Hutchins v. State

• Decision Date: 28 May 1970
• Citation: 265 A.2d 706
• Parties: Elmer C. HUTCHINS v. STATE of Maine et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 706

265 A.2d 706

Elmer C. HUTCHINS v. STATE of Maine et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

May 28, 1970.

Gaston M. Dumais, Lewiston, for plaintiff.

Garth K. Chandler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for defendant.

Before WILLIAMSON, C.J., and WEBBER, MARDEN, WEATHERBEE and POMEROY, JJ.

POMEROY, Justice.

Upon his arraignment on two indictments, one alleging assault on a Mr. Frank Rollins and the other alleging an assault on Mrs. Rollins, the Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to both indictments in the Superior Court of Franklin County on March 25, 1965.

Following the entry of the guilty pleas, the Court heard witnesses concerning circumstances surrounding the commission of the offenses which occasioned the indictments. The Court then found both assaults were of a high and aggravated nature. The Petitioner was thereupon sentenced to serve not less than 2 1/2 nor more than 5 years in each case, the sentences to run consecutively.

On February 9, 1966, a post-conviction petition for habeas corpus was filed, seeking to attack the judgments entered April 1, 1965. This petition was denied after hearing. No appeal from such denial was ever perfected.

On July 8, 1968, a second post-conviction habeas corpus petition was filed.

On July 30, 1968, the State filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition, alleging as grounds therefor that the petition raised no new grounds for relief which were not adjudicated in the prior proceedings and which could not have been raised in the prior proceedings.

The State's Motion to Dismiss was granted. This appeal seasonably followed the granting of such Motion.

The Petitioner designed as the Contents of the Record on Appeal: (1) All pleadings in the case; (2) a copy of the proceedings in Franklin County Superior Court, March 25, 1965, and April 1, 1965, and (3) the indictments in Cases # 1116 and # 1117, Franklin County.

At oral argument counsel agreed the record should be supplemented by adding thereto the Petition for Habeas Corpus of February 9, 1966, together with the Opinion and Order thereon, dated June 23, 1966. The Single Justice from whom this appeal was taken was informed of the proposed supplemental record and has assented thereto. ¹

The petition with which we are here concerned complains that the Petitioner was not informed of his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney following his arrest.

Complaint is also made that the statute under which Petitioner was convicted is unconstitutional because it left to the Court the determination of whether or not the assault was of a high and aggravated nature, and that at the time of the entry of the guilty plea the Court failed to make inquiry to satisfy himself that the defendant, in fact, committed the crime charged. Finally, the Petitioner says his attorney was incompetent.

The Presiding Justice, in granting the State's Motion to Dismiss the Petition, observed:

"In the posture in which I find this case, the present petition raises no single issue of law which is new. No single issue of fact is properly raised. All Petitioner's present grievances were adjudicated against him in Hutchins v. State of Maine, Franklin County Superior Court, Civil Docket No. 1781, in said Court."

The only allegation now made which was not included in the prior petition is alleged incompetence of counsel. No recitation of facts supporting this allegation is any place found in the petition. All that is said is that the Petitioner has now become learned in the criminal law, having studied while in State's prison and now realizes his counsel was incompetent.

By its terms 14 M.R.S.A. § 5507 requires that all grounds for relief claimed by the Petitioner under the remedy of habeas corpus must be raised in his original or amended petition and any grounds not so raised are waived unless the State or Federal Constitution otherwise requires or unless the Court, considering a subsequent petition, finds grounds asserted therein which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition.

In his petition of February 9, 1966, his principal complaint was that when he was arrested the Sheriff:

" * * * never advised him of his right to a lawyer, never told him that he didn't have to say anything if he didn't want to, and never told him that if he did say anything that it could be used against him in a Court of Law."

In his memorandum filed with the Court after the hearing on the petition of February 9, 1966, he alleged:

" * * * he was coerced and threatened by deputy sheriffs to compel him to talk or confess but that he said and told them nothing. By this treatment he was put in fear and later plead guilty when he would not have otherwise done so."

Of this allegation, the then Presiding Justice in his Opinion of June 23, 1966, said:

"First, his post-conviction petition, even though it did allege specific threats by the officers shortly after his arrest and prior to his indictment and subsequent court arraignment, did not raise any such coercive effect on his guilty plea. This is the first time that any such suggestion is made that the alleged threats induced him to enter a plea of guilty to the charge. His original complaint was grounded on the theory that it was error as a matter of law for the officers not to advise him of his rights to counsel and to keep silent and that such violation of his constitutional rights 'ipso facto' voided all subsequent proceedings.

"Secondly, at no time did Hutchins claim, prior to the filing of this letter brief, that he notified his counsel of such inducement, fear or coercion as he now puts forward. The records are silent as to any such suggestion on his part to the presiding Justice at his arraignment or during the hearing on determination of the seriousness of the offense, nor were any appeal proceedings taken to correct what the petitioner knew then if his present allegations are true. Present at the hearing upon the within petition, Hutchins did not offer any evidence whatsoever regarding the matter. To this day, such alleged inducement lies solely within his unsupported self serving assertion that such is so."

We have carefully reviewed the entire record of the proceedings at the time of arraignment and at the time of sentencing. We find from the record the Petitioner was represented by counsel whom he had chosen and in whom at that time he expressed great confidence. The then Presiding Justice, with commendable concern for the rights of Petitioner, repeatedly explained the defendant's rights to him in the presence of his counsel.

After the guilty plea was entered to each of the two indictments, hearing was had on the question as to the gravity of the assaults. This was in accordance with the practice then in effect. See: State v. McKrackern, 141 Me. 194, 41 A.2d 817; State v. Bey, 161 Me. 23, 206 A.2d 413.

Both victims testified at length concerning all the details of the assault. The Petitioner himself took the stand and described in great detail...