Hurst v. Hurst, 2008 Ohio 3462 (Ohio App. 7/8/2008)
| Decision Date | 08 July 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 07CA2980.,07CA2980. |
| Citation | 2008 Ohio 3462 |
| Parties | Delbert E. Hurst, Appellant, v. Sherry S. Hurst, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Steven C. Newman, Newman Law Office, Inc., Chillicothe, Ohio, for Appellant.1
James E. Barrington, James E. Barrington Co., LPA, Chillicothe, Ohio, for Appellee.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶1} In this domestic action, Delbert E. Hurst ("Hurst") and Sherry S. Hurst, now known as Sherry Blevins ("Blevins"), signed a separation agreement that was approved by the trial court and incorporated into its dissolution decree in 1996. This agreement provided that Hurst would ultimately retain the marital residence. However, there was also a "side agreement," which neither of the parties disclosed to the court, that provided for Hurst to transfer the marital home to Blevins after ten years. In 2006, Blevins moved for relief from judgment on the grounds that Hurst appeared to be reneging on the side agreement. The trial court granted Blevins relief from the dissolution decree because it concluded that Hurst's previous attorney and the parties themselves committed a fraud on the court by not informing it of the side agreement.
{¶2} First, Hurst argues that the trial court's finding that there was a side agreement is against the manifest weight of evidence. However, Blevins and her daughter both testified concerning the existence of the agreement, which was introduced as an exhibit. Because there is competent, credible evidence that Hurst promised to deed the marital home to Blevins in exchange for her assent to the dissolution decree, this finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶3} Second, Hurst argues that the side agreement is invalid because it is inconsistent with or merged into the trial court's dissolution decree. He also argues that Blevins's motion for relief from judgment represents an improper collateral attack on a final judgment. However, a party may seek relief from a judgment that was obtained by a fraud on the court. In granting that relief, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Hurst's previous attorney was aware of the side agreement but nonetheless represented to the court that there were no agreements other than the separation agreement. Because the court could reasonably conclude that it would not have approved of the separation agreement and granted a dissolution if it had known of the side agreement, relief from judgment was appropriate.
{¶4} Third, Hurst argues that the trial court should not have considered or enforced the side agreement because it violated the Statute of Frauds. However, the trial court did not simply order specific performance of the side agreement. Instead, it remedied a fraud on the court and ensured that its judgment of dissolution reflected the actual agreement of the parties at the time of the dissolution. Thus, it was enforcing its decree rather than the side agreement, and the Statute of Frauds is inapplicable.
{¶5} Finally, Hurst argues that the trial court ignored principles of equity in granting Blevins relief from judgment. Because the trial court could reasonably conclude that Hurst lacked clean hands, and because the evidence supports the conclusion that the mortgage Hurst paid on the house represented his share of the marital debt, we do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below.
{¶6} Hurst and Blevins obtained a dissolution on November 15, 1996, after sixteen years of marriage. The dissolution decree incorporated a separation agreement, which divided the marital property and gave Hurst the marital residence. However, the agreement allowed Blevins to live in the marital residence rent-free for 10 years from the date of dissolution, provided that she paid the homeowner's insurance and real property taxes. After this 10-year period expired, the separation agreement provided that Hurst would have exclusive possession and ownership of the marital residence. When she signed the separation agreement, Blevins was not represented by counsel. However, Hurst had an attorney who drafted the separation agreement.
{¶7} The trial court conducted a hearing on the dissolution on October 18, 1996, and apparently Blevins expressed some concern about the settlement agreement. For this reason, the court continued the hearing. Because Hurst wanted to expedite the divorce, he agreed to deed the house over to Blevins if she would allow the dissolution to go forward. Blevins, in an attempt to protect herself, prepared a statement in which Hurst swore "to sign over the deed to Sherry S. Hurst, when the house and property at 69 South Brownell Street is paid in full." This statement is dated November 11, 1996, and Hurst signed and had it notarized on November 12, 1996. Blevins and her daughter both testified that Blevins drafted the statement on November 11 and that Hurst returned it to her the next day. According to Blevins, Hurst told her not to mention the side agreement to the trial court. After receiving the signed document, Blevins went through with the dissolution. Unaware of what had transpired after the initial hearing, the trial court held the final hearing and issued its dissolution decree on November 15, 1996.
{¶8} Ten years later at a hearing on the motion for relief from judgment, Hurst admitted signing the statement and promising to convey the house to Blevins. However, he testified that he never intended to deed the property over to her. Instead, he explained that Blevins had been harassing him to sign the paper for weeks and that he was afraid he would lose his job if he did not sign it and keep her from disrupting his work. He also testified that his previous attorney advised him that the promise had no effect and that he should sign it to stop Blevins from harassing him. The record reflects that, although Hurst's previous attorney was aware of the side agreement reached by the parties, neither he nor the parties brought the agreement to the attention of the trial court. Hurst disputed Blevins's testimony that he gave her the statement before the final hearing; he testified that he gave it only after the final hearing. He also denied telling her not to mention the side agreement to the trial court.
{¶9} Both parties abided by the dissolution decree. Blevins paid the insurance and taxes on the property, and by September 2005 Hurst had paid off the mortgage. However, according to Blevins, as the 10-year period came to a close, Hurst began "making noises" that led her to believe that Hurst would not convey the property to her as he promised in the side agreement. On November 14, 2006, Blevins filed a motion for relief from judgment seeking an order requiring Hurst to deed the property to her. After a hearing, the magistrate recommended granting the motion. After considering Hurst's objections, the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision and granted Blevins relief from judgment. The court explained that had it been aware of the side agreement it probably would not have approved of the dissolution of the marriage on the terms laid out in the settlement agreement.
{¶10} Hurst filed this appeal and raises five assignments of error:
1. "The Trial Court erred in finding that a side agreement was reached between the parties prior to the hearing on the dissolution of [sic] heard on November 15, 1996 and the Courts [sic] finding that a side agreement was made is not based upon sufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of the evidence."
2. "Assuming that the parties entered into a side agreement prior to the dissolution judgment, such agreement was merged in the judgment, and ceased to exist as an independent claim to relief; and in any event, is unenforceable to the extent that it is inconsistent and in conflict with the dissolution judgment; and the trial court erred in finding that any such agreement was valid and enforceable."
3. "Regardless of collateral attack, and even assuming legal consideration, the Magistrate and Court erred by failing to find the agreement to be within the Statute of Frauds requiring reliance and part performance such as to make the `writing' of Defendant valid and enforceable."
4. "The Magistrate and Court erred in considering any evidence of any issue as to fraud or an agreement arising prior to or subsequent to the dissolution judgment; such matters alleged prior to the final hearing are improper collateral attacks: [sic] and the facts arising subsequent to such judgment do not establish any separate enforceable agreement or extrinsic fraud warranting relief."
5. "Since the evidence is insufficient to establish any legal consideration for the alleged agreement, and the trial court erred in finding that such an agreement was valid and enforceable and said finding ignores any principles of equity."
Civ.R. 60(B); see, also, Matter of Yates, Hocking App. Nos. 05CA19 & 05CA20, 2006-Ohio-2761, at ¶ 11 (quoting Civ.R. 60(B)).
{¶12} To...
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