Hurst v. New Your Produce Exch.
| Decision Date | 06 October 1885 |
| Citation | 100 N.Y. 605,3 N.E. 42 |
| Parties | HURST v. NEW YORK PRODUCE EXCHANGE and others. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
The plaintiff and the defendant Carhart were members of the New York Produce Exchange. The plaintiff was the agent of the National Steam-ship Company, and represented it in the exchange, and the defendant Carhart was the agent of the New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company. In January, 1883, certain goods which had been delivered to a wharf in the city of New York to be shipped by the steamship Egypt were destroyed by fire, and a dispute arose between the defendant Carhart and the plaintiff in reference to the payment of damages caused by such fire. Carhart presented to the complaint committee of the produce exchange a complaint accusing the plaintiff of proceedings inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade, and the ground of the complaint appears to have been that the plaintiff had refused to pay a debt which Carhart claimed to be due for certain freight and charges upon the goods destroyed by the fire. The plaintiff was summoned before the complaint committee and given an opportunity to be heard if he so desired. He appeared before the committee and protested that the case was not within their jurisdiction, for the reason that the plaintiff's liability was doubtful as matter of law, and the questions involved were then the subject of litigation in the courts. The committee proposed an arbitration, but this the plaintiff declined. The matter was then referred by the committee to the board of managers, who summoned the plaintiff to appear before them and be heard. In answer to the summons plaintiff wrote to the board, repeating his protest that the case was not within their jurisdiction, and declined for that reason to appear.
The plaintiff then commenced this action, the object of which is to obtain a judgment restraining the defendants from proceeding in any way upon Carhart's complaint, and the facts upon which he relies are stated in his complaint, and the affidavit made by him. Among other things he alleges ‘that one on the steam-ships of which he is the agent is the steam-ship Egypt, which for many years past has been running in a regular line between the ports of New York and Queenstown and Liverpool; that while said steam-ship Egypt, on the thirty-first day of January, 1883, lay at a wharf in the North river, in the said city, with most of her cargo discharged thereupon, an accidental fire broke out on said wharf and utterly destroyed the same, together with the cargo discharged from said steam-ship, and merchandise lying on said wharf to be shipped by said Egypt on her return voyage to Liverpool; that the value of the goods so destroyed and damaged by said fire amounted to several hundred thousand dollars; that all the goods so destroyed or damaged, whether discharged or to be shipped, were under bills of lading whereby the said steam-ship and its owners were exempted from all liability by reason of fire at sea, in craft or on shore, before lading or after unlading, and that whether occasioned by negligence or otherwise; that said fire occurred in fact without any negligence; that the owners of said steam-ship were advised that under said bill of lading no liability whatever existed either against them or the said steam-ship Egypt by reason of said fire; that they consequently refused to make payment for any of the goods so damaged or destroyed; that subsequently thereto numerous actions were brought, both in law and in admiralty, against said steam-ship and her owners, to recover by reason of loss or damages caused by said fire, and they are now pending, and the owners of said steam-ship are defending the said actions and suits with every expectation of defeating a recovery in them all; that among the merchandise lying on the wharf at the time of the fire were goods represented by the defendant Carhart, who, after the fire and their destruction, claimed payment for freight and charges from the plaintiff; that the plaintiff called his attention to the protection extended to the said ship and her owners by the bill of lading, and refused for that reason to pay the moneys demanded; that said Carhart declined to test his claim by recourse to the courts, and has attempted to enforce the same in the manner hereinafter stated; that said Carhart made a complaint in September last to the said complaint committee against the plaintiff, wherein he accused him of proceedings inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade in refusing to pay the freight and inland charges on the said goods, as aforesaid, burned on the wharf while waiting to be shipped by the steamer Egypt; that on being notified of this complaint, and that there was to be a meeting of the complaint committee, plaintiff attended, and protested that the matter complained of was not within the jurisdiction of the committee; that it was not an act or omission within the provision of the by-laws empowering said committee to act; that the plaintiff also stated that the legal questions involved were then in course of litigation in numerous suits and actions pending in the courts of the state of New York and of the United States; that for these reasons plaintiff declined to arbitrate as the complaint committee proposed; that the complaint committee then intimated that they would refer the complaint to the board of managers; that the defendants took no further action for more than a month, but on the last day of October last past revived their attempt to assert jurisdiction and to further the views of said Carhart by notifying the plaintiff to appear before said board in the case of said Carhart; that the plaintiff wrote a civil note to said board of managers relating his protest that the case was not within their jurisdiction, and declining for that reason to appear; that said board nevertheless declared that they would proceed with the matter, and have given out that they will suspend plaintiff from his membership and will exclude him, or anybody representing him, from the floor of the exchange.’
The president of the exchange made a counter-affidavit in which he alleges ‘that the complaint was made by Carhart against Hurst, and referred to the board of managers for investigation; that the duties of the complaint committee consisted in dismissing trivial complaints, or those which the complainant is evidently in error, and in arranging arbitration for those parties who desire it; that the said committee have no power to render any other judgment than dismissal; that every defendant has the right to a hearing before the board of managers, and cannot be punished for a violation of the charter or by-laws, except on the judgment of the said board, after such hearing; that a day was duly appointed for such hearing of said complaint, and that the said Hurst was invited to attend; that, instead of appearing, he wrote a letter declining to attend; that upon receipt of said letter, at the time for which said hearing was set down, to-wit, at 11 o'clock on the first day of November, 1883, the said board of managers adjourned said hearing for the purpose of giving said Hurst another opportunity to attend and defend himself; that after the adjournment of said hearing, and before further consideration of the case, the injunction herein was served; that since the service of said injunction no action whatever has been taken by said board; that deponent has been present at all meetings of the said board of managers since the said complaint was first made, and the said board has never declared that they would suspend the said Hurst from membership, or debar him, or any one representing him, from the floor of the exchange, or made any threat or declaration of what its judgment would be; that no evidence relating to said complaint has yet been heard, and there is no intention on the part of said board, as this deponent believes, to do anything in this case except to investigate the said complaint, and decide the same impartially upon its merits; that the said board of managers do not claim or intend to exercise any right or power to decide any question of money damages, or to decide that said Hurst is indebted to the complainant in any sum whatever, or to require or request him to withdraw any suit at law.’
Upon these affidavits it was ordered that during the pendency of the action the defendant Carhart be enjoined and restrained from proceeding in any way before the ‘New York Produce Exchange, or the board of managers thereof, or any committee of the said New York Produce Exchange, in the matter of a complaint made by said Carhart to the complaint committee of the New York Produce Exchange against the plaintiff, bearing date September 2, 1883, and that the defendant the New York Produce Exchange, its board of managers, and its committees, be, and they hereby are, enjoined and restrained from in any way entertaining, proceeding with, or acting upon the said complaint.’
B. H. Bristow, for appellants, New York Produce Exchange and others.
John Chetwood, for respondent, Francis W. G. Hurst.
The sole question for our determination is whether, under the charter and by-laws of the produce exchange, the board of managers had jurisdiction of the complaint presented to the complaint committee by Carhart, and to proceed with a hearing and determination thereof. The produce exchange, under the name of the New York Commercial Association, was chartered by the act, chapter 359, Laws 1862, by section 2 of which it was provided that the property, affairs, business, and concerns of the corporation ‘shall be managed by a president, vicepresident, treasurer and twenty managers, who together shall constitute a board of managers, to be elected annually at such time and place as may be provided by the by-laws;’ and section 4 gave the corporation power to admit new...
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