Hurst v. Beck

• Decision Date: 15 August 1991
• Docket Number: No. 91-2492.,91-2492.
• Citation: 771 F. Supp. 118
• Parties: Wendy R. HURST M.D. and Richard Levine M.D. v. William W. BECK, Jr., M.D., John Doe, M.D., and Pennsylvania Hospital.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

771 F. Supp. 118

Wendy R. HURST M.D. and Richard Levine M.D. v. William W. BECK, Jr., M.D., John Doe, M.D., and Pennsylvania Hospital.

No. 91-2492.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

August 15, 1991.

Giuliana F. Robertson, David E. Landau, Hoyle Morris & Kerr, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs.

John B. Langel, David S. Fryman, Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HUTTON, District Judge.

Presently before the Court are Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint and to Dismiss Richard Levine, M.D.; Plaintiffs' response thereto; and Defendants' reply. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, Wendy R. Hurst, M.D. ("Dr. Hurst") and Richard Levine, M.D. ("Dr. Levine"), commenced this action on April 17, 1991 against William W. Beck, Jr., M.D. ("Dr. Beck"), Dr. John Doe and the Pennsylvania Hospital (the "Hospital"). Doctors Beck and Doe are alleged to have been employed by, acting as agent for and/or affiliated with the Hospital at all times material to the action. On November 15, 1990, Hurst filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") alleging that defendants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. By letter dated May 17, 1991, the EEOC authorized Dr. Hurst to commence a lawsuit within ninety days. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 14, 1991.

The amended complaint purports to assert six causes of action. Count One alleges that defendants made defamatory statements regarding Dr. Hurst to her employer,¹ Avery Center for Obstetrics and Gynecology in Westport, Connecticut (the "Avery Center"), resulting in her termination. Counts II and VI allege that defendants intentionally interfered with the contractual relationship and with prospective contractual relations between Dr. Hurst and the Avery Center. Count III alleges that defendants violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Count V asserts a claim for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Based upon the conduct alleged in counts I, II, III, IV and V, Drs. Hurst and Levine assert that they have suffered, inter alia, lost income, humiliation and emotional distress. Finally, Count VI seeks compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees and equitable relief under Title VII.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard

Defendants move to dismiss part of the amended complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When considering Rule 12(b)(6) motion, this Court shall take all allegations contained in the complaint as true and construe them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 2906, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989); Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989). The complaint shall only be dismissed if "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).

B. Analysis

1. Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

a. Exclusivity Provision

The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act (the "Act") provides as follows:

The liability of an employer under this act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employees, his legal representatives, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin or anyone otherwise entitled to damages in any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death as defined in section 301(c)(1) and (2)² or occupational disease as defined in section 108.

Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 77, § 481(a) (Purdon Supp. 1990-91) (Emphasis added).

The exclusivity provision is "a version of the historical quid pro quo that employers received in exchange for being subjected to a statutory no-fault system of compensation for worker's injuries. Pursuant to its terms, an employer is given immunity from lawsuit by employees for any injury defined as such by section 301(c) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 411."³ Poyser v. Newman, 522 A.2d at 550. Accord Barber v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 521 Pa. 29, 555 A.2d 766, 769-770 (1989). In Lewis v. School District of Philadelphia, 517 Pa. 461, 538 A.2d 862 (1988), the court stated that "the workmen's compensation law is a workers exclusive remedy against his employer for an injury sustained in the course and scope of employment." 538 A.2d at 867 (citing Poyser v. Newman, 522 A.2d at 548; Kline v. Arden H. Verner Co., 503 Pa. 251, 469 A.2d 158 (1983)). In Kline, the court held that the exclusivity provision "bars tort actions flowing from any work-related activity." 469 A.2d at 160. Accord McCullough v. Xerox Corp., 399 Pa.Super. 135, 581 A.2d 961, 963 (1990).

Defendants seek dismissal of plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress contending that such claim is barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act. In Poyser v. Newman & Co., Inc., 514 Pa. 32, 522 A.2d 548 (1987), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the Act provided the exclusive remedy for common law intentional torts directed against employers and arising during the scope of the employment relationship. Since Poyser, courts have held that claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress suffered by employees in the employment context are precluded by the Act.⁴

In response, plaintiffs cite Schweitzer v. Rockwell Int'l, 402 Pa.Super. 34, 586 A.2d 383 (1990). In Schweitzer, the court held that an employee's claims for assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from the conduct of a fellow employee were not barred by the Act. Notably, the court distinguished the Poyser case noting that Poyser arose from alleged deliberate employer misconduct and that no third person/fellow employee was involved. 586 A.2d at 392. Schweitzer has been followed in Gruver v. Ezon Prods., Inc., 763 F.Supp. 772, 775-76 (M.D.Pa.1991); Garvey v. Dickinson College, 761 F.Supp. 1175, 1191-92 (M.D.Pa.1991). Here, as in Schweitzer, the complaint alleges that the distress complained of was caused by the discriminatory conduct of a fellow employee for reasons personal in nature outside the scope of the employment relationship. Thus, this Court holds that Dr. Hurst's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is not precluded by application of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act.

b. Outrageousness

Under Pennsylvania law, maintenance of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires a showing that the conduct complained of is "extreme or clearly outrageous."⁵ Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486-87 (3d Cir.1990) (citing Cox v. Keystone Carbon, 861 F.2d 390, 395 (3d Cir.1988)). Initially, the court must determine if the alleged conduct alleged reaches the requisite level of outrageousness. Id. at 1487. Rarely will conduct in the employment context rise to level outrageousness sufficient to provide a basis for recovery for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Cox v. Keystone Carbon, 861 F.2d at 395. In Cox, the Third Circuit observed that "the only instances in which courts applying Pennsylvania law have found conduct outrageous in the employment context is where an employer engaged in both sexual harassment and other retaliatory behavior against the employee." 861 F.2d at 395. (Emphasis added).

Defendants argue that the statements made to the Avery Center regarding Dr. Hurst's fitness to practice medicine does not satisfy the outrageous conduct element. Although the complaint avers employment discrimination on the basis of sex and pregnancy, there is no allegation of sexual harassment. Recently, this Court in Levito v. Hussman Foods, Inc., No. 89-5967, slip op. at 12-13, 1991 WL 86898 (E.D.Pa. May, 15 1991) (appeal pending) (Lexis, Genfed library, Dist. file), concluded that the absence of sexual harassment forecloses claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising in the employment context.

Based upon the foregoing, Count V of the amended complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiffs are granted leave to file an amended Count V within fifteen (15) days from the entry of the Order accompanying this opinion.

2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

By way of footnote, defendants also challenge the sufficiency of plaintiffs' claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. With mere citation to Miller v. Aluminum Co. of America, 679 F.Supp. 495 (W.D.Pa.), aff'd mem., 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir.1988) and Salerno v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 377 Pa.Super. 83, 546 A.2d 1168 (1988), defendants maintain that "such a cause of action has never been recognized in Pennsylvania upon the facts asserted in the amended complaint." No analysis has been proffered supporting dismissal of this claim.⁶

Defendants are invited, however, to renew their contentions with appropriate specificity.

3. Dr. Levine's Claims

Defendants argue that Dr. Levine's claims should be dismissed. Specifically, defendants contend that Dr. Levine cannot seek recovery under the counts alleging defamation, interference with actual or prospective contractual relations and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because these actions are derived solely from injuries suffered by Dr. Hurst. Plaintiffs maintain that Dr. Levine's claims are properly includable in that he had to forfeit employment in Connecticut and remained unemployed for some time as a result of defendants conduct. Plaintiffs further contend that Dr. Levine's alleged losses were reasonably foreseeable by defendants. Plaintiffs argue that because defendants knew Dr. Hurst was married and knew or should have known her family would have to move with her, Dr. Levine's loss of...