Huston v. Washington Wood & Coal Co., 28003.

• Decision Date: 05 July 1940
• Docket Number: 28003.
• Citation: 4 Wn.2d 449,103 P.2d 1095
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: HUSTON v. WASHINGTON WOOD & COAL CO.

103 P.2d 1095

4 Wn.2d 449

HUSTON v. WASHINGTON WOOD & COAL CO.

No. 28003.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 5, 1940

Department 1.

Action by A. Huston against the Washington Wood & Coal Company to recover the difference between the amount of wages paid plaintiff while employed by defendant and the amount claimed to be due plaintiff by reason of a contract between defendant and a teamsters' union. From a judgment dismissing the action, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; William J. Wilkins, judge.

William C. Taylor and Alexander L. Cain, both of Seattle, for appellant.

William A. Herren and S. H. Kelleran, both of Seattle, for respondent.

MILLARD Justice.

The Washington Wood and Coal Company, a domestic corporation, is engaged in the solid fuel business in the city of Seattle. Plaintiff was employed during the late spring of 1936 as a yard worker by the fuel company. Approximately a month later plaintiff began driving a truck for his employer. He first received $2.50 daily which was increased by his employer to $4 a day within a month or two after he commenced to work. On January 1, 1936, the fuel company entered into a contract with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs Stablemen and Helpers of America, Local No. 174, under the terms of which the employer fuel company agreed to a base rate of pay of $5.50 for an eight-hour day to its truck drivers. On January 1, 1937, by mutual agreement of the parties to the contract the base rate of pay was increased to $6.25 a day.

In the latter part of 1936 plaintiff joined the teamsters' union. He continued to work as a truck driver in the wholesale or industrial division of the fuel company--he continued to perform some yard work labor--until October 1938, when he was laid off for the reason that there was not sufficient work. During this period of more than two years plaintiff accepted each Saturday a voucher check containing the clause 'endorsement of this check is acknowledgment of payment account in full as follows.' Appellant endorsed and cashed each of the checks and never protested to his employer as to the amount or rate of compensation. He did not demand an increase nor did he claim that the union scale fixed by the contract between the teamsters' union and his employer governed the amount of his pay. He never complained to his union nor did his union ever intercede with the employer in behalf of this employee. Plaintiff testified that each Saturday the employees including himself, exhibited their pay checks to each other discussed their rates of wages and changes therein and the part played by the union in effecting changes. He explained that his acceptance of the check each week without remonstrance or argument was because of his understanding that it was a matter to be handled by the union, to which he made no complaint.

Plaintiff did not claim, until after his employment by the fuel company ceased, that he was entitled to recover wages under the contract between his employer and the teamsters' union.

On May 18, 1939, plaintiff commenced an action against the fuel company in which he alleged that he was directed by defendant's manager to begin driving one of the defendant's trucks under an oral agreement with defendant obligating the employer to pay to the plaintiff $4 daily for such work and that he was paid on that basis throughout his term of service from early in 1936 until October 15, 1938 when he left...