Hussain v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan

• Decision Date: 05 January 1996
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 95-CV-701-A.
• Citation: 914 F. Supp. 1331
• Parties: Shahid HUSSAIN, Personal Representative of the Estate of Uzma Hussain, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN OF THE MID-ATLANTIC STATES, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

914 F. Supp. 1331

Shahid HUSSAIN, Personal Representative of the Estate of Uzma Hussain, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN OF THE MID-ATLANTIC STATES, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 95-CV-701-A.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division.

January 5, 1996.

Deborah A. Vitale, Miller & Vitale, Alexandria, Virginia, for Plaintiff.

Bernard G. Feord, Jr., Pledger & Santoni, McLean, Virginia, Richard C. Sullivan, Jr., Alexandria, Virginia, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PAYNE, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by the defendant, Inova Healthcare Services t/a Fairfax Hospital, seeking dismissal of Count I of the Complaint which alleges a violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment And Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd et. seq. ("EMTALA"). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted and Count I is dismissed with prejudice.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The record on this motion consists of the Complaint, the affidavit of Dr. Farideh Sadeghi filed by Fairfax Hospital, the affidavit of Dr. David Abramson filed by the plaintiff, the affidavit of Judy Brown, the document custodian of Fairfax Hospital, and certain documents relating to the treatment and admission of the plaintiff's decedent. The factual circumstances presented by this record are recounted below.

At 10:30 a.m. on February 15, 1994, the decedent, Uzma Hussain, presented to the Emergency Department of the Fairfax Hospital and made a request for examination and treatment of what she perceived to be an emergency medical condition. According to the medical records and the affidavit of Dr. Sadeghi, Ms. Hussain was diagnosed with acute recurrent pancreatitis and was treated intermittently on thirteen occasions between 10:30 a.m. and her admission for in-patient treatment of the diagnosed condition at 4:30 p.m. the same day (Brown affidavit, ¶ 3 and exhibits).

According to the Complaint and the affidavit of Dr. Abramson, at an unspecified time in the early morning ("after midnight") of February 16, 1994, Ms. Hussain required, for unspecified reasons, a medical examination which was requested by the nursing staff. According to Dr. Abramson's affidavit, "no examination was recorded in the medical records and it must be presumed that no examination was performed even though an examination was requested by the nursing staff." Dr. Abramson further avers that "Ms. Hussain's complications of acute pancreatitis were not diagnosed and her life threatening condition was not stabilized, leading to her death." The affidavit does not state explicitly when these complications arose but the affidavit, as a whole, indicates that they occurred on the morning of February 16 because that was when the nursing staff requested the examination. Further, Dr. Abramson's affidavit contains the conclusory statement that: "once the nursing staff requests an examination, the failure to perform such examination is disparate treatment. Disparate treatment was provided in this case to Uzma Hussain." According to the brief in opposition to summary judgment, Ms. Hussain died at approximately 6:00 a.m. on February 16, 1994. The record does not document this assertion, but it is not disputed by Fairfax Hospital.

Count I of the Complaint asserts two violations of EMTALA: (1) that Fairfax Hospital "failed to provide for an appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital's emergency department;" and (2) that Fairfax Hospital "failed to provide within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, for such further medical examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition of Ms. Hussain." At oral argument, the plaintiff abandoned the assertion that Fairfax Hospital had violated the medical screening requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). Thus, the plaintiff now relies solely on the theory that the hospital violated Section 1395dd(b)(1)(A) of EMTALA by failing to stabilize Ms. Hussain's medical condition.

STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is to be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The rules further provide:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

It is the responsibility of the party seeking summary judgment to inform the court of the basis for its motion, and to identify the parts of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211, 216 (4th Cir.1987). "Where the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The moving party may also use affidavits to support its motion. Then the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by citing its own affidavits or by citing "`depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designating `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. Opposition to a properly documented summary judgment motion may not be based solely on the pleadings. Id.

The "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis added). It is the function of the district court not to weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial, and "there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (citations omitted). Hence, summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence is "merely colorable" or "not significantly probative." Id. at pp. 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at pp. 2510-11 (citations omitted). The standard for summary judgment mirrors the standard for directed verdict (now judgment as a matter of law) under Rule 50(a), Fed. R.Civ.P., the principal difference being procedural. Id. at 251, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. And, "when the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citations omitted). The non-moving party, however, "need only present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor. If he does so, there is a genuine issue of fact that requires a trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514. The district court also "must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden." Id. at 254, 106 S.Ct. at 2513.

Furthermore, "the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. Summary judgment is appropriate only if, upon consideration of the record as a whole, a reasonable trier of fact could not find for the non-movant. Allstate Financial Corp. v. Financorp, Inc., 934 F.2d 55, 58 (4th Cir.1991). But, where a faithful examination of the record establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, it is "the affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent `factually unsupported claims and defenses' from proceeding to trial." Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987); see also Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 883 (4th Cir.1992). With these principles in mind, the court now considers the motion for partial summary judgment filed by Fairfax Hospital.

DISCUSSION

The starting point for an analysis of the issues presented by this motion is, of course, the statute which...