970.,78-72970.
Citation686 F. Supp. 608
PartiesHURON VALLEY HOSPITAL, INC., A Michigan non-profit corporation, and Martin Trepel, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PONTIAC, a Michigan municipal corporation; City of Pontiac Hospital Building Authority, a Michigan municipal corporation; Pontiac Osteopathic Hospital, a Michigan non-profit corporation; Sisters of Mercy Corporation, a Michigan non-profit corporation; Comprehensive Health Planning Council of Southeastern Michigan, a health systems agency; North Oakland County Planning Steering Committee, a planning group under the auspices of Greater Detroit Area Health Council, Inc., a Michigan corporation; United States Department of Health and Human Services, an executive agency of the United States; Margaret Heckler, as Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services; Bailus Walker, Jr.; Maurice S. Reizen, M.D.; Herman A. Ziel, M.D.; Richard Reihmer: Paul Masseron, and Terence E. Carroll, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

Cohen, Milstein & Hausfeld by Jerry S. Cohen, Ann C. Yahner, Washington, D.C., Keller, Thoma, Schwarze, Schwarze, Dubay & Katz, P.C. by Anthony J. Heckemeyer, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff Huron Valley Hosp., Inc.

Russell & Dlugokinski by Dennis Dlugokinski, Berkley, Mich., for plaintiff Martin L. Trepel, D.O.

Dickinson, Wright, Moon, Van Dusen & Freeman by Kenneth J. McIntyre, Barbara Hughes Erad, Claudia Rast, Detroit, Mich., for defendants Maurice S. Reizen, M.D., Richard Reihmer, Bailus Walker, Jr., Ph.D., Herman A. Ziel, Jr., M.D.

Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone by Larry J. Saylor, Detroit, Mich., for defendants City of Pontiac, City of Pontiac Hosp. Bldg. Authority.

Dykema, Gossett, Spencer, Goodnow & Trigg by Roger K. Timm, Detroit, Mich., for defendants Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp., Crittenton Hosp.

Charles Sorenson, Dept. of Justice, Civil Div., Washington, D.C., for defendants U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services Margaret Heckler.

Long, Preston, Kinnaird & Avant by Grady Avant, Jr., Detroit, Mich., for defendants North Oakland County Planning Steering Committee Greater Detroit Area Health Council, Inc.

Maxwell, Smith, Hanson and Mulvoy by Robert A. Maxwell, Bloomfield Hills, Mich., for defendants Sisters of Mercy Corp.

Riley and Roumell by Timothy M. Guerriero, Detroit, Mich., for defendants Comprehensive Health Planning Council of Southeastern Michigan, Paul Massaron, Terence E. Carroll.

OPINION

GILMORE, District Judge.

With this opinion, the saga of the Huron Valley Hospital comes to an end. After more than ten years of litigation and numerous published opinions in the United States District Court and the United States Court of Appeals,1 cross-motions for summary judgment have been filed by plaintiff2 and the four remaining individual defendants: Maurice Reizen, Bailus Walker, Jr., Herman Ziel, and Richard Reihmer. For the reasons stated in this opinion, defendants' motion is granted, and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment of liability is denied.3

It is not necessary in this opinion to detail the lengthy and exhaustive history of this case. That has been done in other opinions, cited in the margin. However, a brief review of the hierarchy within the Michigan Department of Public Health is helpful in understanding these motions.

The highest level in the Department is the Director. Defendant Reizen was Director from 1970 to 1981. Defendant Walker was Director from 1981 to 1983. Directly beneath the Director are several bureaus, including the Bureau of Health Care Facilities. Defendant Ziel was Chief of the Bureau from 1966 to 1984. The next lower level consists of several divisions, including the Division of Health Facilities Planning and Construction. Defendant Reihmer was Chief of that division from 1969 to 1978.

Plaintiff's application for a Certificate of Need (CON) was first reviewed and analyzed in Reihmer's Division, and then worked its way up through Ziel's Bureau, and finally to the Director, where approval was necessary for the issuance of a CON.

I

The Court finds dispositive, among the numerous issues raised, the question of whether the adequate state remedy doctrine applies in this case. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981); cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982). On these grounds, the Court will enter judgment for defendants.

Defendants claim that the Court must dismiss the action on the strength of Parratt because plaintiff has failed to plead, and, after extensive discovery, produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate the inadequacy of state remedies for the wrongs it alleges against these defendants. Their point is that plaintiff's action is nothing more than a damage action without constitutional import that should have been brought in state courts. They contend that, at this stage of the litigation, it is clear the plaintiff does not challenge an "established state procedure," thus making the Logan exception to the Parratt doctrine inapplicable.

Defendants claim that this case is similar to National Communication Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 789 F.2d 370 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 479 U.S. 852, 107 S.Ct. 182, 93 L.Ed.2d 117 (1986).

In that case, the § 1983 plaintiffs alleged that actions of members of the Michigan Public Service Commission had caused plaintiffs to suffer unjustifiable delay and increased expenses in the regulatory proceedings necessary to gain the Commission's approval for plaintiffs to borrow funds meant to finance improvements and to effect a rate increase. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged malicious abuse of the regulatory process by, inter alia, defendants requesting the Commission auditor to falsify certain calculations, delaying proceedings without justification, and intentionally disrupting telephone service to plaintiffs' customers by physically destroying plaintiffs' lines. The court dismissed for failure to plead inadequacy of state remedies, finding Parratt applicable. Plaintiffs claimed their allegations of conspiracy made Parratt inapplicable. The court rejected that theory on grounds that the adequate state remedy doctrine does not turn on whether the conduct alleged is negligent or intentional. As for whether there existed an adequate state remedy for the ultra vires acts that plaintiffs alleged commission members had committed, the court said:

In short, Michigan law presents a variety of procedures to redress the wrongs that plaintiffs assert. Not only could plaintiffs have taken an appeal from the regulatory proceedings before the Public Service Commission, but they could have brought a state law action in tort or restitution, not to mention seeking one of the different extraordinary writs available to force the commissioners to cease intentionally acting outside their authority. Plaintiffs failed to show that these available procedures did not afford the process that is due under the fourteenth amendment.

Id. at 373.

Defendants suggest a number of state remedies plaintiff could have pursued, and argue that the potential applicability of state immunity law for defendants under Ross v. Consumers Power Co., 420 Mich. 567, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984), is irrelevant to the § 1983 analysis. They also contend, however, that taking plaintiff's allegations as true, defendants would not qualify for immunity under Ross.

On the other hand, plaintiff very simply argues that the Parratt doctrine is not applicable because plaintiff is challenging "established state procedures." Plaintiff claims that the facts reveal not a mere isolated wrongful act of a state official, but a manifestation of a systematic bias in favor of existing facilities on the part of defendants. Thus, plaintiff concludes, it is not fatal to its action that plaintiff failed to plead inadequacy of state remedies. In the alternative, plaintiff contends that there exists no adequate state remedy to redress its injuries, pointing out that in the state court proceedings challenging the denial of a CON plaintiff was unable to assert a claim for monetary damages. It also argues that, even after Ross, which purported to clarify immunity law in Michigan, it is not at all clear whether plaintiff could sue defendant for damages in state court.

II

In an earlier opinion,4 this Court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim, finding the plaintiff's complaint was sufficient without the necessity of proving the inadequacy of state remedies. This Court contrasted the instant case with the mere negligent loss of a prisoner's hobby kit that was alleged in Parratt.

After that opinion, the Supreme Court held, in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986), that negligent deprivation does not trigger due process protection. Thus, it is now clear that the proper focus in determining whether the adequate state remedy doctrine applies is on whether the case is one of random and unauthorized conduct, in which case Parratt applies, or whether instead the alleged wrongs were the result of established state procedures, in which case Logan applies and it is unnecessary to demonstrate the inadequacy of state remedies.

In addition to this clarification of the law, several cases have been handed down in this circuit that define more precisely the contours of the adequate state remedy doctrine. Additionally, plaintiff has now eliminated all conspiracy allegations from its complaint.

Together these considerations lead the Court to conclude that the plaintiff's § 1983 actions against these four defendants is indeed subject to the Parratt doctrine, and must be dismissed because the state provides remedies to redress plaintiff's injury, and afford plaintiff due process.

The adequate state remedy doctrine is well summarized in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). The gist of the doctrine is that, "The Due Process Clause of the ...

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2 cases
  • Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • 13 October 1989
    ...a hospital in Oakland County, Michigan. 1 The district court has stated in its most recent decision, Huron Valley Hospital, Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 686 F.Supp. 608, 609 (E.D.Mich.1988), "[w]ith this opinion, the saga of the Huron Valley Hospital comes to an end". In 1976, Huron filed an ap......
  • 1946 St. Clair Corp. v. City of Cleveland
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • 14 February 1990
    ...455 U.S. 422, 435-437, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1157-59, 71 L.Ed.2d 265; Wilson v. Beebe (C.A.6, 1985), 770 F.2d 578; Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. Pontiac (E.D.Mich.1988), 686 F.Supp. 608. ...

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