Hurst Const. Co. v. Ramey, 90CA680

Decision Date23 May 1991
Docket NumberNo. 90CA680,90CA680
PartiesHURST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Petitioners, v. Bruce A. RAMEY, Darrell Slater d/b/a Custom Farm Service, the Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, and the Colorado Division of Labor, Respondents. . I
CourtColorado Court of Appeals

Glasman, Jaynes & McBride, Ronald C. Jaynes, Lydia W. Daugherty, Denver, for petitioners.

Sarney, Trattler & Waitkus, P.C., Terry D. Gordon, Denver, for respondents Bruce A. Ramey and Darrell Slater d/b/a Custom Farm Service.

Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Jeanne Labuda, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondents the Indus. Claim Appeals Office and the Colorado Div. of Labor.

Opinion by Judge RULAND.

Hurst Construction Company and the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company seek review of the final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Panel ruling that Hurst was not exempt from the Workers' Compensation Act under § 8-48-101(6), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 3B) (now § 8-41-401(6), C.R.S. (1990 Cum.Supp.)). We affirm.

Hurst Construction Company entered into a contract to build roads. Because Hurst neither owned trucks nor employed truck drivers, it contracted out the gravel hauling required for the project to Darrell Slater, who owned a commercial truck. The contract price for hauling gravel was $42 per hour. Slater, in turn, hired Bruce Ramey, claimant, to drive the truck for an hourly wage. Ramey hauled eight to twelve loads of gravel a day for approximately six weeks. He was injured while working and sought workers' compensation.

The Panel initially ruled that Hurst was not claimant's statutory employer under § 8-48-101(1), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 3B) (now § 8-41-401(1), C.R.S. (1990 Cum.Supp.)). This court reversed the Panel's ruling but remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether Hurst was exempt from the Workers' Compensation Act under § 8-48-101(6). Ramey v. Slater (Colo.App. No. 88CA1562, August 24, 1989) (not selected for official publication).

Section 8-48-101(6) provided that:

"Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, any person, company, or corporation operating a commercial vehicle as defined in section 42-4-234(1)(a), C.R.S., who holds himself out as an independent contractor only to perform for-hire transportation, including loading and unloading, and who contracts to perform a specific transportation job, transportation task, or transportation delivery for another person, company, or corporation is not entering into an employee and employer relationship for purposes of workmen's compensation coverage pursuant to articles 40 to 54 of this title."

On remand, the Administrative Law Judge and the Panel both concluded that Hurst was not exempt under § 8-48-101(6), ruling that the delivery of eight to twelve loads a day for six weeks did not constitute "a specific transportation job, transportation task, or transportation delivery."

We reject Hurst's contention that the gravel hauling was a specific transportation job, task, or delivery within the scope of § 8-48-101(6).

A court's primary task in construing statutes is to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. Kern v. Gebhardt, 746 P.2d 1340 (Colo.1987). Legislative history may be...

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1 cases
  • McKinney v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of State of Colo.
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • February 9, 1995
    ...the statute, including comments by legislators and others during discussions of the proposed legislation. Hurst Construction Co. v. Ramey, 821 P.2d 858 (Colo.App.1991). Because the term "wages" has a technical definition under the Act and it is unclear whether the phrase "any wages" in § 8-......

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