Cooper v. City of N.Y.
| Decision Date | 15 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | 14-cv-3698 (ENV) (PK) |
| Parties | AMBROSE COOPER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, POLICE OFFICER EDWARD MADDEN, POLICE OFFICER ROBERT O'NEIL, SERGEANT WILLIAM DITOMASO, POLICE OFFICER MATTHEW KUDOW, POLICE OFFICERS JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-10, RODERICK E. ALLEN, JAMAICA HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, REYNALDO M. PUNSAL, M.D., AND JEFFREY CHAN, M.D., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Plaintiff Ambrose Cooper brings this action against the City of New York ("the City"), Police Officers Edward Madden, Robert O'Neil, Matthew Kudow, Police Sergeant William DiTomaso, Police Officers John and Jane Does 1-10, Roderick E. Allen, Jamaica Hospital Medical Center ("JHMC"), Reynaldo M. Punsal, M.D., and Jeffrey Chan, M.D., all pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for alleged violations of his constitutional rights resulting from his arrest, and subsequent denial of adequate medical care at JHMC.
On March 13, 2015, JHMC, Dr. Punsal, and Dr. Chan ("hospital defendants") moved, under Rule 12(b)(6), to dismiss Cooper's Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act ("EMTALA") claim, and, thereafter, that the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims of medical malpractice, false arrest, false imprisonment, excessive detention, and negligent hiring, be declined. The same day, the City, Madden, DiTomaso, O'Neil, and Kudow (the "City defendants") moved to dismiss Cooper's § 1983 false arrest, malicious prosecution, delay and denial of medical treatment, and excessive detention claims, as well as his Monell charge and related state law claims, for failure to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, the motions to dismiss are granted in their entirety. The excessive force and failure to intercede claims, which were not the subject of motions, remain unaffected by this disposition.
On March 12, 2013, Cooper was leaving a grocery store at 172-20 Hillside Avenue, in Jamaica, Queens, when he heard someone shout an order to stop. Amended Complaint, ECF Dkt. No. 12 ("Compl.") at ¶ 26. Not realizing the order was directed at him, he kept walking. Id. He was then kicked and fell to the ground. Id. Cooper discovered several police officers standing above him, and he asked them what was happening. Id. at ¶ 27. They did not respond. Id. Instead, he says, the officers attacked him, kicking his left lower ribs, stomach, head, and the rest of his body. Id. Cooper lost consciousness and fell into a coma. Id. The last thing plaintiff heard before losing consciousness was a voice requesting that the police stop kicking him. Id.
He awoke in JHMC's emergency wing, chained to a hospital bed. Id. at ¶¶ 29-30. Cooper had sustained four broken ribs, a collapsed lung, multiple head and chest trauma, and pneumothorax. Id. at ¶ 39. He observed that he was in "a kind of holding cell at the hospital" with "some defendant police officers . . . on guard at his bed." Id. at ¶ 31. The officers informed Cooper that he had been arrested for stealing, an offense which he denies. Id. at ¶ 32. Cooper alleges that, in the six days he spent at JHMC, "no aggressive effort" was made to treat or stabilize him. Id. at ¶ 34. Cooper also, paradoxically, alleges that the hospital defendants cleared him for discharge, yet continued to detain him "at the directive and convenience" of NYPD and its officers. Id. at ¶ 35.
On March 18, 2013, following his actual discharge from JHMC, Cooper was arraigned on two counts of petit larceny and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree. Id. at ¶ 51. Cooper says that, at arraignment, criminal court noted he still needed medical attention, but he was nevertheless sent to Rikers Island. Id. Plaintiff did not complete processing at Rikers Island, however, because "he relapsed into a medical emergency" involving bleeding from the wound where suction tubes had been. Id. at ¶ 53. Plaintiff was then rushed to Bellevue Hospital. Id. at ¶ 54.
Plaintiff maintains that the arresting officers "conspired to unlawfully provide false and misleading information" in order to charge him "with crimes [he] never committed." Id. at ¶ 60. Defendant Allen, the complaining witness against Cooper, according to the criminal complaint, told police that Cooper had taken a bag containing an iPad and iPhone charger—statements, Cooper says, that were false. Nevertheless, these statements formed the basis for his arrest. Id. at ¶ 65; NYPD Omniform Complaint and Arrest Report, attached as Ex. 1 to City Defs. Mot. for Pre-Mot. Conf., dated Oct. 20, 2014 (hereinafter "arrest report"), which is properly before the Court on this motion. See Alvarez v. Cty. of Orange, N.Y., 95 F. Supp. 3d 385, 394-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (). On June 21, 2013, all charges were dismissed. Compl. at ¶ 56.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." A litigant need not supply "detailed factual allegations" in support of his claims, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007), but he must provide more "than an unadorned, the- defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' . . . will not do." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Applying the elemental standard, to survive a Rule 12(b) motion, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This "plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quotations omitted). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the trial court must accept as true all factual statements alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). In addition, the district court "may consider any written instrument attached to the complaint, statements or documents incorporated into the complaint by reference . . . and documents possessed by or known to the plaintiff and upon which [he] relied in bringing the suit." ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Cooper claims that the hospital defendants violated EMTALA by failing to properly treat and stabilize him before release. EMTALA, commonly known as the Patient Anti-Dumping Act, states that an individual seeking emergency care from a Medicare-participating hospital with an emergency room2 must be provided "an appropriate medical screening examination ... to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition ... exists." 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). If hospital staff determine that an emergency medical condition exists, then, with certain exceptions not relevant here, the staff must "stabilize" the patient before transferring or discharging him. 42 U.S.C. § 1295dd(b)(1). EMTALA was passed by Congress to prevent "patient dumping," that is, the practice of emergency rooms turning away patients for economic or other nonmedical reasons. Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1996) (). EMTALA is a "limited 'anti-dumping' statute, not a federal malpractice statute." Alvarez-Torres v. Ryder Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 582 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Bryan, 95 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1996)).
The hospital defendants argue that EMTALA does not apply, because Cooper was properly treated and stabilized when he was in an emergency medical condition, and was discharged six days later, but only after being admitted to the hospital, and after his condition was stabilized. EMTALA's coverage, they contend, ends upon inpatient admission. Put another way, Cooper was never dumped from the emergency room; he was transferred and admitted for in-patient care.
This issue, it seems, has never been before the Second Circuit. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits, as well as a smattering of district courts across the country, have held that admission for inpatient care ends a hospital's EMTALA obligations. See Bryant v. Adventist Health Systems/West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002); Bryan, 95 F.3d at 352; Lopez v. Contra Costa Reg'l Med. Ctr., 903 F. Supp. 2d 835, 840 (N.D. Cal. 2012); James v. Jefferson Regional, No. 4:12-CV-267 (JAR), 2012 WL 1684570, at *3 (E.D. Mo. May 15, 2012); Money v. Banner Health, No. 3:11-cv-00800-LRH-WGC, 2012 WL 1190858, at *9 (D. Nev. Apr. 9, 2012); Hussain v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 914 F. Supp. 1331, 1335 (E.D. Va. 1996). The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid ("CMS"), responsible for enforcing EMTALA, promulgated a rule in 2003 adopting this view as well. See 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2) (2014). New York courts have agreed. See Lear v. Genesee Mem'l Hosp., 254 A.D.2d 707, 708-09, 678 N.Y.S.2d 228 (1998), leave to appeal denied, 92 N.Y.2d 1045, 708 N.E.2d 179 (1999) (); Whitney-Carrington v. New York Methodist Hosp., No. 26096/98, 2001 WL 856133, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2001), aff'd, 289 A.D.2d 326, 734 N.Y.S.2d 490 (2001) ().
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