Hurst v. Goodwin

• Decision Date: 04 February 1902
• Citation: 114 Ga. 585,40 S.E. 764
• Parties: HURST v. GOODWIN.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

40 S.E. 764

114 Ga. 585

HURST

v.GOODWIN.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Feb. 4, 1902.

SLANDER—ACTION BY INFANT.

An infant may, by his next friend, maintain an action for slander.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from superior court, Pierce county; Jos. W. Bennet, Judge.

Action by Mattie Goodwin against N. N, Hurst. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Estes & Walker and L. A. Wilson, for plaintiff in error.

S. W. Sturgis and R. G. Mitchell, Jr., for defendant in error.

COBB, J. Mattie Goodwin, by her next friend, brought against Hurst an action for slander on account of words alleged to have been uttered by him which, in effect, charged her with fornication with a negro. At the trial term the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's suit on the ground that no cause of action was set forth in the petition for the reason that a minor had no right of action for slander. This motion was overruled. After the introduction of evidence for the plaintiff, a motion for a nonsuit was made upon the ground that it appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff was a minor, living with her father, and that under this state of facts she was not entitled to recover, for the reason that the cause of action set forth in her declaration inured to the benefit of her father alone, and she had no right to bring an action for the same. This motion was also overruled. The case proceeded to trial, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant made a motion for a new trial, which was likewise overruled, and he filed a bill of exceptions complaining of the several rulings of the court above referred to.

If an infant is injured by the tortious conduct of another, and the effect of the injury is such as to deprive the father of the services of the infant, the father can maintain against the wrongdoer an action for whatever damages he may have sustained on account of being deprived of the services of his child. But this right of the father does not relieve the wrongdoer from liability for whatever damages accrue directly to the infant In the event the tort is one which resulted in damage to the infant. The above propositions are so well settled that it Is useless to cite authority in support of them: It does not, however, follow that the right of action for injuries of every character to a minor child is in the father alone. If the injury is one from which the father does not sustain any damage, —that is, which does not destroy or impair the ability of the...