Hutchinson v. Stone
Citation | 84 So. 151,79 Fla. 157 |
Parties | HUTCHINSON et ux. v. STONE. |
Decision Date | 25 February 1920 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Rehearing Denied April 13, 1920.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; F. M. Robles, Judge.
Suit by K. Stone against C.J. Hutchinson and wife. Decree for complainant, and defendants appeal. Reversed.
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
Syllabus by the Court
Upon the death of 'the holder of a homestead,' the homestead 'inures' to the widow, as widow, if there be one, and to the 'heirs' of the owner.
A wife has a dower interest in her husband's homestead real estate.
Exempt property is for the benefit of the 'heirs' as well as the 'widow' of the owner.
If a 'deed or mortgage' 'alienating' the homestead is not 'duly executed * * * by husband and wife, if such relation exists,' the deed or mortgage is ineffectual to convey or to encumber the homestead property.
On the mortgage or conveyance of homestead real estate, none of the requirements of the Constitution or the statute may be waived by the husband and wife or by either of them.
It is the wife's acknowledgment before a proper officer separate and apart from her husband, that she executed an instrument conveying real estate freely and voluntarily without compulsion, constraint, apprehension, or fear of or from her husband, and not merely the wife's signature to the instrument, that makes it effective as to her.
The 'heirs' of the homestead owner, as well as the owner and his wife if he has one, have an interest in the homestead real estate that can be 'alienated' only as provided in the Constitution.
If the requirements of the Constitution and statutes are not complied with in 'alienating' homestead real estate the attempt is a nullity as to the 'heirs' of the homestead owner and also as to the husband and wife.
A deed or mortgage, to be 'duly executed * * * by husband and wife,' must be executed as required by the statutes, that is, signed, sealed, and delivered by each of them, attested by two witnesses as to each signature, and as to the wife, a statutory 'acknowledgment' is a part of the due execution of a deed or mortgage.
Under the statute the acknowledgment by a married woman of the execution of a deed of conveyance to be effective as a conveyance must be 'before some officer authorized to take acknowledgments of deeds, separately and apart from her husband, that she executed the same freely and voluntarily and without compulsion, constraint, apprehension or fear of or from her husband, and the officer's certificate shall set forth all the foregoing requirements.'
The 'acknowledgment' of a married woman in executing a deed or mortgage of real estate must be 'before' a proper officer, which means to him and in his presence, and it must be made 'separately and apart from her husband.'
The 'acknowledgment' of a married woman must in legal effect be a statement made by her to the officer in his presence 'that she executed' the deed or mortgage 'freely and voluntarily, and without compulsion constraint, apprehension, or fear of or from her husband.' And the officer's certificate must state in substance and legal effect that all the foregoing requirements were complied with.
A 'mortgage duly executed * * * by husband and wife,' sufficient to create a lien upon homestead real estate of the husband, as between the mortgagors and mortgagee must be duly executed by the husband and wife and the execution by the wife duly acknowledged by her, since under the statute due acknowledgment by the wife of the execution of the deed or mortgage by her is essential to the validity of any conveyance or relinquishment of an interest in real estate by the wife even as between the parties to the instrument.
The law which authorizes designated officers to take the private examination of the wife was designed as a substitution for the proceedings at common law by fine and recovery, whereby the right of the wife, on the one hand, might be guarded, and a sure, indefeasible, and unquestionable transfer of her right secured, on the other.
The certificate of the officer as to the acknowledgment of the execution of a deed of conveyance or mortgage made before him is a quasi judicial act, and where the person executing the instrument and the instrument are in fact before the officer, and he undertakes to act officially, the certificate of the officer as to the transaction, when made as the law requires, is, in the absence of fraud or duress, conclusive as to the facts stated in the official certificate. When fraud is alleged, proof of it must be of the clearest, strongest, and most convincing character.
Unless the married woman who makes an acknowledgment that she executed a deed or mortgage appears in person before the officer, he has no authority under the statute to take her acknowledgment.
An acknowledgment that she executed a conveyance, made to an officer over a telephone wire by the married woman, who is not present with the officer, is not an acknowledgment 'before' the officer, as is expressly required by the statute.
The Constitution provides that homestead real estate may be alienated only by deed or mortgage duly executed by husband and wife when that relation exists with the owner of a homestead, and such requirements are exclusive and mandatory. A failure to comply with controlling organic provisions is fatal to a deed or mortgage attempting to alienate homestead real estate.
COUNSEL Shackleford & Shackleford, of Tampa, for appellants.
W. C. Bigger and Hilton S. Hampton, both of Tampa, for appellee.
K. Stone brought a suit to enforce a mortgage lien upon real estate alleged to have been executed by Hutchinson and his wife. By answer the defendant Harriet M. Hutchinson----
'admits that she signed the mortgage deed referred to in said paragraph, but alleges that she was tricked into doing so, and denies that she ever acknowledged same; that she and Currie J. Hutchinson, named as defendants herein, are husband and wife, and have occupied that relation to each other for some years prior to the 17th day of March, A. D. 1916, the date on which the mortgage sought to be foreclosed in this proceeding was signed, and that she and her said husband, Currie J. Hutchinson, are citizens of the state of Florida, and that the property upon which the mortgage lien is claimed and sought to be enforced by the bill in this proceeding constituted, on or before the said 17th day of March, A. D. 1916, and has ever since constituted, the homestead of herself and her family, consisting of this defendant and her said husband, and their two minor children, upon which they then, and have ever since, actually resided as their home and have not resided anywhere else during that period, said premises embracing less than one-half acre in the incorporated limits of the city of Tampa, Fla., and were then, and are now, used exclusively as the homestead of this defendant, her husband and said family;' that
Testimony was taken and a final decree rendered for the complainant. The defendant mortgagors appealed.
The testimony shows that the property is the homestead of the defendant mortgagors, and that the acknowledgment of the execution of the mortgage by the wife was taken over a telephone; the wife and the notary who took the acknowledgment not being at the same place in the city.
The Constitution of the state contains the following provisions:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Oates
...by the mortgagors, but which mortgage is valid on its face. See First National Bank v. Ashmead, 33 Fla. 416, 14 So. 886; Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla. 157, 84 So. 151; McEwen v. Schenck, 108 Fla. 119, 146 So. Flowers v. Schenck, 110 Fla. 256, 148 So. 581. In Cobb v. Bear, 57 Fla. 370, 49 So.......
-
Van Eepoel Real Estate Co. v. Sarasota Milk Co.
... ... most convincing character. Bank of Jennings v ... Jennings, 71 Fla. 145, 71 So. 31; Hutchinson v ... Stone, 79 Fla. 157, 85 So. 151; Green v. First ... National Bank, 85 Fla. 51, 95 So. 231; Hall v ... Forman, 94 Fla. 682, 114 So ... ...
-
In re Eskay
...3 Cir., 204 F. 240, 243; State v. Murnane, 172 Minn. 401, 215 N.W. 863, 864; Jones v. Jones, 5 Mees. & W. 523, 526; Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla. 157, 84 So. 151. ...
-
Smith v. Mcewen
...Adm'rs, 18 Fla. 103; Shear v. Robinson, 18 Fla. 379; Rausch v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 77 Fla. 846, 82 So. 295; Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla. 157, 84 So. 151; Bank of Jennings v. Jennings, 71 Fla. 145, 71 31; Green v. First Nat. Bank, 85 Fla. 51, 95 So. 231. Compare Albany County Sav.......
-
Alternative Depositions: Practice and Procedure
...Depositions" (1986). 4. C.R.C.P. Rule 28. 5. Moore, Federal Practice,§ 30.57(15) at 30-126, note 5; see also, Hutchinson v. Stone, 84 So. 151 (1920). 6. See generally, Dombroff, supra, note 3, Chapter 11, "Telephone Deposition: A Cost Saving Discovery Technique." 7. C.R.C.P. Rules 37(b)(2) ......