Hutcheson v. Bennefield
| Decision Date | 22 July 1902 |
| Citation | 42 S.E. 422,115 Ga. 990 |
| Parties | HUTCHESON. v. BENNEFIELD. SAME. v. HODNETT. SAME. v. MELSON. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
TRUSTS—LEASING TRUST PROPERTY—POWERS OF TRUSTEE.
1. A trustee in possession of land, charged with the duty of managing and controlling it. and using the income therefrom for the support, maintenance, and education of the beneficiaries of the trust, may grant leases of the same, provided the time fixed for the duration of the leases is not unreasonable, and the amount stipulated to be paid as rental is a reasonably fair compensation for the use of the land for the time specified in the leases; they being otherwise reasonable in their terms. Where such leases have been executed, a court of equity will not, in the exercise of its supervisory powers over trusts and trustees, set aside the leases, but will uphold and confirm them.
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Error from superior court, Clayton county; Jno. S. Candler, Judge.
Three separate actions by J. B. Hutcheson, receiver, against J. H. Bennefield, against Ella Hodnett, and against D. P. Melson. Decree for defendant in each case, and the receiver brings error. Affirmed.
F. E. Callaway and J. D. Bradwell, for plaintiff.
W. L. Watterson and W. M. Wright, for defendants.
COBB, J. Hutcheson, as receiver, brought separate suits against Bennefield, Hodnett, and Melson, seeking in each case to recover possession of lands held by the defendant, to recover damages for acts of waste, and to enjoin future acts of waste. The three cases, together with the case in which Hutcheson was appointed receiver, were by order of the court referred to an auditor, who was authorized to make one report in all the cases, or separate reports in each, as he deemed proper. The auditor made separate reports in the three cases now under consideration; the report in each being, in effectthat the defendant was entitled to a decree. To these reports numerous exceptions, both of law and fact, were filed. The judge disallowed all of the exceptions of fact, overruled all of the exceptions of law, and entered decrees in favor of the defendants. The receiver claimed the right to recover possession of the lands under the terms of two deeds executed by S. H. Gay, in which W. P. Archer was appointed trustee during the lifetime of his wife, Marietta Archer, to manage certain lands for the benefit of his wife and children. The defendant claimed the right to remain in possession of the lands under leases from W. P. Archer as trustee. Marietta Archer joined with her husband in the execution of all of the leases, and to some of them were affixed the signatures of some of the children of Marietta Archer, though it is conceded that at the date of the leases at least three of the children were minora, The leases were for terms running from three to eight years. That portion of the first deed from S. H. Gay, above referred to, which is material to the present investigation, is as follows: That portion of the second deed from S. H. Gay which is material to the present discussion is as follows: It is not necessary to set forth the exact language of any of the leases under which the defendants claimed. It is sufficient to say that while some of them might be so construed as to pass no estate out of the landlord, and to give only the usufruct to the tenant, still others contained language from which it would be manifest that there was an intention to create an estate for years in the tenant. For the purposes of these cases, each of the instruments will be treated as a grant of an estate for years; that is, what is usually termed a "lease." See Civ. Code, § 3114. When so construed, the question arises whether the trustee had, under the terms of the deeds above referred to, authority to convey such an estate. It is not claimed that the leases were executed under the authority of an order of court. It must therefore be determined whether, under the terms of the deeds, there was either an express or implied power in the trustee to execute a lease of the trust property. A trustee, in this state, unless expressly authorized by the instrument creating the trust, or with the voluntary consent of all the beneficiaries, has no authority to sell or convey the corpus of the trust estate, without an order of the superior court upon a regular application made. Id. § 3172. In the present cases the trustee is expressly prohibited from selling or otherwise disposing of the property of the trust estate, the right of disposition conferred upon the trustee in the deeds being limited simply to the income and profits arising from the trust property. The duty imposed upon the trustee under the terms of the deeds is to so manage the property as to produce an income to be expended for the purposes of the trust; that is, for the maintenance and support of his wife, and the maintenance, support, and education of his children. Without an income the purposes of the trust cannot be accomplished. The property of the trust estate consisting of agricultural lands, and there being nothing in the deeds which requires that the lands shall be tilled directly by the trustee, or under his immediate supervision, it is to be inferred that it was the intention of the creator of the trust that the trustee should have a right, in his discretion, to rent the lands for the purpose of making an income to carry out the purposes of the trust. It is conceded that the trustee had the Tight to make contracts of rental for a term not exceeding five years, provided the contracts were not of such a character as to vest an estate inthe tenant. See, in this connection, Civ. Code, § 3115. It is contended, however, that in all cases of contracts for rental, where the term is five years or more, an estate in the land passes to the tenant, and that such contracts are, in effect, sales by the trustee, end invalid, under the laws of this state, when not authorized by an order of the superior court, and would be invalid in the present cases, for the reason that under the terms of the trust deeds the power to sell is expressly denied to the trustee. Whether, under a contract providing for the rent of land, an estate in the land passes to the tenant, or he obtains merely the usufruct, and no estate in the land, depends upon the intention of the parties; and this is true without regard to the length of the term. While, under the Code, contracts of rental for terms of less than five years will generally be construed to give only the usufruct and to pass no estate, still such contracts may have the effect to pass an estate to the tenant where it is manifest from the instrument containing the contract that such was the...
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... ... 787; Sweeney v. Hagerstown Trust Co., 144 ... Md. 612, 125 A. 522; Wilmington Trust Co. v. Carrow, ... 14 Del. Ch. 290, 125 A. 350; Hutcheson v. Hodnett, ... 115 Ga. 990, 42 S.E. 422; St. Louis Union Trust Co. v ... Van Raalte, 214 Mo.App. 172, 259 S.W. 1067; Labatut ... v ... ...
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...must be scrutinized to ascertain what interest the parties intended to be conveyed or demised by it. See, also, Hutcheson v. Hodnett, 115 Ga. 990, 42 S.E. 422 (1902). "We note that, under the provisions of Code § 61-101, where the term of the lease is less than five years a rebuttable presu......
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Allright Parking of Georgia, Inc. v. Joint City-County Bd. of Tax Assessors for City of Atlanta--Fulton County
...must be scrutinized to ascertain what interest the parties intended to be conveyed or demised by it. See, also, Hutcheson v. Hodnett, 115 Ga. 990, 42 S.E. 422 (1902). "We note that, under the provisions of Code § 61-101, where the term of the lease is less than five years a rebuttable presu......
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