Hurst v. State
Decision Date | 31 July 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 124, September Term, 2006.,124, September Term, 2006. |
Citation | 400 Md. 397,929 A.2d 157 |
Parties | Richard David HURST v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Claudia A. Cortese, Asst. Public Defender (Nancy S. Forster, Public Defender, Stacy W. McCormack, Asst. Public Defender, on brief), for petitioner.
Cathleen C. Brockmeyer, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on brief), for respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER* CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE and WILNER, ALAN M. (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.
The issue presented in this case is whether the Circuit Court for Frederick County erred in admitting testimony that a rape victim, unconnected to the case before the court, did not consent to sexual intercourse with petitioner for the purpose of rebutting petitioner's contention that the current complainant consented to sexual intercourse. We shall hold that the Circuit Court erred and that the testimony should not have been admitted.
Petitioner, Richard David Hurst, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Frederick County of first and second degree rape, first and second degree sexual offense, kidnaping, and false imprisonment. The Circuit Court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for first degree rape, a concurrent life sentence for first degree sexual offense, and thirty-years' imprisonment for kidnaping.1
Petitioner's convictions stemmed from events occurring on May 16, 2002. That evening, petitioner encountered Gertrude P., a mentally disabled thirty-seven-year-old woman, as she was walking on Wessel Boulevard in Hagerstown, Maryland. Ms. P. had been searching for jobs at local stores throughout the day and was returning to her home. Petitioner drove by Ms. P. in his pick-up truck and stopped to ask for directions to Frederick, Maryland. Ms. P. responded by telling petitioner that "she was not very good at giving directions" and that he should go to a nearby gas station. Petitioner then drove away.
Petitioner returned along the same road shortly thereafter and again asked Ms. P. for directions to Frederick. During this second encounter, Ms. P. tried to give petitioner directions. Petitioner suggested that she get into his truck to explain the route; Ms. P. agreed and entered the vehicle. Once in the truck, Ms. P. directed petitioner to an exit off the highway that would enable him to reach Frederick. When Ms. P. and petitioner reached the exit, petitioner passed the exit without turning off the road. Petitioner stopped eventually at a field in Frederick County.
Ms. P. and petitioner offered different versions of the events that followed. Ms. P. testified at trial that after stopping the truck, petitioner told her to get out of the truck. She stated that petitioner told her he had a knife but would not hurt her unless she resisted his commands. Ms. P. said that petitioner then dragged her down a hill and told her to get on the ground and pull down her pants and underwear. She testified that petitioner forced her to perform fellatio and to engage in vaginal intercourse. Ms. P. stated that at one point, petitioner held his hand over her mouth so that she would not scream.
Petitioner contended that he had picked up Ms. P. under the impression that she was a prostitute. He testified that after driving together and talking with Ms. P., he stopped in the Frederick County field to urinate. Petitioner stated that after urinating, he returned to the truck and offered Ms. P. twenty dollars to "fool around a little bit." He testified that Ms. P. consented to oral and vaginal sex and that it was only when he started to ejaculate that Ms. P. "freaked out" and began "to push and tug." Petitioner conceded that he placed his hand over Ms. P.'s mouth "for a couple of seconds" because he "was afraid . . . she was turning it into something [it] wasn't." Petitioner testified that when Ms. P. "freaked out" and asked him to stop, he did so immediately.
Following the events in the field, petitioner drove Ms. P. to a Hagerstown area convenience store. After they reached the store, petitioner gave Ms. P. twenty dollars. She left the truck and entered the convenience store, at which time a cashier noticed her crying. After asking her why she was crying, the cashier called the police. Ms. P. told the responding police officers that she had been raped.
At trial, the State contended that petitioner forced Ms. P. to engage in sexual conduct on the evening of May 16, 2002. The State offered Ms. P.'s testimony and the testimony of the convenience store clerk, various police officers, and a registered nurse who had examined Ms. P. early in the morning on May 17, 2002. Petitioner testified that the sexual acts were consensual.
As rebuttal to petitioner's testimony, the State offered the testimony of Jacqueline E., a woman who had been raped by petitioner twenty-one years earlier. The defense objected to Ms. E.'s testimony, arguing that it was inadmissible under Maryland Rule 5-404(b)'s prohibition of the use of prior bad acts or crimes to prove criminal propensity.
The court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury. The State contended that because petitioner had been convicted of raping Ms. E. on the evening of February 2, 1981, and petitioner had argued in that earlier case that Ms. E. consented to sexual intercourse on that date, her testimony was admissible to rebut petitioner's claim that Ms. P. consented to sexual relations on the evening of May 16, 2002. The State argued that the testimony was admissible also as proof of modus operandi or signature evidence.
The trial court admitted Ms. E.'s testimony on the grounds that the testimony was admissible "[b]oth as to the gaining or offsetting the consent defense and the similarities proffer." Ms. E. testified before the jury as follows:
Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The intermediate appellate court held that Ms. E.'s testimony was admissible because the events she described were sufficiently similar to the present charges to be admissible as an exception to the general rule prohibiting the admission of prior bad acts or crimes evidence. Hurst v. State, 171 Md.App. 223, 247-48, 909 A.2d 1069, 1083 (2006). The Court of Special Appeals reasoned that a prior offense need not qualify as a signature crime to be admissible, stating as follows:
Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari before this Court, which we granted to...
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