Hurt v. Dist. of Columbia Court Servs. & Offender Supervision Agency

• Decision Date: 08 December 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 07–1167 (RBW).
• Citation: 827 F.Supp.2d 16
• Parties: Donnell HURT, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT SERVICES AND OFFENDER SUPERVISION AGENCY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

827 F.Supp.2d 16

Donnell HURT, Plaintiff,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT SERVICES AND OFFENDER SUPERVISION AGENCY, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 07–1167 (RBW).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Dec. 8, 2011.

Donnell Hurt, Arlington, VA, pro se.

Rhonda C. Fields, United States Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, District Judge.

This civil action brought pro se is on partial remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for further proceedings to address the plaintiff's claim brought under the improper disclosure provision of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000). See Hurt v. Cromer, No. 09–5224, Order (D.C.Cir. June 11, 2010).¹ At the time giving rise to this action, the plaintiff was a parolee under the supervision of the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia (“CSOSA”). See Hurt v. District of Columbia Court Services, 612 F.Supp.2d 54, 56 (D.D.C.2009). The remanded claim against CSOSA ² is based on the alleged disclosure by the plaintiff's parole officer, Keith Cromer (“Cromer”), to the plaintiff's then-girlfriend that he had served a prison sentence for murder. See id. at 55.

The defendant now moves for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56., which the plaintiff opposes. Upon consideration of the parties' submissions and the relevant parts of the record, the Court will grant the defendant's motion and enter judgment for the defendant accordingly.

I. BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are as follows. The plaintiff was convicted in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for murder in the second degree while armed, grand larceny and petit larceny, and was sentenced on May 19, 1983, to 15 to 45 years' imprisonment. Hurt, 612 F.Supp.2d at 56. He was released to parole supervision on December 30, 2005, with a full-term parole expiration date of July 1, 2039. Id.

In a parole supervision report dated July 24, 2006, the plaintiff stated that he resided with his girlfriend (“L.H.”) in the northeast quadrant of the District of Columbia. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.'s Mot.”), Statement of Material Facts [Dkt. # 62], Exhibit (“Ex.”) 7. On August 1, 2006, parole officer Cromer met with a private investigator employed by L.H.'s family who informed him that L.H. was “mentally challenged and liv[ing] in [an] assisted living [facility]” that did not allow individuals who were not on the resident list to live there. Def.'s Mot., Declaration of Keith Cromer (“Cromer Decl.”) [Dkt. # 62–16] ¶ 12. The investigator further informed Cromer that the plaintiff had met L.H. on June 24, 2006, “on a bus, [ ] stayed with her several nights,” and moved into her residence on July 15, 2006. Id. Cromer was asked to inform the plaintiff that he should have no more contact with L.H., who, through Community Connections of Washington, D.C., had allegedly informed the plaintiff that she did not want to have a relationship with him and that she wanted him to move out of her residence by July 29, 2006. Id. ¶¶ 12, 15. The investigator gave Cromer “a letter dated July 25, 2006, which detailed various allegations against [the plaintiff].” ³ Id. ¶ 12.

On August 1, 2006, Cromer visited L.H.'s home, in part to confirm the investigator's statements. Id. ¶ 14. The plaintiff “answered the door, showed [Cromer] around the apartment[,] ... [and] introduced [Cromer] to L.H.” as his parole officer.⁴ Id. ¶ 15. Cromer then spoke with L.H. alone. L.H. confirmed that she asked the plaintiff to leave the house but only because she did not want to lose her home by allowing an unauthorized person to live there. Id. In response to Cromer's question as to whether the plaintiff “had been in any manner abusive to her or had threatened her [,] L.H. indicated that [the plaintiff] had not been abusive or threatening.” Rather, “[s]he said that [the plaintiff] had been kind to her.” Id. In response to L.H.'s question as to whether the plaintiff was on parole for a murder conviction, Cromer allegedly confirmed that the plaintiff was on parole but told her that she should discuss with the plaintiff why he was on parole. ⁵ Id. Allegedly, “L.H. responded that she just wanted [the plaintiff] out of her house and wanted no further contact with him.” Id. That was the only conversation Cromer had with L.H. Id. ¶ 17.

On August 2, 2006, the plaintiff met with Cromer at his office. The plaintiff informed Cromer that he was no longer living with L.H. “because he was asked to leave by L.H.,” and that he was essentially homeless. Id. ¶ 19. In the instant lawsuit, the plaintiff seeks $10 million in damages. Hurt, 612 F.Supp.2d at 55.

II. DISCUSSION

1. Legal Standard

To grant a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court must find that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and that the plaintiff “fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [his] case, and on which [he] will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In responding to a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Accordingly, the plaintiff must not rely on “mere allegations or denials ... but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there [are] genuine issue[s] for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (second omission in original). Thus, “[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted).

2. Analysis

“The Privacy Act regulates the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information about individuals by federal agencies [and] authorizes civil suits by individuals .... whose Privacy Act rights are infringed.” Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 707 (D.C.Cir.2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). It prohibits a federal agency from disclosing “any record ... contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person” without the subject's permission, save exceptions not applicable to this case. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).

Subsection (g)(1)(D) of the Privacy Act authorizes civil remedies against an agency that “fails to comply with [the disclosure provision],” and subsection (g)(4) provides for monetary damages of no less than $1,000, costs and attorneys' fees where the agency is shown to have acted intentionally or willfully. See Doe v. FBI, 936 F.2d 1346, 1350 (D.C.Cir.1991); accord Maydak v. U.S., 630 F.3d 166, 177–78 (D.C.Cir.2010). Thus, an agency may be held liable for “actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or failure” where the agency has failed to comply with any other provision “in such a way as to have an adverse effect on an individual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D); Maydak, 630 F.3d at 178 (“Plaintiffs seeking relief must establish that (1) the agency violated a provision of the Act, (2) the violation was ‘intentional or willful,’ ... and (3) the violation had an ‘adverse effect’ on the plaintiff.”) (quoting § 552(a)(g)(4), (g)(1)(D)). “The plaintiff must allege ‘actual damages' connected to the adverse effect to ‘qualify’ under the Act.” Doe v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 660 F.Supp.2d 31, 49 (D.D.C.2009) (quoting Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 620–27, 124 S.Ct. 1204, 157 L.Ed.2d 1122 (2004)).

Whether Cromer disclosed to L.H. that the plaintiff was on parole for murder is a materially disputed fact that cannot be resolved at the summary judgment stage. See Cromer Decl. ¶ 15 (stating that he “confirmed that [the plaintiff] was on parole, but told L.H. that she should discuss with Hurt what he was on parole for.”); Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.'s Opp'n”) [Dkt. # 67], Ex. 5, Declaration of [L.H.] [Dkt. # 67–1] ¶ 6 (“Mr. Keith Cromer did tell me about Donnell Hurt being in prison for killing someone.”). However, even if the plaintiff is able to prove that the disclosure was made, the plaintiff's Privacy Act claim nevertheless would fail in regards to the elements of intent and causation.

A. Intentional or Willful Conduct

The intent element of a Privacy Act damages claim is a high hurdle to clear. Thus, “a violation of the statute ‘must be so patently egregious and unlawful that anyone undertaking the conduct should have known it unlawful.’ ” Maydak, 630 F.3d at 179 (quoting Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1122 (D.C.Cir.2007)) (other citation omitted). “ ‘Intentional or willful’ means: ‘somewhat greater than gross negligence, or, an act committed without grounds for believing it to be lawful, or by flagrantly disregarding others' rights under the Act.’ ” Id. (quoting Waters v. Thornburgh, 888 F.2d 870, 875 (D.C.Cir.1989), abrogated on other grounds by Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 124 S.Ct. 1204, 157 L.Ed.2d 1122 (2004)) (alterations omitted). To survive the defendant's summary judgment motion as to this element of a Privacy Act claim, ...