Hurt v. State
| Decision Date | 29 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 82A01-9705-CR-161,82A01-9705-CR-161 |
| Citation | 694 N.E.2d 1212 |
| Parties | William F. HURT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
John D. Clouse, John P. Brinson, Evansville, for Appellant-Defendant.
Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General, Randi E. Froug, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee-Plaintiff.
Appellant-defendant William F. Hurt appeals his conviction for Voluntary Manslaughter, 1 a Class B felony. Specifically, he
contends that the incriminating statements he made, while involuntarily committed at the Evansville State Hospital, were released in violation of federal statute and erroneously admitted at trial.
On June 19, 1982, Hurt was walking the streets and looking into cars in order to find his wife. After Hurt peered into a station wagon belonging to Wayne Hilgeman, Wayne and his friend, Walter Axley, approached Hurt. Hurt then shot Axley three times in the chest and abdomen. After Axley was transported to the hospital emergency room, he died of complications stemming from the gunshot wounds.
Although Hurt was not charged with Axley's death, he was incarcerated in the Indiana Department of Correction for an unrelated offense from approximately 1982 to 1994. Immediately after his release, the authorities petitioned the LaPorte Circuit Court for an order committing Hurt to the Indiana Department of Mental Health. Thereafter, Hurt was found to be mentally disabled and involuntarily committed to the Department of Mental Health Logansport Hospital. On March 3, 1994, Hurt was transferred to the Evansville State Hospital where he was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, antisocial personality disorder and alcohol dependence abuse in remission. Record at 330. During his stay at the hospital, Hurt stayed on the locked ward and was treated with antipsychotic medications, including Prolixin, Respirdal and Klonopin, and an antianxiety medication, Atarax.
On the evening of February 27, 1996, and nearly fourteen years after the shooting, Hurt approached qualified medicine aid Carol Motisi and informed her that he wished to speak to an officer. After Motisi informed Hurt that only hospital personnel were present on the hospital grounds, Hurt confessed to the Axley homicide. R. at 580. As a result, Motisi contacted her supervising nurse, Julia Thomas, who contacted hospital security.
Thereafter, hospital security officer Hugh Nicholas went to Hurt's room and escorted him to the sun room where Hurt, in the presence of Nicholas and Thomas, again confessed to killing Axley. R. at 589, 593. Nicholas then revealed Hurt's story to his supervisor, Don Tharp, who conveyed the information to the hospital's liaison to the Indiana State Police. Tharp then arranged for an officer of the Evansville Police Department to interview Hurt on March 1, 1996.
At approximately 10:25 a.m. that day, Hurt complained that he felt anxious. As a result, the nurse gave him 25mg of Atarax. Later that afternoon, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Detective Chapman and Officer Joyce Molinet of the Evansville Police Department, Trooper Gary Gilbert of the Indiana State Police and Tharp arrived to interview Hurt. Before Hurt made a statement, he was given his Miranda rights and was presented with a waiver of rights form which he signed. Thereafter, Hurt answered several questions and confessed to killing Axley. Hurt's statement was taped and later transcribed.
On May 6, 1996, Hurt was charged with Axley's murder. 2 Four days later, Hurt was transported from the hospital to the jail. On March 16, 1996, Hurt filed a request for a competency examination and notice of intent to rely on the insanity defense. Thereafter, the trial court determined that Hurt was competent to stand trial.
Prior to trial, on November 15, 1996, Hurt filed a motion to suppress all of the statements he had made to agents of the State. On December 30, 1996, Hurt filed a notice to withdraw the waiver of his constitutional rights. Following an evidentiary hearing on January 10, 1997, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. Thereafter, on January 29, 1997, Hurt withdrew his notice of intent to rely on the insanity defense.
A jury trial was held on February 3, 1997. At the beginning of trial, Hurt filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him, arguing that the State failed to obtain a court order prior to obtaining his statements in violation of federal statute. The trial court, however, denied his motion. During trial, the statements which Hurt made to Motisi, Nicholas and the police were admitted into evidence over his objection. Following the trial, Hurt
was convicted of the lesser included offense of Voluntary Manslaughter, a Class B felony. Hurt now appeals.
Hurt contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss the charges against him because the statements he made to medical assistant Motisi, nurse Thomas and security guard Nicholas were released from the hospital in violation of federal statute and regulation. Specifically, he contends that, because he had been diagnosed with and treated for alcoholism in remission and the State received federal funding for operating its alcohol program, the hospital was required to obtain a court order prior to releasing his incriminating statements to the Indiana State Police for purposes of conducting a criminal investigation.
42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Requirement. Records of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment of any patient which are maintained in connection with the performance of any program or activity relating to substance abuse education, prevention, training, treatment, rehabilitation, or research, which is conducted, regulated, or directly or indirectly assisted by any department or agency of the United States shall, except as provided by subsection (e), be confidential and be disclosed only for the purposes and under the circumstances expressly authorized under subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Permitted disclosure ...
(2) Method for disclosure.
Whether or not the patient, with respect to whom any given record referred to in subsection (a) of this section is maintained, gives written consent, the content of such record may be disclosed as follows: ...
(C) If authorized by an appropriate court order of a court of competent jurisdiction granted after application showing good cause therefor, including the need to avert a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm.
(c) Use of records in criminal proceedings.
Except as authorized by a court order granted under subsection (b)(2)(C) of this section, no record referred to in subsection (a) of this section may be used to initiate or substantiate any criminal charges against a patient or to conduct any investigation of a patient.
Further, 42 C.F.R. § 2.13 provides as follows:
(a) General. The patient records to which these regulations apply may be disclosed or used only as permitted by these regulations and may not otherwise be disclosed or used in any civil, criminal, administrative, or legislative proceedings conducted by any Federal, State, or local authority. Any disclosure must be limited to the information which is necessary to carry out the purpose of the disclosure.
The State concedes that, if Hurt had been actively receiving treatment for alcoholism, the hospital would have been required to obtain a court order prior to releasing his statements. The State further concedes that, had the hospital obtained his statements in violation of the statute, any subsequent statements which Hurt made would have been inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. However, the State contends that the statute does not apply to Hurt's statements because they were not maintained "in connection" with the performance of any activity relating to substance abuse. Thus, the State argues the hospital was not required to obtain a court order prior to releasing Hurt's statements.
The plain language of the statute requires a party to obtain a court order only for records "maintained in connection with the performance of any program or activity relating to substance abuse education, prevention, training, treatment, rehabilitation or research." 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(a) (emphasis added). The commentary on this code section, which is contained in the code of federal regulations, provides guidance in interpreting the statute. Specifically, it states that these "regulations impose restrictions upon the disclosure and use of alcohol and drug abuse patient records which are maintained in connection with the performance of any federally assisted alcohol and drug abuse program." 42 C.F.R. § 2.3. Further, 42 C.F.R. § 2.12(e) provides that "[t]hese regulations cover any information ... about alcohol and drug abuse patients obtained by a program (as the terms "patient" and "program" are defined in § 2.11) if the program is federally assisted in any manner described in § 2.12(b)." 3 A "program" includes any "identified unit within a general medical facility which holds itself out as providing, and provides, alcohol or drug abuse diagnosis, treatment or referral for treatment" or "medical personnel or other staff in a general medical care facility whose primary function is the provision of alcohol or drug abuse diagnosis, treatment or referral for treatment and who are identified as such providers." 42 C.F.R. § 2.11. More specifically, § 2.12(e)(3) provides that the "restriction on use of information to bring criminal charges against a patient for a crime applies to any information obtained by the program for the purpose of diagnosis, treatment, or referral for treatment of alcohol or drug abuse." (emphasis added). Thus, based on the plain language of the statute and this commentary, Hurt's statements qualified as confidential statements under the...
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