Molina v. State
| Decision Date | 23 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 2380, 2537 Sept. Term, 2017,2380, 2537 Sept. Term, 2017 |
| Citation | 222 A.3d 222,244 Md.App. 67 |
| Parties | Ana Beti MOLINA v. STATE of Maryland Javier Molina v. State of Maryland |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued by: M. Peter Nelson, Baltimore, MD, Michael T. Torres (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
Argued by: Cathleen C. Brockmeyer (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee
Panel: Kehoe, Leahy, Sally D. Adkins (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
The Indictments ...232
Pre-Trial Motions ...232
Trial ...233
Gustave Shapiro, a widowed nonagenarian, depended on others for his transportation and daily care—he was a vulnerable adult.1 In 2016, Montgomery County Adult Protective Services ("APS") removed Gustave from the house in which he was residing with Ana Beti Molina and her husband, Javier Molina (the "Molinas" or "Appellants"). He died from severe dementia just one week later, at the age of 99.
A grand jury in Montgomery County indicted the Molinas on several charges relating to their financial gains from Gustave, including theft scheme, financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult, and financial exploitation of a person over 68 years old. The couple stood trial, as co-defendants, before a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.
At trial, the evidence revealed that Ana was hired in 2012 to clean Gustave's house after his wife passed away. Within months, Gustave became estranged from his only living son, Dana Shapiro, and Ana gained control of Gustave's medical care and finances. Over defense objections, the State introduced evidence that the Molinas declared income between $26,000 and $68,000 from 2012 to 2016, along with evidence that the Molinas, primarily Javier, suffered gambling losses of more than $200,000 from 2011 to 2016. Also, between 2012 and 2016, $450,000 was withdrawn from Gustave's bank accounts to purchase a new vehicle for the Molinas and a new house in which the Molinas lived with Gustave. Neither the house nor the car had accommodations for Gustave, who was wheelchair-bound. More than $60,000 was withdrawn to pay college tuition for the Molinas' daughter, and another $60,000 was withdrawn from ATMs near two casinos where Javier gambled. The jury found each of the Molinas guilty of theft scheme, two counts of financial exploitation, and conspiracy to commit these crimes. Separately, the jury found Ana guilty of two counts of misappropriation by a fiduciary.
Ana and Javier appealed and each presented four issues for our review, which we have consolidated, reordered, and rephrased as follows:
The statute featured in this case, Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article ("CR"), § 8-801 was enacted by the General Assembly in 2002 to prohibit the financial exploitation of vulnerable adults, and then amended in 2009 to include a prohibition against the financial exploitation of individuals who are at least 68 years old. See SB 646 (2002); HB 559 (2002); SB 304 (2009); HB 583 (2009). As Delegate Kramer, the sponsor of House Bill 583, wrote in 2009, "The financial exploitation of the elderly is a significant problem and perhaps the fastest-growing crime in the nation."2 Our appellate courts have had few opportunities to consider CR § 8-801 ; indeed, the sole reported opinion discussing the statute, Tarray v. State , 410 Md. 594, 979 A.2d 729 (2009), pre-dates the 2009 amendment and examines only the prohibition against the financial exploitation of vulnerable adults.
The case before us is the kind that the General Assembly intended to address when it enacted the financial exploitation statutory scheme.3 As is common for many vulnerable adults, Gustave's cognitive impairment, caused by his worsening dementia and advanced age, prevented him from appreciating the financial abuse at the time. Although the evidence of the Molinas' intent to commit financial exploitation was largely circumstantial, we hold that it was more than sufficient to support the jury's verdicts. Finding no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court's rulings, we affirm the jury's verdicts, but remand Javier's case to the circuit court to vacate one of his two conspiracy convictions.
On February 2, 2017, a grand jury sitting in Montgomery County returned indictments against Ana and Javier, respectively. As relevant to this appeal,4 the first six counts in each indictment were for crimes against Gustave: (1) theft scheme over the value of $100,000 in violation of Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2017 Supp.), CR § 7-104; (2) conspiracy to commit theft scheme over the value of $100,000; (3) financial exploitation, value over $100,000, of an adult over 68 in violation of CR § 8-801(b)(2) ; (4) conspiracy to exploit a vulnerable adult: value over $100,000; (5) financial exploitation, value over $100,000, of a vulnerable adult in violation of CR § 8-801(b)(1) ; and (6) conspiracy to exploit a vulnerable adult: value over $100,000.5 Ana was also charged with two counts of misappropriation by a fiduciary.
Four pre-trial motions are relevant to this appeal. They are treated fully in the discussion but outlined here for context. First, on April 28, 2017, the court granted a motion by the State, over the defendants' objections, to consolidate the cases against Ana and Javier.6 The court revisited this issue later in response to Ana's motion to sever the cases and reaffirmed its earlier ruling.
The Molinas, through two motions in limine, moved to exclude evidence of their gambling and financial status. They urged the court to bar the evidence because it was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. The State responded that the gambling records were relevant both to show motive and to show where the money went—a fundamental element of the theft charges. The circuit court denied the Molinas' motions to suppress the gambling evidence, granted Javier a continuing objection on the issue, and ultimately allowed the State to introduce evidence of the Molinas' financial circumstances.
In a fourth pre-trial motion, the State sought to prohibit Elizabeth Goldberg, an attorney, from offering opinion testimony at trial as to Gustave's capacity to execute legal documents. The court denied the State's motion.
The Molinas' trial took place over eight days between November 13 and 27, 2017. The State called 26 witnesses to testify. The following account is derived from the evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the State.
Ana and Javier were married with three children. In 2012, their oldest child, Janesse, was 22, and their two minor children were 17 and 14 years old. The Molinas lived in a three-bedroom apartment in Montgomery County from 1996 through 2015. Their rent for that apartment, from 2010 until they moved out, was $484 per month. Javier worked at a car wash that paid him between $20,000 and $48,000 per year. He also declared about $43,000 in income from gambling between 2013 and 2016. Ana cleaned houses for a living, although she did not declare any income on her Maryland tax returns aside from an amount less than $8,000 earned from gambling between 2014 and 2016. She began working for Gustave in September 2012.
Gustave was born in July 1917. He eventually married Ruth, and the couple adopted two sons, Dana and Marvin. Marvin would pre-decease his parents but, before he died, he had a falling out with Gustave that caused Gustave to disavow Marvin. Dana, on the other hand, maintained a relationship with Gustave until September 2012.
Gustave worked as an electronics engineer for the federal government until his retirement. He owned a house on Munsey Street in Silver Spring where he lived with Ruth. In addition to the retirement income he received in the form of pension and Social Security payments, Gustave owned treasury bonds that reached maturity between April 2012 and June 2013. The income from these treasury bonds brought Gustave's bank account ending in -7829 to a balance of $1.9 million.
As far back as 2004, Gustave had trouble getting around and required the assistance of a walker. He did not drive or like to take taxis, so Dana drove his parents around...
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