Huston v. Konieczny

Decision Date11 July 1990
Docket NumberNo. 89-834,89-834
Citation556 N.E.2d 505,52 Ohio St.3d 214
PartiesHUSTON et al., Appellees, v. KONIECZNY et al., Appellees; Cordell et al., Appellants.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

At common law, a parent is not ordinarily liable for damages caused by a child's wrongful conduct. However, liability can attach when the injury committed by the child is the foreseeable consequence of a parent's negligent act. In those circumstances, liability arises from the conduct of the parent.

On the evening of December 31, 1983, Ronald Cordell, Harry Cordell, Jr. and Robert Chio held a New Year's Eve party at the home of their parents, Harry Cordell, Sr. and Linda Cordell. The parents had given their children permission to invite a few friends to the house that evening. The parents knew that the children "probably would have some beer." For this reason, the parents apparently instructed their children to invite their friends to spend the night. At the time of the party, the parents had gone out of town.

Approximately twenty people attended the party; most were under the legal drinking age of nineteen. 1 Some guests apparently brought their own beer. One guest, Ernest Goodsite, purchased a pony keg of beer which was placed in the bathtub, along with various cans and bottles of beer. Robert Huston, Matthew Bodnar and Lowell Rouanzoin brought the remainder of a twelve-pack of beer.

After several hours, Huston left the party as a passenger in the back seat of his car. Bodnar drove and Rouanzoin sat beside him in the passenger seat.

In the amended complaint, it is alleged that Huston's car veered off State Route 163 and struck a tree. It then apparently slid back onto the icy road. Plaintiffs further alleged that Carl Konieczny drove his car into Huston's. Huston was the sole occupant of the car at the time of the second collision. He suffered injuries.

Huston and his parents sued Harry Cordell, Sr., Linda Cordell, Ronald Cordell, Robert Chio, Harry Cordell, Jr., Matthew Bodnar, Bodnar's parents, Lowell Rouanzoin, Rouanzoin's parents and Ernest Goodsite, among others. The Hustons alleged that the Cordell parents negligently sponsored a party at which minors were allowed to consume alcohol. Plaintiffs further alleged that the Cordell children negligently acquired alcohol and provided it to minors.

Plaintiffs also claimed that Bodnar or Rouanzoin was driving at the time the car veered off the road and that the two left the semiconscious Huston in the car to make it appear that Huston had been driving at the time of the accident. In a videotaped affidavit, 2 Huston identified Bodnar as the driver of the vehicle when the accident occurred.

All defendants filed motions for summary judgment and/or dismissal. This appeal arises out of the trial court's orders granting summary judgment in favor of the Cordell family and Goodsite. The court of appeals reversed those orders because it found genuine issues of disputed material fact.

The cause is before the court pursuant to the allowance of motions to certify the record.

Murray & Murray Co., L.P.A., W. Patrick Murray, William H. Bartle and Steven C. Bechtel, Sandusky, for appellees Robert Huston, Roger Huston and Joyce Huston.

Eastman & Smith, Richard E. Antonini and Joseph A. Gregg, Toledo, for appellant Goodsite.

Schuller & Bennett and James L. Schuller, Toledo, for appellants Ronald Cordell, Harry Cordell, Sr., Linda Cordell, Harry Cordell, Jr. and Robert Chio.

Manahan, Pietrykowski, Bamman & DeLaney and Cormac B. DeLaney, Toledo, for appellee Bodnar.

Sauter & Hohenberger and Wayne P. Hohenberger, Mansfield, for appellees Lowell Rouanzoin, William Rouanzoin and Frances Rouanzoin.

HERBERT R. BROWN, Justice.

Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), we must determine whether appellants were entitled to summary judgment. We find that they are not, because genuine issues of material fact exist; we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Our analysis of the issues requires three steps. First, we must determine whether the driver of the car was intoxicated. If the evidence supports an affirmative finding, we must resolve two additional issues. We must decide whether liability can lie against the parents who authorized the party at which the driver became intoxicated. Finally, we must determine the responsibility of those who furnished the intoxicants which caused the driver to become intoxicated.

I

Our threshold inquiry is: Was the driver of the car intoxicated? Huston claimed that Bodnar was driving at the time of the accident. Bodnar disagreed, claiming that he drove the car to his own home where he exited the vehicle, leaving Rouanzoin and Huston to drive to their homes. Rouanzoin confirmed Bodnar's version of the facts. Thus, the evidence is conflicting as to the identity of the driver.

However, the appeal is before us on motions for summary judgment and we must construe the evidence most strongly in the non-moving parties' favor. Williams v. First United Church of Christ (1974), 37 Ohio St.2d 150, 66 O.O.2d 311, 309 N.E.2d 924. Thus, for purposes of this appeal, we accept plaintiffs' evidence that Bodnar was driving.

Bodnar claims that he drank only soft drinks on the night of the incident. None of the parties herein claimed that anyone at the party saw Bodnar drink alcoholic beverages.

Plaintiffs produced a deposition by Ann Fizer, who stated she had a conversation with Bodnar as she was arriving at the party and he was leaving. During the conversation, Bodnar told Fizer that he and the others were drunk.

Fizer's statement contradicts the trial court's finding that no evidence existed that Bodnar drank intoxicants at the party. It may be inferred from Fizer's statement (when construed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs) that Bodnar consumed alcoholic beverages at the Cordell party, since Bodnar says he consumed no alcoholic beverages before arriving at the party. The conflict in the evidence should not be resolved on a motion for summary judgment.

Thus we assume, for the sole purpose of evaluating the summary judgment, that Bodnar was the driver of the car in which plaintiff suffered injury and that Bodnar became intoxicated at the party.

II

We next consider whether the Cordell parents can be held liable for Bodnar's intoxication. In tort law, whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff depends upon the relationship between them. Commerce & Industry Ins. Co. v. Toledo (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 96, 98, 543 N.E.2d 1188, 1192. Whether a duty exists depends on the foreseeability of injury. Menifee v. Ohio Welding Products, Inc. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 75, 77, 15 OBR 179, 180, 472 N.E.2d 707, 710. Injury is foreseeable if a defendant knew or should have known that his act was likely to result in harm to someone. Mudrich v. Standard Oil Co. (1950), 153 Ohio St. 31, 39, 41 O.O. 117, 121, 90 N.E.2d 859, 863.

Once the existence of a duty is found, a defendant must exercise that degree of care which an ordinarily careful and prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. Mussivand v. David (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 314, 318, 544 N.E.2d 265, 270; Di Gildo v. Caponi (1969), 18 Ohio St.2d 125, 127, 47 O.O.2d 282, 283, 247 N.E.2d 732, 734; Gedeon v. East Ohio Gas Co. (1934), 128 Ohio St. 335, 338, 190 N.E. 924, 925; Bellefontaine Ry. Co. v. Snyder (1874), 24 Ohio St. 670, 676.

The complaint alleges that the Cordell children negligently acquired and served alcoholic beverages to underage persons at the party. 3 At the time of Huston's injury, R.C. 4301.69 stated in part:

"No person shall * * * buy beer for or furnish it to a person under the age of nineteen, unless given by a physician in the regular line of his practice, or by a parent or legal guardian." 139 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2508, 2521.

We have held that one who furnishes alcoholic beverages to an underage person may be held liable for injuries to a third person resulting from that wrongful conduct. Mitseff v. Wheeler (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 526 N.E.2d 798.

The Cordell parents, however, argue that they would be liable only if they personally gave beer to Bodnar. At common law, a parent is not ordinarily liable for damages caused by a child's wrongful conduct. Elms v. Flick (1919), 100 Ohio St. 186, 126 N.E. 66, paragraph four of the syllabus; Prosser & Keeton, Law of Torts (5 Ed.1984), Section 123. However, liability can attach when the injury committed by the child is the foreseeable consequence of a parent's negligent act. Kuhns v. Brugger (Pa.1957), 135 A.2d 395, 404, fn. 14. In those circumstances, liability arises from the conduct of the parent. Bankert v. Threshermen's Mut. Ins. Co. (Wis.1983), 329 N.W.2d 150, 153. Applying these principles, courts have held parents liable for the acts of their children in several ways which are relevant to the issue here.

Parents may incur liability when they negligently entrust their child with an instrumentality (such as a gun or car) which, because of the child's immaturity or lack of experience, may become a source of danger to others. See, e.g., Davis v. Mack (C.P.1939), 29 Ohio Law Abs. 210, 15 O.O. 4, and Bankert, supra.

A parent may also be held responsible for failure to exercise reasonable control over the child when the parent knows, or should know, that injury to another is a probable consequence. See, e.g., Cashman v. Reider's Stop-N-Shop Supermarket (1986), 29 Ohio App.3d 142, 29 OBR 158, 504 N.E.2d 487; Landis v. Condon (1952), 95 Ohio App. 28, 52 O.O. 371, 116 N.E.2d 602; Parsons v. Smithey (1973), 109 Ariz. 49, 504 P.2d 1272; Gissen v. Goodwill (Fla.1955), 80 So.2d 701; see, also, 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Section 316.

Finally, when parents know of the child's wrongdoing and consent to it, direct it or sanction it, they may be held liable. Wery v. Seff (1940), 136 Ohio St. 307, 16 O.O. 445, 25 N.E.2d 692 (parent incurred liability for third person's injuries...

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